井上円了英文稿録解

喜多川　豊　宇

井上円了英文稿録解序言

本英文ノートは、円了が東京大学文科哲学科三年生の頃に綴られた読書ノートを中心とした覚書である。このノートには東西の哲学者、宗教家、社会思想家、心理学者等の学説の円了自身によるサマリーが多数綴られ、これに補して、和文で試訳、随想などがいたるところに書きこまれている。併せて、当時の円了の万巻の洋書への取り組みを示すべく、円了洋書目録も添付されている。

この目録に記録された洋書の出版年度などから推量すると、上記学生時代から妖怪論の構想を練り、哲学館の創設を企てる時期までにまたがっている。謂わば、初期円了の洋学思想の道程をトレースする上で不可欠のテクストであり、さらに、円了のライフコースの決定期にこのノートのタイムスパンが完全に一致することから考察して、円了の哲学にあたえた、洋学ベクトルの解析に資するものと思い、解読に着手し、一応の完成をみたものである。

従来、円了の語学力については、充分の敬意がはらわれないどころか、ある著述家が「円了は、語学については、著しく不如意であった。」と記述したぐらいで、適正に円了の西欧理解の水準を示す証左に欠ける傾向があった。然るに、この英文ノートを解読し、詳細にこれを検討した結果、円了の西欧理解とそれへの指向、さらに、その基礎力たる英語力が驚異のレヴェルにあったことが実証され

た。

私は円了研究の諸先達にこの英文ノート解読版を作成配布し、幅広い西欧研究の専門家の手により、円了の西欧吸収の道程解析がさらに一層進展することを祈って、この小冊子を編み、江湖の閲覧に供することとした。

この「稿録」は、ふるぼけた大学ノートであり、井上家所蔵の円了愛蔵コレクションにまじって発見されたものであり、現在、東洋大学の地下書庫に静かに眠っている。かび臭い時の流れに風化した一ページ、一ページに初期円了の骨格標本をみるおもいがする。頭蓋骨、脊髄、四肢にそれぞれ対応するものはなんであろうか。今後無限にこの種の研究が進捗することを念ずる。

例えば、円了の「妖怪論」のモチーフがこの英文ノートに現れている。円了が妖怪や怪奇現象に興味をもちはじめるのは、明治六年頃とされるが、「妖怪論」の認識論、方法論が固まったのは、進化論、経験論、実験心理学、社会学などの実証科学のパラダイムに遭遇してからであることがわかる。コンウエーの「デモノロジー」などをも読んでいるようである。カーペンターなどの実験心理学などは、米国で発行されて半年後位には概に精読している後がみられる。当時、欧米にはスピリチャリズムが大流行したことが知られているが、カーペンターがこれらの怪奇現象を実証科学の立場から批判的に論述するのを、円了は克明にフォローしている。事実、「妖怪論」の引用の出典と円了自筆英文ノートは極めてよく対応していることがわかる。同書中に書かれているテーブルターニングの部分の試訳と思われるものも、ノートにしるされている。出典は、カーペンターの「精神生理学原理」であることがわかる。現存する円了の愛蔵書から同書を捜してみると確かにそれは存在し、件の所には、円了自身によるものとおもわれる、葉書をきって作ったしおりがはさまっており、アンダーラインがひかれている。

この小篇は、二篇のなかの前篇の一部に相当するものである。英文稿録はノー

トの巻頭からと末尾からとそれぞれ二個所から始められているが、今回は、巻頭から始まる部分（本文P. 14～）と、末尾から始まる部分（本文P. 77～）を一気に公刊するものである。

なお、井上円了英文稿録解の編纂にあたっては、福鎌忠恕先生に種々ご示唆いただき、衷心より感謝申し上げるものである。また、社会学部紀要への発表をお勧めいただいたことにも感謝申し上げる次第である。終わりに、稿録のタイプアウトを引き受けてくれた、山本和江氏に心より感謝の意を表するものである。併せて、種々の研究の便宜を図ってくれた、故伯父桑野平太郎のご冥福を祈念するものである。同氏が新潟市にあって円了墨蹟を多数所蔵していたことで、現学長神作光一先生、福鎌忠恕先生、故田中菊次郎先生などが同氏宅を訪問され、これを契機に円了研究が一層進展することになったのである。同氏恵贈の篇額「知命」の甫水書を拝観しつつ筆をおくものである。

井上円了英文稿録略記

(1) 稿録執筆時代の円了

この稿録は1973年１月18日に円了の未整理本の中から稿録に記された明治16年より90年ぶりに発見されたもので、今日から数えて丁度、一世紀前のものである。大学ノートに卓抜な英文が記され、所々に円了の和文の書き込み、コメントが書き添えられている。全体で約400ページあり、ノートの最初からと末尾からの、両端より書き始められている。採録された内容は、円了が学んだ泰西の碩学のエッセンスや、章節のサマリーや筆写、これらに対する円了の和文所感、あわせて、ナンバーが施された、円了の洋学読書リスト等からなりたっている。

ノートの見返しには円了自題として、この時期における円了の洋学への見解が墨痕秀麗に、七言絶句されている。「俗海誰に向かって復(ま)た津(しん)を問はん／満城

の風雨幾昏晨／胸間独り迷雲を払い去り／占め得たり真如月下の春／甫水自ら題す」（注・書き下し文に改め）。この絶句に見られるフレーズは円了の先に示した「仏教活論序論」のコンテクストに全く同律である。円了の津を求めての彷徨（津は真にかけていると考えられる）の終局、ようやく「泰西講ずる哲学」の「津」（港の意味）に到達し得て心窓の迷雲が払われたという感動の極致がこの稿録に墨書されている。

この稿録の記述されたタイム・スパンは如何か？記された明治16年を起年として、いつまでをカバーしているものか。この稿録にノートされた本の中で最も新しいものを調べてみると、ウイリアム・B・カーペンター（M. D.）の1887年ニューヨーク刊行の「精神生理学原理」である。このカーペンターの書は東洋大学図書館の倉庫の中から発見された。これには、数箇所に、円了が自からハガキを破って即座に作ったしおりがさし込まれたままであり、鉛筆で「抜」と引用箇所が所々示されていた。したがって、この稿録は明治16年（円了26才）から明治20年（円了30才）の間に綴られたものと確定できる。この時代は円了東大文科三年から私立学校哲学館の創立にかけての重要な過程に重なりあっている。この間の主な研究著述を挙げると、明治17年、「三学論」、明治18年、「耶蘇教の難目」、「真理金針」、「仏教新論」、「哲学新論」、「破邪新論」、明治19年、「哲学要領」、「哲学道中記」、「哲学一夕話」、明治20年、「仏教活論序論」、「妖怪玄談」、「心理学」、「高等心理学」、「応用心理学」、「心理摘要」等々となる。

これらの著述は円了の思想の骨格をなすものであり、これらの著わされた時と円了英文稿録の時期が完全に一致していることに注目しなければならない。またこの時期は、東大の卒業、「哲学会」の創立、「不思議研究会」の開催、哲学書院の創設、私立学校哲学館の設置願、同認可設立というように、円了のライフ・コースの決定期にあたり英文稿録のタイム・スパンと完全に一致していることに驚かされるにである。

(2) 英文稿録に実証される円了に与えた諸洋学思想

稿録の巻頭から始められた部分には約86項目、末尾から始められた部分には約10項目の哲学・宗教・歴史・倫理学・社会学・実験心理学等々の広汎な分野にまたがった円了の直筆が網羅されている。

これをみるとシュヴェグラーの哲学史の精細なノートを作成し、ターレスからライプニッツに到るまでクロノロジカルに系譜を辿った読書書誌に基づいて勉強していることが判明する。この書誌に列挙された人名は150余にのぼるが以下、簡略ながらここに顕われた諸カレントを洗い出してみよう。リードを代表として18世紀末から19世紀にかけてスコットランドに発達したイギリス啓蒙思想の形態たる常識哲学、18世紀啓蒙哲学の鼻祖たるロック、さらに、これがフランスに波及して展開するフランス啓蒙思想や、ドイツに到って生み出されたカント哲学の研究を精力的に勉強していることがわかる。特にここにおいて注目すべきは、円了の英文稿録、所蔵本リストから考察するに、英語文献がその大部分を占めていることからして、スコットランド学派、イギリス経験論、功利主義の英国のメイン・トレンドの円了に与えた影響は顕著であり、例のミュアヘッドもこの流れの延長上に登場するものといえよう。円了の英語文献への傾斜の例として、カントに関していえば、マックス・ミューラー訳の英語版カントを通して研究したことが、円了の所蔵本から実証される。このように円了はロックからヒューム、スミス、ベンサム、ミル、スペンサーと下って、人間学的倫理学から国家論、経済論、法律論へと発展する過程を克明に追っている。この倫理学に関しては、アレクサンダー・ベインの「感覚・知性論」、アルデンの「倫理学」、アレクサンダーのモラルサイエンス、ジョン・アーバー・クロンビーの道徳感情の哲学、ウィンスローの道徳哲学等を列挙して倫理学に高い関心を示している。同じように、倫理学に関して、ホッブス、カンバーランド、カドワース、クラー

