

## MYSTERY STUDIES AND ANALOGICAL THINKING

THE INTERLACE BETWEEN INOUE ENRYŌ AND MINAKATA KUMAGUSU

KŌDA Retsu 甲田烈

### 1. Introduction: Analogical Thinking and Yokai

Ken WILBER (1949–), the theoretical leader of early period transpersonal psychology, said in *The Spectrum of Consciousness* that there are two patterns of the human intellect: linear / theoretical and imaginative. He argued that these are employed to express reality—the ultimate concern of all religions—through analogical, negative, and / or injunctive methods. These three methods each show what does and what does not resemble reality, as well as what humans can do in order to know reality. For example, when reality is expressed analogically as an eternal being or oneness, this shows that it is neither eternal in the sense of being an extension of linear time, nor singular in a numerical sense. On the other hand, when reality is expressed negatively as "neither this nor that," this shows that it transcends the limits of the intellect. ("Injunction" refers to the concrete method used to awaken people to reality.)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>0</sup> KŌDA Retsu 甲田烈, Visiting Scholar, Inoue Enryō Research Center, Toyo University. Translated by Dylan Luers TODA.

<sup>1</sup> See Ken WILBER. *The Spectrum of Consciousness*, in *The Collected Works of Ken Wilber*, vol. 1

Some readers might find it strange that I have presented methods for expressing reality (religion's ultimate concern) in the context of research on *yōkai* 妖怪 (i.e., "mysteries" in its broadest sense). Recently, I have reformulated Inoue Enryō's *yōkai* studies (or, Mystery Studies) as a methodological pluralism, and from this perspective redefined *yōkai* as the "edge of the cosmos."<sup>2</sup> In this context "edge" refers to the border of the common sense knowledge of those who transmit *yōkai* and as well as those who research *yōkai*. It refers to abstract and concrete phenomena that continually threaten existing concepts about the world. However, it is clear that in current research on *yōkai* culture, "personification" is held to be the most important concept for deciphering *yōkai*.<sup>3</sup> For example, in his research comparing various printings of the "Demons' Night Procession Picture Scroll" 「百鬼夜行絵巻」, KOMATSU Kazuhiko 小松和彦 divides the *yōkai* that appear therein into three categories based on their odd looks (1. animals / plants / fish / shellfish, 2. everyday supplies, 3. demons), and states, "I think that the narrative and pictorial art technique of 'personification' is very important when thinking about *yōkai*."<sup>4</sup> For example, if one adds heads, legs, and arms to fish and shellfish then they will look like humans, and if one makes animals like frogs and rabbits stand upright, they will as well. *Yōkai* are also physical things that have been transformed: one finds everyday supplies that resemble wild animals or demons due to the hands, legs, nails, and tusks that have been added to them.<sup>5</sup> These concrete images bring to mind the *yōkai* depicted in anime, games, and young adult novels. They will help us in our understanding contemporary representations of *yōkai* as characters.

More abstract than personification, *yōkai* can be understood as "analogies": they are attempts to understand the unknown through the known. Then, what is the relationship between this and the borders of the world's concepts? If *yōkai* are the products of analogical thinking, this means that they are imagined. Thus our task would be to understand via comparison that which at first glance appears to be incomprehensible in light of existing knowledge. When doing so, their unknown nature is lost, and one arrives at the conclusion that certain *yōkai* are modeled on certain known things or are mistaken understandings of them. At first glance this appears to contradict my defini-

(Boston and London: Shambhala, 1999), 88–92.

2 See KōDA Retsu 甲田烈. 「世界の際としての「妖怪」 ['Yōkai' as the edge of the cosmos]. *International Inoue Enryō Research* 4 (2016): 156–173.

3 For a detailed work in the field of *yōkai* research on personification, see ITŌ Shingo 伊藤慎吾, ed. 『妖怪・憑依・擬人化の文化史』 [A cultural history of *yōkai*, possession, and personification] (Tokyo: 笠間書院, 2016).

4 KOMATSU Kazuhiko 小松和彦. 『百鬼夜行絵巻の謎』 [The mystery of the 'Demon's night procession' picture scroll] (Tokyo: 集英社, 2008), 193–194.

5 KOMATSU 小松. 『百鬼夜行絵巻の謎』 (see note 4), 165–216.

tion of *yōkai* as the edge of the world's concepts. Also, if *yōkai* are actually completely unknown phenomena, this would mean that there is no way to arrive at an understanding of them in the first place.

The aim of this study is to, with the above-described current state of *yōkai* research in mind, concretely elucidate the formation process of *yōkai* in terms of analogical thinking. To do so, I will refer to the thought of INOUE Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919) and MINAKATA Kumagusu 南方熊楠 (1867–1941). While I have already published a comparative philosophy-based analysis of their academic methods,<sup>6</sup> this paper does not adopt such an approach. I have chosen to use their thought because they both were deeply interested in *yōkai*, and, as I will describe below, had deep insight into human errors related to analogical thinking.

First, let us discuss analogical thinking in a little more detail. In the philosophy of science, analogical thinking is understood to be "reasoning that is not valid logically but useful."<sup>7</sup> For example, gravity is a force that appears to act from a distance, and its strength is inversely proportional to the square of the distance over which it works. Since electromagnetic force also appears to act from a distance, we might infer that due to this resemblance with gravity it also is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the two bodies upon which it acts. Here, analogical thinking is at work. In recent years in the field of cognitive science, it is becoming clear that analogy is not simply one important activity of thought but the basis of thought itself. Induction and deduction (kinds of reasoning in the field of logic) do not depend on the situation or content to which they are applied. However, in actual daily life, humans acquire new knowledge, accumulate it as existing knowledge, and refine it. Thus, the premises used in induction and deduction are incomplete and uncertain. Humans make correct judgments in certain situations and incorrect ones in other situations because their thought is context-dependent. Analogy is a mechanism that tries to apply to current situations similar experiences from the past. It makes flexible thinking possible even when one's knowledge is inadequate.<sup>8</sup> This is a process comprised of a (1) target expression (understanding a given target), (2) base search (searching for a related base in long-term

6 KŌDA Retsu. 「「不思議」の相含構造：井上円了と南方熊楠をめぐって」 [The mutual inclusive structure of the mystery in the thoughts of Inoue Enryo and Minakata Kumagusu], *International Inoue Enryo Research* 3 (2015): 64–81.

7 MORITA Kunihisa 森田邦久. 『理系人に役立つ科学哲学』 [Philosophy of science useful for science people] (Kyoto: 化学同人, 2010), 22.

8 See NISHIBE Makoto 西部忠. 「進化経済学の概念的・方法的基礎：メタファー・アナロジー・シミュレーション」 [The concepts and methods of evolutionary economics: Metaphor, analogy, and simulation], *Economic Studies* 『経済学研究』 50.1 (2000): 75–78.

memory), (3) mapping, (4) rationalization (judging whether this mapping is appropriate, evaluating multiple mappings), and (5) learning (preserving the results of this analogical thinking in long term memory). Analogy also has various constraints: (1) the direct resemblance of its included elements, (2) the structural similarity of the base domain (the domain which with one is familiar) and the target domain (the domain that one is trying to understand), and (3) its investigation of the target domain being dictated by its aim of understanding. Thus, it is thought to lay the theoretical foundation for research based on leaps in thought (or, as SAIJŌ Takeo puts it, "this structure can probably be applied to that phenomenon"<sup>9</sup>). In other words, analogical thinking is one kind of creative action. Wilber points out that analogical thinking does not simply map any old unknown event or phenomenon; instead creativity is at work. This can be seen from the above research on analogical thinking.

## 2. Yokai and Truth: Inoue Enryō's Theory of Analogy

### A. "Analogy" in *Record on the Path of Philosophy*

Incidentally, what was INOUE Enryō's understanding of analogy, and what influence did it have on his interpretation of *yōkai*? There is almost no research on this topic. Morikawa has investigated in detail instances of "analogy" 比喻 in Enryō's works from around the time he founded the Philosophy Academy 哲学館 and from after his retirement. While he notes that they can be used to pinpoint Enryō's "surface intent and actual intent,"<sup>10</sup> this is not an analysis of Enryō's understanding of analogy. Thus, in this section I will make clear Enryō's philosophical understanding of analogy and, while doing so, discuss this understanding's relationship with his *yōkai* studies. To do so, his early period (1887) publication *Record on the Path of Philosophy* 『哲学道中記』 will serve as a useful guide.<sup>11</sup>

9 SAIJŌ Takeo 西條剛央. 『構造主義とは何か：次世代人間科学の原理』 [What is structuralism? The principles of next-generation human sciences] (Kyoto: 北大路書房, 2005), 164–166.