ク、ロバート、バトラー、ハッチンスン、マンドビル、ヒューム、マッキントッシュ、ミル等の所説をこの順にとり扱ってまとめており、この流れの終りにカントに触れている。カントをイギリスの文献にとらえ、倫理の問題でノートしていることは極めて重要なことといえる。

社会学の分野ではスペンサーの記述が最長である。物理、心理、社会、倫理の諸現象について普く進化論的方法を適用し、認識の相対性を主張し、絶対者について不可知論の立場をとったスペンサーからの影響は甚大である。この意味において、この時期の円了は社会学者とも称しうるものがある。他にはウォードを素早く読んでおり、輓近の社会学的メソッドの吸収には鋭敏であった。無論、社会学の祖コントについては言をまたない。

円了の耶蘇批判についての準備もこの時期既になされている。ラボックの哲学の進化論に対する円了の和文メモは興味深い。「理学ハ宗教ノ真理ヲ駁スルニアラズ、其ノ正理ニ反スル点ヲ破スルノミナリ―中略―ヤソ教の真理トナリテ世間ニ行ハルルニ至リシハ理学進達ノ力ニ由ル。」として理学と宗教の関係が相矛盾しないこと、耶蘇教の隆盛はその背後にある理学の振興に因ることをノートし、円了の排耶蘇論の導入モチーフを窺わせている。

心理学の日本の先覚者としての円了の足跡もここに実証される。マウズリーの「精神生理学」に関して、円了は、「心理ハ物理ナリ―中略―心理ハ物理ヲ以ッテ証セリ―中略―心力ハ大ニ物力ト異ナル所ニアルモ其ノ高低・増減毎ニ物力ヲ伴フヲ以ッテ勢力保存ノ理法ノ中ニ入ルベシト云フ。」とコメントしており、実験心理学を迅速に吸収していたことがわかる。円了の「妖怪玄談」や「妖怪学」に出てくる「コックリさん」の問題は、カーペンターの「精神生理学原理」に出てくるテーブル・ターニング、テーブル・トーキングの話がヒントになっていることは間違いない。稿録には、この件についてかなり長い素訳が示されているが、これがそのまま「妖怪学」に引用されている。1850年以降欧米に大

流行したスピリチュアリズムに対する実験心理学的考察が「妖怪学」のモチーフであるといえよう。「妖怪博士」円了の面目は、心理学者円了を前提にしたとき初めて正しく評価できるのである。

このように円了の英文稿録は洋学ソースをトレースしてくれる最良のテキストであり、これにより円了の初期思想解明の研究は一挙に進展することが期待される。

便　覧

1　本解読はすべて原文に忠実に行ってある。従って、明らかにミススペリングと思われるものも、敢えて、そのままにしてある。

2　原文中どうしても判読、解読できないものについては、その部分を線で丸くかこっ該当部分に挿入してある。

3　英文に対する、円了の日本語の書き込み場所は、ほぼ、原文の場所に対応しているが、やむを得ず、多少場所が移っているものもある。

4　巻末「外史評論」は、「稿録」の巻末に書かれていた評論である。

5　本文中の訂正、削除の斜線傍線は原文のまま再現した。

井上円了英文稿録抄九篇

（本「稿録解」は、東洋大学社会学部紀要第23号－３「井上円了英文稿録解」前篇(1)、同第24号－１　同前篇(2) 並びに後篇を合併、加筆したものである。）

稿録表紙

(8)

Habit & Intelligence
by Murphy.

He says: "Life is a process of Assimilation and waste. De Blainville has defined Life as "a double internal motion, general and continuous, of composition and decomposition." A living organism is constantly receiving new

No.1 マーフィーの習慣知識論

Mill's Three Essays of Religion.

Meaning of Nature.

Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them; including not only all that happens, but all that is capable of happening; the unused capabilities of causes being as much a part of the idea of Nature, as those which take effect.

The word Law has distinctly two meanings, in one of which it denotes some definite portion of what is, such as the law of gravitation, or the law of motion, in the other, of what ought to be, such as moral laws or the law of justice. The law in the expression of Law of nature is used in the first meaning - that is, of what is.

1. what is, 2. what ought to be.

No.2 ミルの宗教論



No. 3　中国儒教論



No. 4　中国儒教論（続）



Table-Turning.

Ideas, which have passed out of the conscious memory, sometimes express themselves in involuntary muscular movement.

思ヒ出サレル思想ガ運動トナリテ現ハスコトアリ。

人ノ知ラヌ間ニハ[illegible](table Turning)([illegible]

[illegible]

其ハ時[illegible]アルカラ[illegible] table ヲ

三回[illegible]二回[illegible]

四人ノ大人ト[illegible]二人ノ小供アリタリ依テ[illegible]

[illegible]

一人ハ[illegible]

[illegible] Spiritual agency ヲ[illegible]

No.5　カーペンターの実験心理学　テーブルターニング



Table Turning.

The examples of table talking.

299. [illegible] Spirit 乃至 devil, agency ナスモノナリトイフ

[illegible] 300 ニ examples.

bias, pre-possession.

communication by Spirit

Explanation of table turning.

(1) The continued concentration of attention upon a certain idea gives it a dominant power, not only over the mind, but over the body; and the muscles become the involuntary instruments whereby it is carried into operation.

No.6　テーブルターニングの説明



No. 7　心理ハ物理ヲ以ッテ証セリ



Psychology.

V. 39.	Abercrombie	Intellectual Power of Truth
V. 29.	Alden	Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
V. 37.	Aristotle	Metaphysics.
V. 175.	Bacon	Physical and Metaphysical Works.
V. 40.	Bain	Mental and Moral Science
V. 15.	"	Mind and Body.
V. 34.	"	Science and Intellect.
V. 138.	Boole	Investigation of Laws of Thought.
V. 135.	Brodie	Mind and Matter.
V. 86.	Burton	Anatomy of Melancholy.
V. 35.	Carpenter	Principles of Mental Physiology.
V. 82.	Classical	Studies.
V. 157.	Comte	Lectures on Phrenology.

V. 54.	Darwin	Expressions in Man and Animals.
V. 65.	"	Origin of Species.
V. 57.	"	Descent of Man. 2V.
X. 122.	Fichte	Science of Right.
V. 160.	Friswell	
V. 19.	Fowler	Memory and Intellectual Improvement
V. 14.	"	Self-Culture & Perfection of Character.
V. 77.		Lectures of Metaphysics.
V. 42.	Haben	Mental Philosophy.
V. 31.	Hazard	Freedom of Mind in Willing

No. 8　後篇参照　円了洋書目録　心理学



甫水　自ら題す　七言絶句　ノート見返し
(13)

BOOK I

Spencer's First Principle of Philosophy

Part 1. The Unknowable

Chapter I

Religion and Science

1. Every belief which is held by public minds,however absurd, must have certain reason to be believed; so that we can not deny it directly.

2. Thus, there are two different opinions which are opposed to each other, but which have something in common. In this something each of them contains a truth. Take, for instance, various forms of government. Though they are entirely different, they are same in the fact that they require some subordination either to the ruler or the public. In this point they agree with each other.

3. The greatest of quarrels which have ever occurred, is that between religion and science. This occurs from their seeing the same thing on different sides. So, we make take care in deciding this question without inclining to one side and with equatable justice.

4. Religion and science are same not in forms but in essence.

5. They have equally certain trace of truth.

6. There is something in religion and in science, which must be held by each even in absence of the other; thus something is the point at which they agree.

7. This something is the most abstract truth contained in religion and in science.

8. In the following chapters, we shall examine whether this something really exists taking our conception of the universe, of life and of human nature for consideration.

Chapter IV

The Indestructivity of Matter

By the advancement of chemistry, this truth, scientifically established. But this proposition must tacitly imply the persistance of force. Matter is, in truth, force by which we are affected. It is tested by weight, but weight itself is the manifestation of force, thus it follows from this proposition that force is constant.

(He says in p. 175, "Manifestly, there is a recognition of necessary truths, as such, which accompanies mental evolution. Among with acquirement of more complex faculty and more vivid imagination, there comes a power of perceiving to be necessary truths what were before not recognized as truths at all." By this reason it

seems to me that there is no permanent and unchangeable truth; for the truth which we think as permanent while boy, is not the truth in the adult age, and in the same reason, the truth which is a permanent truth in our present time, will not be the truth in future time.

Remark—(Cap. V, p.55, 2nd sec.)—The second fundamental truth, like the first, is by no means self-evident to primitive men or to the uncultivated among ourselves. Contrariwise, to undeveloped minds the opposite seems self-evident.

Chapter V

The Continuity of Motion

Another general truth may be derived from the continuity of motion. If motion is given to a ball suspended by a string, the ball begins to move in one direction, and reaches the highest point, beyond which it does not go; but in this point, the motion will not cease, if there be no hindrance, and the ball turns and begins to move in the other direction. Thus, the motion, once given, continues, as long as the case may be.

Chapter VI

The persistance of force

There are two kinds of force, by one of which we know the existence of matter, its space-occupancy affecting our senses, that is, intrinsic force, and by the other the action of matter is unformed, that is, extrinsic force. The latter is named by physicists Energy, which is also devided into 2 kinds, actual and potential, or visible and latent. In any kind of force, its persistence may be traced.