10 MORIKAWA Takitarō 森川滝太郎. 「井上円了に見る比喻の用法」 [Inoue Enryō's usage of analogies], *Annual Report of the Inoue Enryō Center* 9 (2000): 64–65.

11 INOUE Enryō 井上円了. 『哲学道中記』 [Record on the path of philosophy] (Tokyo: 哲学書院, 1887). The text is not included in the 『井上円了選集』 [Inoue Enryō selected writings]. Old-style *kanji* and *kana* usage in Japanese given for quotations from *Record on the Path of Philosophy* has been changed to contemporary *kanji* and *kana* usage.

Enryō begins this text by relating how, after having passed through Utsunomiya 宇都宮 on his way back to Tokyo from Shiobara Hot Springs 塩原温泉, he was listening to the conversations of people on the train. Farmers were looking at the view outside of the window and talking about the timing of millet and rice planting. Merchants were discussing the differences in price from Tokyo of silk cocoons, rice, and so on. In this way, the interests of people in things they encounter vary according to their professions. He then considers philosophy: "Living things, non-living things, things with traits, and things without traits all have philosophical truth [哲理] within them, and thus if one arrives at their ultimate principles [極理] by researching them, one will discover the so-called truth of philosophy [哲学の真理]"(p. 8). In other words, for philosophers not only specialized knowledge is necessary: they must philosophically consider everyday things. While carpenters are knowledgeable about the structure of houses, that does not mean that they have the same level of knowledge about clothing as a weaver. The opposite is also true. Furthermore, everyday knowledge and academic knowledge also each have their own domains at which they excel as well as at which they are limited. However, in the case of philosophy there is no need to further create such limits. Then Enryō focuses on the field of logic: "the hurdle of the world of philosophy" and "the starting point on the philosophical path" (p. 12). However, he asserts that in order to consider the rules of logic, one must first consider the nature of language:

While the world of logic has various diverse parts, they generally fall into the two areas of the deductive and the inductive. While in essence logic is a field of thought, the assistance of language is needed in order to deal with thought, and thus in order to discuss deduction, first I must explain the nature and use of language. In the usage of language there is what the field of logic calls 'ambiguity' [汎意]: polysemous characters and words that have an unclear meaning. I am first going to discuss ambiguity because logic is lost due to it particularly frequently. (pp. 12–13)

According to Enryō, logical ways of thinking such as deduction and induction are based on language, and logic is an academic field that deals with thought. If this is the case, he says, first we must consider the nature of this language that is used to express thought, and when doing so avoid logical ambiguity as much as possible. Therefore, we need to first consider the ambiguity of language. Just from this passage, we can see that *Record on the Path of Philosophy* is part of a grand framework, and we should keep in mind that therein Enryō does not use terms or concepts from logic but rather seeks to begin his analysis using everyday, familiar examples.

According to Enryō, generally speaking there are three types of ambiguity: that which is due to (1) words' sounds, (2) Chinese characters, and (3) association (p. 18). Let us briefly look at each of these. Ambiguity due to (1) words' sounds arises when words with different meanings having the same pronunciation (homonyms like "pole" as in "fireman's pole" and "pole" as in "North Pole" and "South Pole") (p. 18).<sup>12</sup> If one misunderstands which word is being used, unusual events could occur. One might go fetch a violin "bow" for a hunter, or head to the local river when told to meet someone at the "bank" (p. 21). We should note that Enryō touches on the issue of superstition in this context. For example, in Japan the ages nineteen and forty-nine are considered unlucky because in Japanese the former is pronounced the same as "great hardship" (*jūku* 重苦) and the latter the same as "continuous hardship" (*shijūku* 始終苦). Or, people burn chrysanthemum (*kiku* 菊) and eggplant (*nasu* 茄子) stems on New Year's Eve so that one will hear (*kiku* 聞く) and do (*nasu* なす) good things. Similarly, at a wedding one does not say that guests "go home" but that they "open" (開く) in order to avoid bad luck (pp. 50–51).

Ambiguity also arises due to the (2) polysemy of Chinese characters in Japanese. This might be due to a single character that has a different meaning in different compounds (e.g., 樂 means "music" in the compound for "music" 音樂 and "pleasure" in the compound for "enjoyment" 歡樂; or, 惡 means "evil" in the compound for "good and evil" 善惡 and "dislike" in the compound for "like and dislike" 好惡), or pairings of characters that act as abbreviations (e.g., the two characters 文武 could refer either to King Wén 文王 and King Wǔ 武王 of the Zhōu 周 dynasty, or the "literary arts" 文道 and "martial arts" 武道) (pp. 78-79). We should note that the examples Enryō presents here were familiar to people at the time; in *Record on the Path of Philosophy* Enryō avoids the kind of conceptual interpretations that one finds in his other works. This proves just how sharp Enryō's observation of the everyday world was. Then, what is the relationship between analogy and ambiguity? Enryō thought that analogy is a kind of ambiguity arising from (3) associating.

This third kind of ambiguity is related to both words' sounds and characters' polysemy, and divides into two types: ambiguity that arises from 'proximate associations' [付近連想] and ambiguity that arises from 'similar associations' [類同連想]. Proximate association refers to connecting in thought things that are proximate to each other. For example, farmers and fields are always seen to-

<sup>12</sup> Translator's note: In some instances in this section, examples from the English language have been used instead of the ones presented by Enryō.

gether, and thus when one thinks of a farmer, a field comes to mind. Or, since alarms and fires occur at the same time, when one hears an alarm, one thinks of a fire. This is based on connecting the thought of a farmer and the thought of a field, and called proximate association. However, in the case of similar association, things do not need to be proximate in this way. Similar association is the functioning of thought that goes to something else due to its similar nature. For example, it is the likes of seeing a flower and thinking of a beautiful person, or seeing falling leaves and feeling the impermanence of life. Due to a flower and beautiful person similarly having a beautiful nature, seeing one, one thinks of the other. Since a falling tree leaf and a person dying are similar in content, one sees one and thinks of the other. (p. 97)

According to Enryō, ambiguity that arises from association comes from both the pronunciation of words and the polysemy of characters. This ambiguity divides into two types: proximate association and similar association. The former refers to mental connections based on one's experience of them as always being near each other (e.g., thinking of a field when one hears of a farmer). The latter refers to the "functioning of thought that goes to something else due to its similar nature" (e.g., a flower evokes a beautiful person; or, a falling leaf evokes life's impermanence). Analogies are this latter kind of association. Enryō presents examples from his time: someone who is thin is said to have a willowy waist; someone being fast was described as being "like one had put oil on a light;" and something that was difficult to achieve was said to be like "three strands of hair on a bald head." Furthermore, Enryō holds that there are three types of similar association. First, there is similar association based on the similarity of the characteristics of two things: an honest person is called a Buddha, and someone with a cunning personality is referred to as a fox. Second, there is similar association based on the similarity of both the characteristics and the appearance of two things: "the chills" is described in Japanese as a "wind" (*kaze* 風) and table-turning is referred to as *kokkuri* こっくり or "nodding." Third and finally, there is association based on the similar form of two things: Lice are referred to using the name of the thousand-armed Bodhisattva Kannon (Avalokiteśvara) because one must itch everywhere to make them go away; or, based on a beauty standard that holds white, oval faces as ideal, a beautiful person is described as "an eye and nose on an egg" (*tamago ni mehana* 卵に目鼻) (p. 110). Admonitions and popular sayings can also be analogies: "a smooth talker is like a needle wrapped in floss silk," "a frog in a well doesn't know the ocean," "the ground hardens after getting wet from rain" (in other words, good things will come after bad

things happen), and so on. Here one finds many expressions used by people today in Japan on an everyday basis, and it is easy to see how similar association functions in ordinary language use.

While intellectuals and religious thinkers use many analogies in their discussions, Enryō calls for caution: "In the end, while analogies might be beneficial for a discussion, they can make people somewhat misunderstand its central meaning" (pp. 112–113). In this way Enryō sees analogies as a kind of ambiguity that arises from association. While recognizing to an extent their effectiveness, daily conversations aside, he advised against using inappropriate ones in intellectual discussions.