But, before we experience the persistence of force, we must have that notion in assumption, without which we can not make experience. Thus, the persistence of force is necessary thought, on which all science stands. Therefore, it is real but unknowable. In this point science and religion agree.

Spencer says in the end of the chapter that "the sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it, is the persistence of force. This being the basis of experience, must be basis of any scientific organization of experiences."

Chapter VII

The Persistence of Relation among Forces

		Particle, or Particles
	Statics	Rigid Body
Dynamics		Fluid (called Hydrostatics)
(Science of Force)		Particle, or Particles
	Kinetics	Rigid Body
		Fluid (called Hydrokinetics)
	Hydrostatics Hydrokinetics	Hydrodynamics (or Pneumatics)

Skepticism

The doctrine that no fact on principle can be certainly known; the tenet that all knowledge is uncertain; universal doubt; the position that no fact or truth, however worthy of confidence can be established on philosophical grounds; critical investigation on inquiry, as opposed to the positive assumption or assertion of certain principles.

Sophism

The doctrine practiced by a sophists, who taught eloquence, philosophy, and politics in ancient Greece, and who, by their fallacious but plausible reasoning, puzzled inquirers after truth, weakened the faith of the people and drew upon themselves general hatred and contempt.

Nihilism

The doctrine that nothing can be known; Skepticism carried to the denial of all knowledge and all reality.

History of Philosophy

Ancient Philosophers (from Schwegler's)

Name	Place	Dates	Age
Thales		640–550, B.C.	
Anaximander			
Anaximenes			
Pythagoras		florished between 540–550 B.C.	
Xenophones	Asia Minor		
Parmenides			
Zeno		born at 500 B.C.	
Heraclitus		flourished about 450 B.C.	

Name	Place	Dates	Age
Empedocles		flourished about 440 B.C.	
Leucippus			
Democritus		born about 460 B.C.	
Anaxagoras		born 500 B.C.	
Protagoras			
Gorgias			
Prodicus			
Hippias			
Socrates		born 469 B.C. died 399 B.C.	70
Antisthenes			
Cynics			
Aristippus			
Eucrid			
Plato		429–347 B.C.	82
Spensippus			
Polemon			
Crates			
Crantor			
Aristotle		385–322 B.C.	63
Zeno		born 340 B.C.	
Cleanthes	Asia Minor		
Chrysippus			
Epicurus		born 342	
Pyrrho			
Aenesidemus			
Agrippa			
Sextus Empiricus			
Plotinus	Egypt		

Modern Philosophers

Descartes	France	born 1596–died 1650	54
Spinoza	Amsterdam	1632–1677	44
Locke	England	1632–1704	
Hume	Edinburgh	1711–1776	
Condillac	French	1715–1780	
Heleutins	Paris	1715–1771	
Voltaire	French	1694–1778	
Diderot	"	1713–1784	
La Mettvie	"	1709–1751	
Leibnitz			

Mencius （孟子）

(From the Chinese Classics by James Legge)

The constitution of man's nature, and a rule of conduct and a law of duty. These questions were largely discussed in the Schools of Greece. A hundred vigorous and acute minds of modern Europe have occupied themselves with them. It will hardly be questioned in England that the palm for clear and just thinking on the subject belongs to Bishop Butler, but it will presently be seen that his views and those of Mencius are, as nearly as possible, identical. There is a difference of nomenclature and a combination of part, in which the advantage is with the Christian prelate. Felicity of illustration and charm of style beong to the Chinese philosopher. The doctrine in both is the same.

Confucius syas, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man be without rprightness and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune. 子曰人之生也直，罔之生也，幸而免

By many writers Mencius doctrine of the goodness of human nature has been represented as entirely antagonistic to Christianity. But as Butler's scheme has been designated the system of Zeno baptized into Christ, that of Mencius, identifying closely with the master of the Porch, is yet more susceptible of a similar transformation.

Let us Mencius' words be compared with the language of Butler in his three famous sermons upon Human Nature. He shows in the first of these:

"First, that there is a natural principle of benevolence in man; secondly, that

the several passions and affections, which are distinct both from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to public good as really as to private; and thridly, that there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish betwoen approve and disapprove their own actions."

此ノ一章ハ孟子ノ人ニ仁義ノ端アル証ト同シト知ルヘシ

Butler says in the conclusion of his first discourse that:

"Men follow their nature to a certain degree but not entirely; their actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to; and they often isolate their nature."

此ノ孟子ノBK. 11pr. 1. 17. 6及ヒBK. VI pr. 1 V1 7 ニアル如ク，仁義ホノ四端ヲ失スルトキハ，自身ヲ賊スルモノト云フニ応ス又，之ヲ妍クトス妍トニヨリテ，人ノ知ル善ナルノ理ニ当ル

第一，人之有是四端猶其有四体也，有是四端而自謂不能者，自賊者他

謂其君不能者賊其君者他

page 65

Mencius was senior to Zeno.

More particularly against Hobbes, denying all moral sentiments and social affections, and making a regard to personal advantages the only motive of human action, it was his business to prove that man's nature is of a very different constitution, comprehending disinterested affections, and above all the supreme element of conscience, which "had it strength as it has right, would govern the world." He proves this.

V. 75 Vo. 2

Conscience, – see Ethic G. 15, V. IV.

Bain's Sense and Intellect about the Classification of Mind

The threefold division of Mind–into Feeling, Intellect, and Will– seems to have been first explicitly made in Germany, in the last century, by certain almost forgotten psychologists who flourished in the interval between Wofl and Kant.

About Conscience, Alden's Text Book of Ethics

What is conscience? It is the mind's power of perceiving the difference between right and wrong. It is simply a power or faculty of the mind.

It is conscience that makes known to us our duty.

What is meant by "Our Moral Nature"? It is our capacity to perceive duty, and to act freely in view of it.

Moral Science by Alexander

All men possess the power of discerning a difference between actions as to their moral quality.

If conscience were not an original faculty, enabling us to form a conception of moral qualities, man could never acquire such an idea by any other means. The opinion, therefore, that moral feelings are merely the effect of instruction and education is erroneous.

The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings
by John Abercrombie

A determination may arise from a sense of duty, or an impression of moral rectitude, apart from every consideration of a personal nature. This is the moral principle or conscience.

The analysis of the principles which constitute the moral feelings indicates the farther division of our inquiry in the following manner:

I. The Desire, – The Affections, – and Self-love
II. The Will
III. The moral principle or conscience
IV. The moral relation of men toward diety

Without arguing respecting the propriety of speaking of a separate power or principle, we simply contend for the fact that there is a mental exercise, by which we feel certain actions to be right and certain others wrong. It is an element or a movement of our moral nature which admits of no analysis, and no explanations; and is referable to no other principle than a simple recognition of the fact, which forces itself upon the conviction of every man who looks into the processes of his own mind.

To act under the influence of conscience is to perform actions, simply because we feel them to be right, and to abstain from others, simply because we feel them to be wrong, without regard to any other impression, or to the consequences of the actions to ourselves or others.

Conscience is the regulating power, which acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among them harmony and order.

The Moral Relation of Man towards the Deity, Part IV, p. 161. (V. 38)

Elements of Moral Philosophy
by Winslow (V. 43)

I. Definition of Conscience. – Conscience, as mentioned in the Bible, and generally understood is not a single primitive faculty. It includes both the power of perception, and a susceptibility to a peculiar feeling.

II.. Functions of Conscience. – 1. Conscience makes us feel that we ought to do what we believe to do right. 2. Its function is to afford us a delightful feeling of self-approval when we have done what we believe to do right. 3. The 3rd function of conscience is to inflict upon us a peculiar painful feeling, when we have done what we believe to be wrong.

Bain's Moral Science (V. 40)

Ethical theory embrases certain questions of pure psychology.

1. The psychological nature of conscience, the moral sense, or by whatever name we designate the faculty of distinguishing right and wrong, together with the motive power to follow the one and eschew the other. The question is, what is its place and origin in the mind. (on one side, Conscience is viewed as a growth or derivation from other recognized properties of the mind, on the other, it is not.

2. Freedom of the Will

3. Our Benevolent action. Is this ultimately modes of self-regard, or a source of purely disinterested conduct?

(a) Hobbes' and Mandeville's Theory. – Our constitution may be such that we are painted by the sight of an object in distress, and give assistance, to relieve ourselves of the pain. This was the view of Hobbes; and it is also admitted by Mandeville as a secondary motive.

(b) It may be held that in performing good actions, we expect and obtain an immediate reward fully equivalent to the sacrifice made. Occasionally we are rewarded in Kind; but the reward most usually forthcoming (according to Mandeville), is praise or flattery, to which the human mind is acutely sensitive.

(c) We may be so formed as to derive enjoyment from the performance of acts of Kindness, in the same immediate way that we are gratified by warmth, flowers, or music; we should be thus moved to benevolence by intrinsic pleasure, and not by extraneous consequences.

Bentham speaks of the pleasures and the pains of Benevolence, meaning that we derive pleasure from causing pleasure to others, and pain from the sight of pain in others.

(d) It may be affirmed that although we have not by nature any purely disinterested impulses, these are generated in us by associations and habits, in a manner similar to the conversion of means into final ends, as in the case of money. This is the view propounded by James Will, and Mackintosh.