Then, in what kind of cases does ambiguity give rise to errors? Regarding this, Enryō just concludes *Record on the Path of Philosophy* by stating, "The principles by which ambiguity arises and develops is a problem for the philosophy of language" (p. 121). Enryō didn't engage in any focused treatments of the philosophy of language during his life. However, we can find his conception of it in *Lectures on Mystery Studies*.

## B. A Night that Cries Tōtenka: Logic and Analogy in Enryō's Mystery Studies

Lecture six "On Causes" 「原因編」 in the "Outline" 「総論」 of Enryō's *Lectures on Mystery Studies* focuses on the relationship between *yōkai* and human logic. In this lecture, Enryō declares that "*yōkai* refers to errors that arise out of confusion [迷誤]" (16:98),<sup>13</sup> and says, "here I will just explain in terms of logic why *yōkai* arise from errors in inferential judgments" (16:102). According to Enryō, these *yōkai* that arise from "errors in inferential judgments" are "alleged *yōkai* [假怪], not the True *Yōkai* [真怪]," i.e., the True Mystery (16:102). Then, concretely what are these *yōkai*? At the end of the lecture, we find the following interesting episode:

Before the Meiji Restoration, every morning there was a voice within a certain castle that cried out *tōtenka*, *tōtenka*, before the rooster's cry. Maybe the cry of a bird. While the meaning of this word cannot be deciphered, it probably means "this world" [当天下]. If so, maybe it is a *yōkai* bird announcing a great change in this world. There was someone who wanted to know its cause, and they went in the direction from which it was coming, but discovered that it was not in the castle but outside of it. The person went out of the castle and investigated, and found out that the *tōtenka* was a blacksmith who wakes up around 3:00 every morning to work. (16:110)

<sup>13</sup> Below, quotations from *Inoue Enryō Selected Writings* 『井上円了選集』, 25 vols. (Toyo University, 1987–2004) are cited inline in a ([volume]:[page]) format.



Before the Meiji Restoration, people heard the cry *tōtenka*, *tōtenka* before the break of dawn—probably the cry of a bird. While people were unsure of what it was, *tōtenka* also means "this world" 当天下, and they came to think that it was a *yōkai* bird announcing that a great disturbance would soon arise in this world. However, someone looked into the source of the sound, and it became clear that it was not from within the castle but from outside of it: a blacksmith who starts working at 3:00 every morning. Enryō concludes, "many *yōkai* in the world are of this sort" (16:110).

Following *Record on the Path of Philosophy*, we can understand this phenomenon as follows. First there is ambiguity due to that arises from the sound of a word: *tōtenka* sounds like the cry of a bird. The sound of it then leads people to associate it with the similar word 当天下 (this world), and what was at first a sound *similar* to the cry of a bird became *the* cry of a *yōkai* bird. This is a case of a thing X that was supposed to just be similar to thing Y becoming thing Y. An analogy was taken literally. This led to people thinking that a great disturbance was going to occur. It was forgotten that analogies also show what reality is *not* (that X is just similar to Y, not actually Y). The person who sought the cause of this tried to find out not what it was but rather what it was not, and found out that it was the sound of a knife maker.

In *Lectures on Mystery Studies*, Enryō also distinguishes between deductive *yōkai* and inductive *yōkai*. The former arise either through mistaken inference between part and whole (e.g., the view that everything in the universe has a soul because humans have one) or mistaken inference from one part to another (e.g., the view that things can transform into other things in the human realm because this can happen in the heavenly realm) (16:102–103). The latter arise when, for example, people think a comet is a sign of a revolution because there had been one in the sky the night before a revolution, or interpreting a murderer's death from disease as the work of the spirit of the person who had been murdered (16:104). According to Enryō, "changes in things arise from the entangled connections and unions of causes and effects" (16:104). One cannot simply pinpoint results from causes. Based on the relationship between *tōtenka* and 当天下 (this world), it appears that he thinks that this is a case of people making a mistake due to inductive reasoning. Enryō thought that errors in deduction and induction as well as the analogical thinking behind them give rise to many *yōkai*.

However, as already discussed, Enryō did not completely reject analogies, which tend to develop in this kind of unruly fashion. This is because he thought that "generally it is people's nature to be intrigued when they come into contact with the abnormal or the mysterious and try to find out the reason for them" (16:189). The apex of the mysterious is the True Mystery, which is not separate from the alleged *yōkai*. As Enryō

states, the True Mystery is "arrived at if one investigates thoroughly alleged *yōkai*" (16:190). Furthermore, Enryō uses nothing other than an analogy to articulate the True Mystery: "one must perceive the moonlight of the truth that arises at the bottom of one's good heart [良心の水底]" (16:85). Then, what is the difference between analogies filled with errors that give rise to alleged *yōkai* and analogies regarding the True Mystery? The latter are unique in that they point not only to what the True Mystery resembles but also to what it does not resemble as well as to what should be done to know it. The True Mystery is similar to moonlight but not moonlight in the true sense of the word. According to Enryō, to encounter this True Mystery that is similar to moonlight, it is necessary to engage in "seated meditation" 座禪 (*zazen*) and the meditation of "contemplating phenomena" 觀法 (16:238). The True Mystery is different from alleged *yōkai*, which arise either due to associations between similar things (i.e., people seeing X that is similar to Y as actually Y) or due to associations between proximate things. Analogies based on resemblance mean that the objects of comparison are *not* the same. This is closely connected to knowing the True Mystery: if one sees X that has been likened to Y as actually Y, the path to knowing the unknown is closed off. For Enryō, the *yōkai* that people normally believe in are not the real *yōkai*; the latter gives rise to the former (16:84). From the perspective of the unknown True Mystery, Enryō was able to elucidate various *yōkai* phenomenon. Was this not his explanation of the "principles by which ambiguity arises and develops" that he did not cover in *Record on the Path of Philosophy*?

### 3. Minakata Kumagusu's Logic of Analogy: "Footprints of Gods, &c."

Incidentally, MINAKATA Kumagusu also focused on analogy's functions from his perspective as a folklorist and natural historian. In a letter to his friend TOKI Hōryū 土宣法龍, he wrote, "The wisdom of humans is inferior in its detail; it cannot see things like the identity of truth, the mark of truth, and so on. It cannot even imagine them. Therefore, the reasoning and ideas of the world and humans all rely on analogy."<sup>14</sup> He created a diagram of this (cf. Figure below). Kumagusu points to people inferring that there is an order to heaven and earth because the four seasons progress sequentially, or people comparing cautious individuals to strong, firm seashells. He also points out that the refractive indexes of light beams from things that include carbon are larger than

<sup>14</sup> MINAKATA Kumagusu 南方熊楠. 『南方熊楠全集』 [Complete works of Minakata Kumagusu] (Tokyo: 平凡社, 1971), vol. 7, p. 406.

those that do not. Since diamonds also have a high light beam refractive index, Newton reasoned that they include lots of carbon, which was confirmed after his death. According to Kumagusu, "inference by analogy" 影応論理 (right-side) means to know based on the black, thick lines of phenomenon イ and phenomenon ロ that probably the dotted line phenomena イ' and ロ' are similar to them. While in the case of "inference by coincidence" 符合論理 (left side) strictly speaking this doesn't exist. As an example, he notes that even if one hand draws two triangles, the ink's shading will differ to some degree, as will the thickness of their lines, and thus they are different. However, because their shape coincides, they are held to be the same thing (pp. 406–407).



Figure. Graphic representation of analogical thinking in Kumagusu's letter to TOKI Hōryū (August 20, 1908). MINAKATA 南方. 『南方熊楠全集』 (see note 14), 7:407.

This kind of interpretation of analogical thinking is found throughout Kumagusu's writings. However, particularly in Japanese, he does not present any clear conclusions on the topic, and it is hard to trace how he discovered them. In the 1899 article entitled "The Origin of the Swallow-Stone Myth," which he wrote during the time he spent secluded in Nachi 那智 and unsuccessfully submitted on March 13, 1903 to the English-language journal *Nature*, he describes the myth that "swallow-stones," which swallows bring from the ocean to their nests, heal their nestlings' eye disease, and that any person who acquires such a stone will be blessed with children. He also discusses a myth regarding the fossils of crustacean percular bones (called "eye rocks" 眼石) and of spirifer brachiopods (which resemble flying swallows). When placed in acid, the bubbly state that results resembles males and females seeking each other out, and they thus, says