It is still maintained in the present work, as by Butler, Hume, Adam Smith and others, that human beings are (although very unequally) endowed with a prompting

to relieve the pains and add to the pleasures of others, irrespective of all sefl-regarding considerations; and that such prompting is not a product of association with self.

Patriotic Self-devotion, Love, Friendship. These are general benevolence.

Supreme end of life. This question has devided the Ethical Schools both ancient and modern.

Ancient－It was the point at issue between the Stoics and the Epiculians. Modern －That Happiness is the highest end has been assumed by Butler and others; the opposite position is held by the supporters of utility.

Duties to

1. God – religious
2. Others – moral or ethics
3. Self

The Moral Faculties on Conscience

In favour of the simple and intuitive character of Moral Sentiment, it is urged:

1. That our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and instantaneous.
2. It is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind.
3. Moral Sentiment is said to be radically different in its nature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind.

In reply to these arguments, the following considerations are urged:

1. The Immediateness of a judgment is no proof of its being innate; long practice or familiarity has the same effects.

我々カ数度手ガケタル事ハ猶予思考ヲ労セズシテ，直チニ判知スル事ヲ得。

2. The alleged similarity of men's moral judgments in all countries and times holds only to a limited degree.

広ク世界古今ノ情況ヲ案スルニ，人種ノ異同ニヨリテ，是非曲直ノ径庭スル事少キニアラズ，一夫数婦ハ今日開化国ニテ禁スルモ野蛮国ニテハ禁セズノ類ナリ

3. Moral right and wrong is not so much a simple, indivisible property, as an extensive code of regulations, which can not even be understood without a certain maturity of the intelligence.

4. Intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions of practical morality.

5. It is practicable to analyze or resolve the moral faculty; and, in so doing, to explain, both its peculiar property, and the similarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men.

(a) Prudence, (b) Sympathy, and (c) The Emotions generally

(a)

(b) The peculiarity of the Moral Sentiment or Conscience is identified with our education under government or Authority.

The characteristic of the Moral Sense is an education under Law, or Authority, through the instrumentality of Punishment.

It is a fact that human beings living in society are placed under discipline, accompanied by punishment. Certain actions are forbidden, and the doers of them are subjected to some painful inflictions; which is increased in severity if they are persisted in. The action that always brings down punishment, would be associated with the pain and the dread of punishment.

人一事ヲ成シテ刑戮或ハ督責ヲ受クル事再三ニ及ブ中ハ思想ノ濆合ニヨリテ其事ヲナサントセバ，忽チ苦痛ヲ感ズルニ至ル。

Association of Pain

Action that have long been connected in the mind with pains and penalties, come to be contemplated with a disinterested repugnance.

縦ヒ人自身ハ生来，他人ノ叱責ニ過ハザルモ其ノ他全ク道徳ノ理ヲ知ラサルニ至ラス　他ナシ自ラ試験セザルモ他人ノ例ヲ見，或ハ public opinion ノ為メニ制セラレテ然ル也

According to Stoics, we are not only all brethren but also the children of one Father or God. 我人ノ精神ハ神ヨリ来ルモノトス

Freedom of Willモ主唱サレタリ (V. 40) page 525, Epicurus

The standard of virtue and vice is referred by Epicurus to pleasure and pain. Freedom from pain is thus made the primary element of happiness.

His theory of virtue is the type of all those that make an enlightened self-interest the basis of right and wrong. Four cardinal virtues are Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice.

Neo-Platonic

In the theory of Emanation, the Primordial One or God emits the Nous wherein the ideas are immanent, the Nous, in turn, sends forth the Soul, and the soul, Matter or nature; the gradation applying to man as well as to the universe. Now, to each of these principles, there is a corresponding subjective state in the inner life of man. The virtue that is founded upon free will and reason answers to the soul. Finally, to the One or Good correspond the state of Love. This peculiar elevation is something far above the highest intellectual contemplation and is not reached by thought.

Scholastic Ethics

With the schoolmen generally, pronounces the highest good to be God. If the

highest good in itself is God, the highest human good is love to God. This is attained by way of virtue, which is a good will consolidated into habit.

In man, there is a lower and a higher faculty of Desire; or, otherwise expressed, these are the various affections that have their roots in sense and centre in self-love or the desire of self-preservation, and there is also a natural love of justice implanted from the beginning.

Self-love rules in man, so long as he is in the natural state of sin; if amid great conflict and by divine help, the higher affection gains the upper hand, the state of true virtue, which is identified with the theoretic state of belief, and also of pure love to God and man, is reached.

Hobbes (1588–1679)

He says: Pity is grief for the calamity of another, arising from the imagination of the like calamity befalling one's self; the best men have, therefore, best pity for calamity arising from great wickedness. 測隠ノ心ハ自分ノ身ノ上ニ均シキ害ノオコルコト想像スルヨリ生ス

He supposes a liberty in man of doing or omitting, according to appetite or aversion.

According to him, in the natural condition Self-interest, of course, is the Standard. He says, "disinterested Sentiment is, in origin, self-regarding, such as pity." 「ホッブス」ハ専ラ自愛説ヲ主唱スルヲステ，他愛ハ其本源，自愛ヨリ起ルト云フ。

Richard Cumberland (1632–1718)

The standard of Moral Good is given in the laws of Nature, which may all be summed up in one great Law,—Benevolence to all rational agents, or the endeavour to the utmost of our power to promote the common good of all.

The Faculty (moral) is the Reason

Conscience is only Reason, or the Knowing faculty in general, as specially concerned about actions in their effect upon happiness; it rarely takes the place of the more general term.

Ralf Cudworth (1617–88)

According to him things are what they are not by Will, but by nature. The Will of God is the supreme efficient cause of all things, but not the formal cause of anything besides itself.

Samuel Clarke (1675–1727)

The standard is a certain Fitness of action between persons. The Faculty is the Reason.

John Locke (1632–1704)

His human object is stated generally as the procuring of Pleasure and the avoiding of pain.

These is no innate moral sentiment; our moral ideas are the generalization of moral actions.

Joseph Butler (1692–1752)

His standard of Right or Wrong is the subjective Faculty called by him Reflection or Conscience. He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to the Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise.

His psychological scheme is the three-fold division of the mind already brougnt out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution.

He has no psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity.

He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others.

With regard to the theory of Happiness, he holds that men can not be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance of conscience. In short, virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world.
今世ニテ罰賞ノ及バザルハ来世ヲ待ッテ知ルベシ

Men are not to persue happiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love, including the good of others and the greatest happiness will ensue to each. This is in fact the Platonic view.

Francis Hutcheson (1694–1747)

He states that the aim of Moral Philosophy is to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest happiness and perfection of men, by the light of human nature and to the exclusion of revelation; thus to indicate the rules of conduct that make up the Law of Nature.

He places the pleasures of sympathy and moral goodness in the highest rank, the passive sensations in the lowest. 是レ他愛ヲ本トシテ，自愛ヲスツルナリ

Bernard De Mandeville (1670–1733)

Morality is not natural to man; it is the invention of wise men who have endeavoured to infuse the belief, that it is best for everybody to prefer the public interest

to their own.
道徳ナルモノ本性ニアラズ，学者ガ工夫シテ，外ヨリ　スルモノナリ
Man won to virtue, not by force, but by flattery.
We are naturally regardless of the effect of our conduct upon others; we have no innate love for our fellows. 余輩，本来，他愛心ヲ有スルニアラズ。 The highest virtue has a satisfaction of its own, the pleasure of contemplating one's own worth.

Pride is of great consequence in Mandeville's system. The moral virtures are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride. Man is naturally innocent, timid and stupid; destitute of strong passions or appetites, he would remain in his primitive barbarism were it not for pride.

David Hume (1711–1776)

The standard of Right and Wrong is Utility, or a reference to the Happiness of Mankind. This is the ground, as well as the motive, or moral approbation.

As to the nature of the moral Faculty, he contends that it is a compound of Reason, and Humane or Generous Sentiment.

He does not introduce the subject of free-will into Morals.

He contends strongly for the existence Disinterested sentiment or Benevolence; but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and uncompensated self-sacrifice.

The inducements to virtue are, in his view, our human sentiments, on the one hand, and our self-love, or prudence, on the other; the two classes of motives conspiring to promote both our own good and the good of Mankind.

Richard Price (1723–1791)

As regards the Moral Standard, he asserts that a perception of the Reason or the understanding,—a sense of fitness or congruity between actions and the agents and all circumstances attending them,—is what determines Right and Wrong. Utility, although not the sole ground of justice, is yet admitted to be one important reason or ground of many of its maxims.

The nature of the Moral Faculty, in Price's theory, is not a separate question but the same question with the Standard.

As regard to the psychology of Disinterested Action, he provides nothing but a repetition of Butler.

Happiness is the end and the only end.

Adam Smith (1723–1790)

The Ethical Standard is the judgment of an impartial spectator or critic; and our own judgments are derived by reference to what this spectator would approve or

disapprove.

In the Psychology of Ethics, Smith would consider the moral faculty as identical with the power of sympathy, which he treats as the foundation of Benevolence. A man is a moral being in proportion as he can enter into, and realize, the feeling, sentiments, and opinions of the others.

He does not discuss Free Will. On the question of disinterested conduct, he gives no clear opinion.