Kumagusu, were mistakenly thought to preside over fertility. This all, in turn, led them to be connected to the swallow-stone myth. As TSURUMI Kazuko 鶴見和子 points out, this article is "research on the source of errors, or a theory of erroneous ideas."<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, regarding discontinuous perception and analogical thinking in myths, NAKAZAWA Shin'ichi 中沢新一 draws from Kumagusu's analysis and argues, "analogy creeps into a fluid cause and effect relationship, shredding the flow of continuous thought, selfishly reversing the direction of logic, and taking a quantum jump to a different level. It repeatedly moves in a way that modern logic cannot at all control."<sup>16</sup>

Since Kumagusu's "The Origin of the Swallow-Stone Myth" was not published during his lifetime, below I would like to briefly consider his piece "Footprints of Gods, &c." which was published in the English-language journal *Notes and Queries* while he was residing in England.<sup>17</sup> Just like "The Origin of the Swallow-Stone Myth," a consistent argument runs throughout it,<sup>18</sup> and it uses as an example the Japanese legend of the giant Daidara Hōshi (or, *daita botchi* as Kumagusu writes).

Kumagusu considers examples of sacred footprints from North America, Central and South America, Europe, Egypt, India, Pacific Islands, Japan, China, and Korea. With regard to Japan, he discusses Benkei 弁慶 (a legendary warrior monk), Daidara Hōshi, and the Buddha's footprints. Regarding them, he states,

Such is a list of the natural objects and formations which very probably drew much curiosity, or even semi-religious awe, from the Japanese, from the early times of their national nascency, on account of a singular resemblance that they bear to feet and foot-impressions of man and animals. Notwithstanding, however, the great majority of their footprint stones, definitely with religious purport, appear to have been created since the introduction of Buddhism in the sixth century A.D.<sup>19</sup>

In other words, things in the natural world and human / animal footprints were seen as resembling each other.

He says that these are cases of people thinking that unique natural forms which appear in the process of rock formation and transformation are in fact footprints, and that such myths transmit to the present "ancestors' thoughts and imaginations" (p. 109).

15 TSURUMI Kazuko 鶴見和子. 『南方熊楠』 [Minakata Kumagusu] (Tokyo: 講談社, 1981), 104.

16 NAKAZAWA Shin'ichi 中沢新一. 『森のパロック』 [Forest baroque] (Tokyo: 講談社, 1992), 173.

17 Published in five installments, the first of which appeared September 22, 1900. Reprinted in MINAKATA 南方. 『南方熊楠全集』 (see note 14), vol. 10.

18 MATSUI Ryūgo 松居竜五. 『南方熊楠：一切智の夢』 [Minakata Kumagusu: The dream of omniscience] (Tokyo: 朝日新聞社, 1991).

19 MINAKATA 南方. 『南方熊楠全集』 (see note 14), vol. 10, pp. 110–111.

People of the past thought that these resembled the footprints of humans and animals based on the view that human and animal bodies exist eternally (that they have "constancy"). Footprints thus came to be seen as second bodies, so to speak, like shadows, mirror reflections, and voices (p. 114). They were used as the basis for measurements and also replaced full-body images in eras in which it was technologically impossible to make them (p. 116). This also gave rise to the custom of worshiping the footprints of great persons (p. 117). Kumagusu concludes his article as follows:

I will say that the regard paid to foot-outlines as records of a pilgrimages or visit took its origin in time quite immemorial, when the footsteps were thought of as mysterious accompaniments of the material existence of men and animals, as their shadow and reflections, which notion, associated with the likeness to the steps man had found in various natural objects and formations, eventually culminated in the fancy that even spiritual beings actually had their tracks.<sup>20</sup>

It appears that Kumagusu's intent in this article was to consider through "footprints" the process by which rocks in nature (matter) and human's imagination (mind) come into contact. His focus was the ability of humans to sense resemblance and likeness, and how this gave rise in a complicated fashion to religious belief in footprints.