David Hartley (1705–1757)

Hartley denies the existence of any moral instinct or any moral judgments, preceeding upon the eternal relations of things. All moral sentiments are the influence of association. Children are taught what is right and wrong, and thus the associations connected with the idea of praise and blame are transferred to the virtues and the vices.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796)

By an original power of the mind, which we call conscience or the moral faculty, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong. Hamilton remarks that this theory virtually found morality on intelligence.

Conscience

Regarding Conscience, Reid remarks, 1st that like all other powers it comes to maturity by insensible degrees, and may be a subject of culture or education. He takes no note of the difficulty of determining what is primitive and what is acquired.
良心ニハ，本来有スルモノト，教育ニヨリテ生ズルモノアリトス，コレ孟子ト異ナル所ナリ。
Secondly, Conscience is peculiar to man; it is wanting in the brutes.
是レ孟子モ同シキ所ナリ。
Thirdly, it is evidently intended to be the director of our conduct; and fourthly, it is an active power and an Intellectual power combined.

The views of Reid is adopted by Stewart.

Dugald Stewart (1753–1828)

The Standard is internal or intuitive–the judgments of a Faculty, called the Moral faculty.
「ステウアルド」ハ，「リード」ノ如ク，人ニ本来，固有ノ良心アル事ヲ説ク故ニ子モ又孟子ノ派ナリ
He maintains Free Will.

Thomas Brown (1778–1820)

As regards the Standard, Brown contends for an Innate Sentiment or moral sense.
氏モ本来ノ性ヲ説クモノトス

He is opposed to the theory that would trace our disinterested affections to a selfish origin. He makes some attempt to refer to the laws of Association, the taking in of other men's emotions but thinks that there is a reflex process besides.

William Paley (1743–1805)

The Ethical Standard with him is the reference to the Will of the Diety and Utility, or human happiness. He does not discuss Disinterested Sentiment; by implication, he denies it.

V. 40. page 659. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

Utility serves in his judgment for Ethics or Morals. Nature has placed Mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure. He defines Utility in various phrases; the tendency of actions to promote the happiness and to prevent the misery, of the party under consideration, which party is usually the community where one's lot is cast.

There are four sanctions or sources of Pain and Pleasure, by which men are stimulated to act right, – physical, political, moral and religions.

The value of a lot of Pleasure or Pain is measured or determined greater or less according to 1. its intensity, 2. its duration, 3. its certainty or uncertainty, 4. its propinquity or remoteness, 5. its fecundity, 6. its purity, 7. the extent.

The Standard or End of Morality is the Production of Happiness or Utility. Bentham is thus at one in his first principle with Hume and with Paley; his peculiarity is to make it fruitful in numerous applications both to legislation and to morals.

He is the first person to provide a classification of Pleasures and Pains as an indispensable preliminary alike to morals and to legislation.

The disinterested sentiment is not regarded by Bentham as arising from any disposition to pure self-sacrifice. He recognizes Pleasures of Benevolence and Pains of Benevolence; thus constituting a purely interested motive for doing good to others.

As regard Happiness, or the Summum Bonum, he presents his scientific classification of pleasures and pains, without, however, indicating any plan of life, for attaining one and avoiding the other in the best manner.

Sir James Mackintosh (1765–1832)

On the Standard, he pronounces for Utility, with certain modifications and explanations. The Utility is the remote and final justification of all actions accounted right, but not the immediate motive in the mind of the agent.

In the Psychology of Ethics, he regards the Conscience as a derived or generated faculty, the result of a series of association.

人ノ良心ハ，思想ノ連絡ニヨリテ生スルモノトス。

He makes Disinterested Sentiment a secondary or derived feeling—a stage on the road to conscience.

James Mill (1783–1836)

He endeavours to show in his Analysis of the Human Mind that the moral feelings are a complex product or growth, of which the ultimate constituents are our pleasurable and painful sensations.

By the union of two streams of association the idea of our beneficient acts becomes a pleasurable idea; that is, an affection, and, being connected with actions of ours, is also a Motive. Such is the genesis of Beneficient or Disinterested impulses.

Mill considers that the existing moral rules are all based on our estimate, correct or incorrect, of Utility.

John Austin (1790–1859)

Paley and others have proved that it was not the purpose of Revelation to disclose the whole of our duties; the light of Nature is an additional source. But how are we to interpret this Light of Nature? The various hypothesis for resolving this question may be reduced to two: 1. an Innate Sentiment, called a Moral Sense, Common Sense, Practical Reason; and 2. the theory of Utility. The author avows his adherence to the theory of Utility, which he connects with the Divine Benevolence in the manner of Bentham. God designs the happiness of sentiment Beings.

He is thus seen to be one of the most strenuous advocates of Utility as the Standard, and is distinguished for the lucidity of his exposition, and the force of his replies to the objections made against it. He is also the best expounder of the relationship of Morality to Law.

William Whiwell (1794–1866)

Morality has its root in the common nature of Man; a scheme of Morality must conform to the Common Sense of Mankind, in so far as that is consistent with itself. Happiness is not a sufficient end in itself; morality is also in end in itself. Human happiness is not to be conceived or admitted, except as containing a moral element.

James Frederick Ferner (1908–1964)

He says: "some writers—Hutcheson, for example,—are of opinion that man naturally has a conscience or moral sense which discriminates between right and wrong. That man has by nature and from the first, the possibility of attaining to a conscience

is not to be denied. That he has within him by birth right something out of which conscience is developed, I firmly believe.

氏ノ意イテハ，人ハ本来良心ノナルベキ元種ヲ有スルモノトス。

Henry Longqueville Mansel

That the conceptions of right and wrong are sui generis is proved. 1. by the fact that in all languages there are distinct terms for right and agreeable; 2. by the testimony of consciousness; and 3. by the mutual inconsistencies of the antagonists of a moral sense. The intuitive element may be called conscience. The representing element is the understanding. The Standard of right and wrong is the moral nature of God.

氏モ亦良心ナルモノハ天ヨリ人ノ受ケ来ルモノトス

John Stuart Mill

His Ethical Standard is the principle of Utility. We have seen his psychological explanation of the Moral Faculty, as a growth from certain element feelings of the mind. He believes in Disinterested impulses, but traces them to a purely self-regarding origin.

Samuel Bailey

The Standard is the production of Happiness. It is a wider than morality.

Herbert Spencer

His ethical Doctrines from part of the more general doctrine of Evolution.

He says; "My dissent from the doctrine of Utility, as commonly understood, concerns not the object to be reached by men, but the method of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end to be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end. Thus, agreeing with Utilitarians in the belief that happiness is the end, and that the conduct called moral is simply the best means of attaining it, he of course does not assert that there is a morality which is absolute in the sense of being true out of relation to human existence.

To be fully understood, this conception must be taken along with the general Theory of Evolution. Spencer argues that all things whatever are inevitably tending towards equilibrium; and that consequently the progress of mankind cannot cease until there is equilibrium between the human constitution and the conditions of human existence. Or, as he argues in First Principles, the adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence can not cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of human nature and social

organization, such that the individual has no desires but those who may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects. The progressive extension of the liberty of citizens, and the reciprocal remoral of political restrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And the ultimate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those imposed by the like freedom of all, must result from the complete equilibrium between man's desires and the conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions.

The principles of private conduct in physical, intellectual, moral and religions – that follow from the conditions to complete individual life; or those modes of private action which must result from the eventual equilibrium of internal desires and external needs.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

The Standard of morally good action as expressed in the different forms of the categorical Imperative, is the possibility of its being universally extended as a law for all rational beings.

According to him the moral faculty is reason. The apprehension of what is morally right is entirely an affair of Reason.

His position with respect to happiness is peculiar. Happiness is not the end of action; the end of action is rather the self-assertion of the rational faculty over the lower man

Victor Cousin (1792–1867)

The standard is the Judgment of good or eveil in actions. He holds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our judgment, and having a sort of objective existence.

The moral faculties he analysis into four judgments: 1. good and evil; 2. obligation; 3. freedom of the will; and 4 merit and demerit. The moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those judgments and chiefly the feeling connected the idea of merit.

In regard to the Summum Bonum, he considers that virtue must bring happiness here or hereafter, and vice misery.

Theodoe Simon Joffroy (1796–1842)

The Standard is the idea of Absolute Good or Universal order in the sense explained by the author. Like Cousin, he identifies the Good with the true.

The moral faculty is Reason. Conscience is hardly more than a confused feeling

of obligatoriness.

Sympathy is one of the primitive tendencies of our nature.

He upholds the freedom of the Will. The Summum Bonum is the end of every creature.

Remarks

Descartes has only a few allusions to the subject; the Ethics of Spinoza is chiefly a work of speculative philosophy; Leibnitz has no systematic treatment of moral questions. The case is very different in the new German philosophy since the time of Kant,—and he not to any great extent—none of these has influenced the later attempts at ethical speculation amongst ourselves; nor, again with the exception of Kant, are we as yet in a position properly to deal with them.

Definition of History

by Voltaire

History is the recital of facts represented as true. Fable, on the contrary, is the recital of facts represented as fiction.

「ロック」氏ハ人ニ本来固有ノ善心ナキ所以ヲ証セント欲シ，引クニ野蛮人中往ヽ隣人ヲ殺害シテ更ニ愛隣ノ心ヲ生セサルヲ以テス。

幷ニ，従前教育ヲ受ケタル兵卒ヲ以テス，野蛮人中，兵卒中ニハ，都城ヲ襲撃シテ，其民家ヲ劫掠シテ却ッテ名誉トナシ更ニ悔悟ノ情ヲ生セザリシト云フ，然レドモ，ロック氏ハ，人ノ善悪ハ生ニハ生来善悪ノ別ナシ　其之カル，経験ニヨリ生ス

荀子ノ性悪ヲ論ズルガ如シ。

Idea is defined by Voltaire an image painted upon my brain. Are all thought then, images? Certainly; for the most abstract thoughts are only consequences of all the objects that I have perceived. I utter the word 'being', in general, only because I have known particular beings; I utter the word 'infinity', only because I have seen certain limits, and because I push back those limits in my mind to a greater and still greater distance, as far as I am able. I have ideas in my head only because I have images.

「ホルテノア」氏ハ，　　ナルヲ知ルヘシ幸福ハ如何，ホルテノア曰ク，楽ノ諸想ノ集合シテ抽象論，一種ノ理想ヲ構成スベキモノ之ヲ幸福ト云フ。

Habit and Intelligence

by Murphy　　習慣智力論

習慣ナルモノ，之ヲ大ニシテ諸生物ノ動作性質ノ反復，因襲シテ子孫ニ　　テ遺伝スベキ一種ノ性法ニ与フルノ名ニシテ，有識，無識両作用ノ基礎ハナルモノトス故ニ，観念聯合ノ性法モ

此一種ニ属スルモノト云ヘリ。

化学上ノ生活ノ定触

He says: Life is a process of Assimilation and sate. De Blainville has defined Life as "a double internal motion, general and continuous, of composition and decomposition." A living organisms is constantly receiving new substance from without by accretion, and losing substance by excretion or waste. Growth is due to the excess of accretion over waste.

Energy may be defined as that which does work. Equal quantities of energy are those which are capable of doing equal quantities of works.

Difference between Force and Energy

All energy has its origin in force, but force cannot pass into energy unless it is at liberty to act.

General Definition of Life

An organism consists of a mass of peculiar chemical compounds of high complexity, and contains a charge of a peculiar kind of energy. It is constantly transforming both matter and energy, by assimilation, into these peculiar forms, and is at constantly parting with matter and energy, which are transformed into forms which are no longer capable of remaining in the organism. These relations of the organism to matter and energy constitute the differentia of life.

Origin of Life (36 page)

Habbit and Intelligence are not only distinct but contrasted; Habit is conservative and can work only on the lines of the past; Intelligence is progressive, and works with a definite view to the future. In the ascending scale of organic nature, Intelligence first appears at the power of working toward a purpose; while habit can only repeat former actions, either exactly or with purposeless variations.

This contrast between the functions of Habit and of Intelligence would be more evident if we had to deal with them in the sphere of consciousness alone. But Habit is in general regarded as belonging chiefly to the motor system; it is scarcely yet recognized that on the one hand, the perpetuation of organic characters by descent, and their changes by variation, occur under the laws of Habit; and, on the ohter hand, that the Association of Ideas, a law which is fundamental in psychology, is nothing more than habit acting within consciousness. Still less is it recognized that Intelligence is not confined to the sphere of consciousness; that the intelligence which organizes the body is the same that becomes conscious in the mind; and that animal instinct constitutes the transition between the two. To prove these is part of the purpose of this work.

The definition of Habit and its primary law, is that all vital actions tends to repeat themselves; or, if they are not such as can repeat themselves, they tend to become easier on repetition.

When I speak of Intelligence, I mean not only the conscious intelligence of the mind, but also the organizing intelligence which adopts the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing, and every other part of an organism for its work. I maintain that they are not distinct, but are two separate manifestations of the same intelligence, which is coextensive with life.

According to him, Man is a distinct creation.

A Letter from Spencer to Mill

Spencer says: "I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of human race, have been producing modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.

Handbook of the History of Philosophy
by Schwegler

Definition. – Philosophy is reflection, the thinking consideration of things. The various empirical sciences take their matter directly from experience; they find it ready to hand; and as they find it, they accept it. Philosophy, on the contrary, accepts not what is given in experience as it is given, but follows it up into its ultimate grounds, regarding each particular fact only in relation to a final principle, and as a determinate link in the system of knowledge.

Division of Philosophy

Philosophy is divided into two parts: 1. Ancient and 2. Modern. The Ancient philosophy is subdivided into 3 periods: 1. The Pre-Socratic; 2. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and 3. The Post-Aristotelian Philosophy.

1. Pre-Socratic Philosophy

The general tendency of Pre-Socratic Philosophy is this, to find a principle of the explanation of nature. What is the primitive ground of things? What natural element is the basal element? An answer to this question constituted the problem of the earlier Ionic natural philosophers or Hylicists. One suggested water, another air, and a third a chaotic primeval matter. A higher solution of the problem was attempted by the Pythagoreans. As their principle, they adopted numbers, the signs of relations. This advance beyond matter constitutes the nature and the position of the Pythagorean

principle. Heraclitus, then, appeared now with his solution, and asserted for absolute principle the unity of being and non-being, – becoming. To Empedocles matter became the principle of being, fixed and permanent being, while force became the principle of movement.

a. The Earlier Ionic Philosophers

Thales. – At the head of the Ionic Physicists, and at the head of philosophy in general, the ancients place Thales of Miletus, a contemporary of and Ac- cording to him the principle of all things is matter; all comes from matter, and to water all returns. Anaximander. Anaximander of Miletus, a disciple or a contem- porary of Thales, endeavoured still further to develop the principle of the latter. Anaximenes. – Anaximenes, a disciple or a contemporary of Anaximander, returned in some degree to the fundamental views of Thales.

The three Ionic philosophers have thus, and to this entire philosophy reduces itself, (a) sought the universal primitive matter of existence in general; (b) found this in a material substrata; and (c) given some intimations in regard to the derivation from this primitive matter of the fundamental forms of nature.

b. The Phythagoreans

The Ionic Philosophy, as we have seen, developed a tendency to abstract from the immediately given, individual quality of matter, we have the same abstration, but on a higher stage, when attention is turned no longer to the qualitative character of matter, as water, air, , but to its quantitative measure and relations. This is the princi- ple and the position of the Pythagoras. This numerical system is referred to Pythagoras of Samos.

The fundamental thought of the Pythagoras was that of proportion and harmony. Their cosmology regarded the world as a symmetrically arranged whole, that united in harmony within itself all the varieties and contrarities of existence. This idea has for its metaphysical foundation and support the Pythagorian number theory. All forms, and propositions of things are referred at last to number. Numer is therefore necessarily the principle of things themselves. Undoubtedly the Pythagorians held number to be the inherent essence and substance of things. In regard to its operation there arose such combinations as these: One is point, two the line, three the plane, four the solid, five the quality, or the soul is a harmony, and equally so virtue.

The consideration of the body as a prison of the soul, which later, for its part, belonged to loftier regions, their tenet of the transmigration of souls into the bodies of animals, from which only a pure and pious life delivered, their representations of the severe penalties of the other world, their prescript that man should regard himself

as property of God, that he should strive after likeness with God are all capable of being alleged in proof.

古代哲学中第一期ヲ前期索克羅　号ス其期ノ第一期ヲ　　云フ　第二派ヲ古羅記ト云フ，第一派ノ祖ヲ　　ト号ス其主義トスル所，物ノ現象ヲ論究シテ万物ノ諸源ヲ水ノ一体ニ皈ス，其義弟子ニ傳ハリテ愈ゝ明カナリ，然レドモ第一派学者中ニテハ唯，物自身ノ性質ニシテ論ズルノミニテ，其他物トノ関係ヲ論ズルニ至ラズ，然ルニ第二派ニ至リテハ専ラ其関係ヲ論シ，之ヲ帰スルニ数理ニ本ツク総シテ物ノ関係ハ数ニアリトス。

c. The Eleatics

The Eleatics now went a step farther and took for principle a total abstraction from every finite particular, from all change, from all vicissitude of existence. Eleaticism is consequently monism, so far as it endeavours to reduce the manifold; but it falls into dualism so far as it can neither carry out the denial of the phenomenal world of finite existence, nor deduce this world from the presupposed general ground of pure being. This contradition of an unreconciled dualism between pure and phenomenal being is the point where the Eleatic philosophy discloses its own insufficiency. The foundation of the Eleatic school belongs to Senophanes, its systematic development to Parmenides, its completion, and in part its resolution, to Zeno and Melissus.

(1) Xenophones, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, is the originator of the Eleatic tendency. He seems the first to have ennunciated the proposition, 'All is one'. The Eleatic 'One and All' had still with him a theological, or a religious character. The idea of the unity of God, and the polemic against the anthropomorphism of the popular religion, this is his starting point.

(2) Parmenides is the special head of the Eleatic school, a disciple of Xenophones. His philosophy is divided into two parts; in the first part he discusses the notion of being: Being and thought are to him one and the same. But there follows now a second part which occupies itself phypothetically with the explanation and physical derivation of the non-being, that is, of the phenomenal world. Body and sould are therefore considered by Parmenides as one and the same.