While Kumagusu does not explicitly use the term "analogy" in "Footprints of Gods, &c.," the idea that rock formations look like footprints is to say that X resembles Y. In Japan this became linked with the worship of rock "Buddha's footprints" and Daidara Hōshi, and in other countries is connected to the worship of great persons and spirits of the deceased. This same train of thought can be found in Kumagusu's Japanese article "Daidara Hōshi's Footprints" 「ダイダラハウシの足跡」: "Since people's footprints, like their shadows and images, normally do not become separate from the body but stay with it, ignorant people think that people's spirits are in them, as is the case with shadows and images. This shows that they attach various wondrous powers to footprints."<sup>21</sup> The footprints of Daidara Hōshi—a Japanese version of the Bigfoot legend—can, when placed in the context of footprint legends from around the world, be elucidated. Kumagusu saw humans' analogical thinking as comparable to a forest in that it entangles together in complicated ways. As the aforementioned TSURUMI Kazuko points out, it is certainly a theory of error. However, since Kumagusu understands this kind of thinking in humans as something that inevitably arises and as the

20 MINAKATA 南方. 『南方熊楠全集』 (see note 14), vol. 10, pp. 120–121.

21 MINAKATA 南方. 『南方熊楠全集』 (see note 14), vol. 3, p. 12.

source of legends and myths, he does not fully reject it. This is because analogies share with us today ancient people's ways of thinking and imaginative abilities, and contemporary humans even use them in their daily lives.

However, to decide that some depression in a natural rock formation *is* the footprint of Daidara Hōshi (or Benkei, Buddha, etc.) would actually be to cover the tracks of these ancestors' imagination: the depressions *resemble* the footprints of Daidara Hōshi. Daidara Hōshi itself remains unknown. This is because X resembling Y means that X is not Y. If it was just Y, then we would no longer have an analogy, but X would be a "true mark" which Kumagusu thought could not exist in reality. Reading Minakata's "Footprints of Gods" in this way, it appears that it is very similar to Enryō's theory of analogy, and certainly approaches an understanding of the true nature of *yōkai*. In closing, let us look into this point in a little more detail.

#### 4. Conclusion: Yokai and Analogy

Above I have considered INOUE Enryō and MINAKATA Kumagusu's views of analogical thinking and these views' relationship to their interpretations of *yōkai* using the former's *Record on the Path of Philosophy* and *Lectures on Mystery Studies* and the latter's English-language article "Footprints of Gods, &c." Analogy is the basis of human thought, and expressed as "X resembles Y." There is a structural similarity between the base sphere of X and the target sphere of Y, and this similarity is restricted by the aim of analogy (understanding Y). However, at the same time "X resembles Y" also means that "X is not Y." When this resemblance is ignored and X is seen as being the same as Y, analogy ceases to function.

In *Record on the Path of Philosophy*, Enryō warned about ambiguity developing in an out-of-control fashion due to the sounds of words, Chinese characters, and association. He also discussed analogies as a kind of association with the aim to distinguish between fallacious and insightful analogies. Furthermore, in *Lectures on Mystery Studies*, he added deductive errors (based on confusing the whole for the partial and one part for another) and inductive errors (based on confusing cause and effect relationships) as factors giving rise to alleged *yōkai*. Enryō touches upon the process by which the sound *tōtenka* is first heard as a bird's cry and then seen as a *yōkai* bird, pointing out that an error arose due to people thinking that a cry resembling a bird's cry was actually that of a bird. With regard to the True Mystery, he says it resembles moonlight reflected at the base of the mind, and recommended practicing *zazen* to acquire insight

into it. He did so because the True Mystery is similar to moonlight but not moonlight itself. Enryō critically examined *yōkai* that arose from analogies not functioning as such.

The same thing can be pointed out with regard to Kumagusu. In "Footprints of Gods, &c." while analyzing the process by which depressions in rocks around the world are worshiped as the footprints of spirits of the deceased and great people, he made clear that recognizing them as such is based on an "X resembles Y" thought pattern. According to Kumagusu, even contemporary people think in this way, and that this was the source of ancient people's imaginations. However, at the same time Kumagusu did not see natural phenomena as actually the footprints of specific spirits of the deceased or great people. He made clear that natural phenomena were not simply natural phenomena but indispensable mediators in the formation process of folklore, which is based on a chain of associations ("this resembles that").

Thus, the following is clear. First, *yōkai* are analogies. They are correlated with humans thinking that something resembles something else. For example, the *yōkai* depicted in picture scrolls resembling humans' tableware has legs. However, at the same time they are neither a human nor tableware. This is because to resemble something is to not be it. This advances our understanding of *yōkai* because the process of X being likened to Y means that X is unknown, and that Y is only one example of something that is similar to X. Due to these variations, the many *yōkai* that we know today have come into existence. We need to consider this concrete formation process of *yōkai* phenomena while being led by the insights of Enryō and Kumagusu.

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