(3) Zeno. – The Eleatic Zeno, a disciple of Parmenides developed the doctrine of his master, and carried out the abstraction of the Eleatic one as in contrast to the multiplicity and natural qualitative indeviduality of the finite. He justified the doctrine of the one, sole, simple. If Parmenides maintained that only the one is, Zeno, for his part, polemically showed that there is possible neither multiplicity nor movement, because these notions lead to contradictory consequences. Thus, the many is an aggregate of units, of which it is made up. Zeno is named by Aristotle the originator of

dialectic.

初期哲学界ノ第三派ナル「エリヤチック」学派ハ一歩ヲ進メ諸現象，有形物ヲ論究シテ，之ヲ抽象シ其基礎トナルベキ一原理ヲ信ズルナリ，故ニ其学派ノ祖ナル「ゼノフェタス」氏ハ万法即チ一ナリト定ム。次ニ「パーメニーズ」氏ハ万有ト心想ノ一体ナルヲ推究シテ遂ニ心身，是一ノ論ヲ発ス，而シテ，「ゼノ」氏ニ至リテ単一説初メテ全シ，数量モ運動モ皆一ヨリ外ナシト審定ス。

d. Heraclitus

Pure bing and phenomenal being, the one and the many, fall, in the Eleatic principle, apart from each other: The attempted monism results in an ill-concealed dualism. Heraclitus reconciles this contradiction by enunciating as the truth of the being and non-being of the one and the many—becoming. If the Eleatics persist in the dilemma, the world is either being or non-being, Heraclitus answers, it is neither of them, because it is both of them.

1. Heraclitus of Ephesus flourished nearly contemporaneously with Parmenides. He was the deepest of the pre-Socratic philosophers. His philosophical thoughts are contained in a work, 'On Nature'.

The Principles of Becoming—As principle of Heraclitus, the idea is unanimously assigned by the ancients, that the totality of things is in eternal flux, in uninterrupted motion and mutation, and that their permanence is only illusion. Nothing, he said, remains, the same, all comes and goes, resolves itself and passes into other forms; out of all comes all, from life death, from the dead, life; therefore is everywhere andeternally only this one process of the alteration of birth and decay. It is said from his dicta, that 'Join together whole and unwhole, congrous and incongrous, accordant and discordant, then comes from all one, from one all.'

Fire — Heraclitus, say Aristotle made fire the principle, as Thales water, and Anaximenes air. We might name fire, in the Heraclitus sense, as a symbol or manifestation of the becoming. Heraclitus then explains the multiplicity of things by the arrestment and partial extinction of this fire, in consequence of which it condenses itself into material elements, first air then water then earth. But the fire rekindles itself afresh. These two processes of extinction and ignition in this fire power, alternate in perpetual rotation with each other. In stated periods the world resolves itself into the primal fire, in order to recreate itself out of it again. Moreover, also, fire is to him the principle of movement, of physical as of spiritual vitality; the soul itself is a fiery vapour.

If Heraclitus resolves all permanent existence into an absolutely fluent becoming,

Parmenides, resolves all becoming into an absolutely permanent being. We may say, accordingly, that being and becoming are the equally justified antitheses which demand for themselves mutual equalization and conciliation. The question ever recurs again, Why is all being a becoming? Why is the one perpetually sundered into the many? The answer to this question, that is to say, the explanation of the becoming from the preconceived principle of the being is the position and the problem of the philosophy of Empedocles and of the Atomists.

第四派ノ「ヘラクリタス」氏ハ「エレアチック」学派ノ現象ト実体両者ノ関係ヲ証而セザルヲ見テ，其欠点ヲ補助シ且ツ其ニ者ノ関係ヲ明瞭セント思ヘリ′於是「ヘラクリタス」氏ハ可成説ヲ起ス。万物一トシテ変化セザルナシ，出没隠現，更ニ窮リナシ，ト云ヘリ，而シテ，氏ノ説ノ奇ナルハ，万物皆火ニヨリテ成ル，火ヲ以テ初元本素トナス，火ニハ明滅ノ変アルヲ以テ，物ニ増減ノアルヲシレルモ一度滅シタル火，永久滅スルニアラザルナリ。物ノ運動，人ノ霊魂ノ如キ，皆火ノ原理ヲ以テ開示ス，何故ニ萬有ハ可成ノ一理ニ帰スルヤ，可成説ノ真ナル証アリヤ，是レ，次学諸家ノ説ヲ待ッテ明カナリ。

e. Empedocles

Empedocles, extolled by antiquity as physicist, Physician and poet, even as prophet and worker of miracle was later than Parmenides and Heraclitus. His philosophical system may be briefly characterized as an attempt at a combination between Eleatic being and Heraclitic becoming. He assumed, as imperishable being, four eternal, self-subsistent, mutually inderivative, but divisible primal matters. He conceives his four elements to be mingled and moulded by two moving forces, the uniting one of friendship and the disuniting one of strife. At first four elements existed together, absolutely one with each other and immovable in the pure and perfect globe-shaped divine primitive world where friendship maintained them in unity, till gradually strife penetrating from the periphery into the inner of the Sphairos, that is, attaining to a disintegrating power, broke up the unity, whereby the world of contrarietiesin which we live began to form itself.

Four elements	1. fire 2. air 3. water 4. earth	Two forces	1. friendship—attractive force 2. strife—repulsive force

f. Atomists

Like Empedocles, the Atomists, Lenccipus and Democritus, endeavoured to effect

a combination of the Eleatic and Heraclitic principles, but in another way, Democritus was younger and better known of the two. The Atomists derived all phenomenal specific quality from a primeval infinitude of original constituents, which, alike in quality, were unlike in quantity. Their atoms are immutable, and differing from each other only in side, shape and weight. Plurality in the phenomenal world is only to be explained by the various figures, order, and positions of the atoms, which present themselves, too, united in various complexions.

What is the reason that the atoms take on these multiform combinations, and produce the wealth of the inorganic and organic worlds? Democritus finds this in the nature of these atoms themselves, to which the vacuum affords room for their alternate conjunctions and disjunctions. The atoms, variously heavy, and afloat in empty space, inpinge on each other.

In the Eleatic philosophy, being and non-being are as in mutual contradiction – only being is, non-being is not. In the same, both are together, or becoming is predicate of the being. But the Atomists constitute a conciliation between Heraclitus and the Eleatics. Their atoms, for example, are, on the one hand, in their indivisible oneness, Eleatic, but on the other, in their composite plurality, Heraclitus.

前両学派ノ一物体論ハ第一ニ,「エムペードークル」学派ノ説起ル，氏ハ萬物ノ初元素ヲ地水火風ノ四ニ定メ，此四者ノ間，敵争スルト親愛スルトノ両作用関係アリ相愛スルトキハ互ニ相引クノ力ヲ生シ相争フトキハ互ニ相離ルヽノ性ヲ発ス，是四者ノ関係トニ力ノ作用ヲ以テ萬物ノ現象変化ヲ証明スルモノヲ,「エムペードークル」学ト云フ。次ニ「アトミック」学派尋テ起シ均シク前両学派ヲ調解セント欲ス，其説タルヤ，物ニ数万計ルベカラザル元素アリテ存ス，其各原素即チ細微分子ノ間ニ自ラ空隙ノアルアリテ，自他互ニ相流動スル事ヲ得，斯クシテ，万象ノ変化ヲ見ルナリ，是理ヲ以テ考コレバ，諸物ノ帰要ハ一物一体ニシテ一原理ノ存スルアルモ，常ニ千態万状ノ変化ヲ生スルヲ得ルナリ，此派ニ属スルモノ「デモクリタズ」トス。

g. Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras wrote a work 'On Nature'. The system of Anaxagoras rests wholly on the presuppositions of his predecessors. Like Empedocles and the Atomists, Anaxagoras, too, denies becoming in the proper sense. He says that nothing originates and nothing is destroyed; all is mixed or unmixed out of pre-existent things; and it were more correct to name the one process composition and the other decomposition. From this view, separation of matter and of moving force follow, for him as well as for his predecessors. Hitherto, however, the moving force had been imperfectly conceived. The existence of design in the process of nature was no explained by the predecessors. It was consequently seen to be necessary that this notion of design should

be identified with that of the moving power. This Anaxagoras accomplished by his idea of a world-forming intelligence that was absolutely separated and free from matter, and that acted on design.

Anaxagoras describes this intelligence as spontaneously operative unmixed with anything, the ground of all motion but itself unmoved, everywhere actively present, and of all things the finest and purest. His intelligence is in strictness, therefore, only a mover of matter; in this function its entire virtue is almost quite exhausted. Side by side with the intelligence and equally original with it, there stands according to him, the mass of the primitive constituents of things: All things were together, infinitely numerous, infinitely little; then came the intelligence and set them in order. Thus, the business of the intelligence is to dispose all things, each in accordance with its own nature, into a universe that shall comprehend within it the most manifold forms of existence, and to enter into, and identify itself with this universe as the power of individual vitality.

Anaxagoras may be taken as the termination and close of the Pre-Socratic Realism. With the Intelligence, with the acquisition of an immaterial principle the realistic period of early Greek Philosophy concludes. Anaxagoras brings all preceding principles into unity and totality. The pure being of the Eleatics is to be found in his intelligence, as both the becoming of Heraclitus and the moving forces of Empedocles in his shaping and regulating power of an eternal mind; and in his like parts or hom
we have the atoms. Anaxagoras is the last of an old and the first of a new series of development; the one by the proposition, the other by the incompleteness and persistently physical nature, of his ideal principle.

「アナキザゴラス」氏ハ前諸学派諸学家ノ雑説異論ヲ総計競合シテ一説ヲ起スモノナリ，物ニハ数万ノ元素，分子アリテ之ヲ集成スルノ理ハ前学者ノ既ニ証明スルトコロナルモ其作用ノ起ル真因ニ至リテハ未ダ知ルベカラズ，然ルニ「アナキザゴラス」氏ニ至リテハ智力ノ現存ヲ論ジ，其媒介意志ニヨリテ，物ノ分合変化ノ現象起ル蓋シ智力ハ物ヲ統治調理スルノ力ナリ。斯クシテ，氏ハ前諸説ヲ統合シ，以テ後学世ノ論端ヲ開ク，即チ想像上定ムル所ノ智力ノ現存ノ如キ是レナリ，故ニ氏ヲ以テ，上古哲学上期ノ末学トシ，其結論ハ中期ノ論壇ヲ開クモノトスト云フ。

h. The Sophists

The Sophists is one of a class of men who taught eloquence, philosophy and politics in ancient Greece, and were noted for their fallacious but plausitic mode of reasoning.

The preceding philosophers all tacitly assume that our subjective consciousness is

in subordination and subjection to objective actuality, or that the objectivity of things is the source of our knowledge. In the Sophists a new principle appears, the principle of subjectivity; the view, namely, that things are as they seem to us, and that any universal truth exists not. (that is no objective truth.) Enjoying the exercise of the power of subjectivity and destroying, by means of subjective dialectic all that had been even objectively established, the Sophists founded a new school. What characterizes the Sophists, then, is illuminated reflection. They have no philosophical system.

The Sophists rendered general culture universal. Thus, Protagoras was cerebrated as a teacher of morals, Gorgias as a rhetorician and politician. Prodicus as a grammarian and etymologist, and Hippias as a polymath. Some set themselves for task the art of education, others the exposition of the ancient poets. In short the Sophists were to be found, each according to his individuality, in all the professions in all the spheres of knowledge. What alone was common to them all was method.

As regards culture the Sophists introduced a profusion of general knowledge among the people, scattered a mass of fruitful and suggestive germs, called forth investigations into language, logic and the theory of cognition, laid a foundation for the methodic treatment of many branches of human inquiry.

The first who is said to have been named Sophist in the given sense is Protagoras of Abdera, who flourished about the year 440 B.C. His book on the gods was burned in open market by the public crier. It begins with the words—"As for the gods, I am unable to know whether they are or whether they are not; for there is much that prevents us from knowing these things, as will the obscurity of the subject as the shortness of the life of man." In another work he developed his theory of cognition or incognition.

After Protagoras, Gorgias was the most celebrated Sophist. His work was titled 'Of the Non-existent, or of Nature'. The proof of the first proposition—namely, that nothing exists, since whatever were assumed to exist can neither be something existent must have either originated or not originated, neither of which alternatives is possible to thought.

The later Sophists were for the most part free-thinkers, whose views could only tend to destroy the national religion, laws and observances.

Something remains to say about the transition to Socrates and character of the following period. The right of the Sophists is the right of subjectivity, of self-consicouness; its unright is the regarding of this subjectivity as only finite, empirical, egoistic subjectivity; its right is to have established the principle of free-will, of self-conviction; its unright is to have set upon the throne the contingent will and judgment of the

individual. To complete the principle of free will and self-consciousness into its truth, and to set in the place of empirical subjectivity or ideal subjectivity, objective will, and rational thought, was the task which Socrates undertook and achieved. Every thinking being has the consciousness that what he holds for right, duty, good, is not merely so to him, but that it is so also for every rational being, and that consequently his thought has the character of universality, a universal validity, in a word, objectivity. Therefore, so far as we are a rationa, thinking being, our subjectivity is a unviersal subjectivity. This is, as opposed to that of Sophists, the standpoint of Socrates, and on this account there bebins with him the philosophy.

Objective thought. What Socrates could do in contradiction to the Sophists was that man is undoubtedly the measure of all things, but man as a universa, thinking, rational man. With Socrates begins the second period of Greek philosophy. It realizes itself in three great philosophical system, the originators of which, connected personally also in the relation of teachers and taught, represent three successive generations – Socrates, Plato, Aristotle.

「アナキサゴラス」氏ノ智力現存ヲ論ジテヨリ，始メテ虚想ニ渉ルノ理論ヲ発スルニ至リ「ソフィスト」ニ至ッテ尤モ甚シトス，「ソフィスト」家ノ信據スルトコロ，全ク主視域内ニアリテ，客観ノ試験ヲ用キス，唯，極メテ虚想ナル観念意志ヲ本トス，然レドモ，其学派ニテハアラユル学識ヲ網羅シテ余ストコロナシ，故ニ其派ニ属スル学者尽ク其主業専学ヲ異ニス，然レドモ其論法ニ至リテハ，皆同ク霊想ヲ本トス，「プロタコラス」氏及ヒ「ゴルジアス」氏最モ名アリ，「ソクラテス」氏其後ニ出テ，其余ヲ承ケテ霊想ヲカタムルニ事実ヲモッテシ，主観ヲ全フスルニ客視ヲ待タシム蓋シ，客観実証ノ学是ヨリ起ル，「ソクラテス」氏ノ往古中学生ノ管ヲ啓ク所以ナリ，夫レ氏ノ説タルモ一人一箇ノ霊想自信ハ以テ証トナスニ足ラズ，之ヲ衆人ニ正シ，衆智ニ計リテ，明ラカナレバ即チ以テ真実ヲ定ムベシ人ハ道理的ニシテ之ニ片覧セバ，以テ真偽ヲ定ムルヲ得ヘキナレバ一般ノ家説独リ取ルヘシトス。

universality is taken as test of

- Philosophy
  - Ancient
    1. Pre-Socratic philosophy
    2. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle
    3. Post-Aristotelian philosophy
  - Modern

1. Pre-Socratic
   - a. The Earlier Ionic Philosophers — Thales, Anaximenes
   - b. The Pythagorians (Pythagoria)
   - c. The Eleatics — Xenophones, Parmenides, Zeno
   - d. Heraclitus
   - e. Empedocles
   - The Atomists — Lencippus, Democritus
   - g. Anaxagoras (proper ending of this period)
   - h. The Sophists — Protagoras, Gorgias

The Second Period of Ancient Philosophy

(a) Socrates

His Philosophy is wholly individual practice; life and doctrine can not in his case be separated. A full exposition of his philosophy is therefore essentially biography.

Socrates was condemned by the State to drink the poison. The first motive of his accusation was his identification with the Sophist, the actual belief that his teaching and influence were characterized by the same dangerous principles, in a political aspect, by which the Sophists had already given rise to so much evil. Denial of the natural gods is quite similarly situated; it was as accused of this that already Protagoras had had to flee from Athens. There was present also another, and perhaps more decisive elements, a political one. Socrates was no aristocrat, but he was too firm of character ever to lend himself to an accomodation with the humours of the sovereign masses, and too truely convinced of the necessity of a lawful and intelligent control of political affairs, to be able to make friends with the Athenian democracy as it was.

It is an old well known controversy as to whether Xenophon or Plato is to be regarded as having drawn historically the truer and completer image of Socrates, and as being the source of the Socratic philosophy. This question comes more and more to be decided in favour of Xenophone. There are distinguished an exoteric and an esoteric Socrates, the former drawn from Xenophon, the latter from Plato. But the giving of precedence to Plato over Xenophone has, in the first place, no historical right on its side, so far as Xenophon presents himself as an historian and asserts a claim to historical authenticity, while Plato, on the contrary, only in a few passages expressly gives himself out as an historical narrator, by no means wishes all the rest that is put into the mouth of Socrates to be regarded as authentic speech and utterance of this latter; and we possess no historical right therefore, to view at will what belongs to Plato as belonging also to Socrates; secondly, the subordination of Xenophon rests for the most part on the false conception that Socrates had a philosophy, that is, a speculative philosophy on an unhistorical mistaking of the limits by which the philosophical character of Socrates was necessarily conditioned and opposed. There was not even a Socratic doctrine, but only a Socratic life; and just in this we have the explanation of the disparate philosophical directions of his followers.

General character of the Socratic Philosophy. – The Socratic philosophy is conditioned and determined by its antithesis partly to the teaching of the Sophists. The Pre-Socratic philosophy was in essential character an investigation of Nature. With Socratics, mind for the first time turns on its own self, on its own essential nature,

but it does this in the directest fashion in that it regards itself as active or as endowed with morality. The positive philosophizing of Socrates is exclusively of an ethical nature, exclusively an inquiry into virtue.

The other side of the Socratic philosophy is its opposition to the philosophy of the time. He understood his task here and saw that it consisted in placing himself on the same ground as the Sophists themselves. While the Sophists made all moral action their business, by means of subjective reflection, to confound and subvert all established prescripts, and render impossible all objective standards, Socrates recognized thought as the act of the universal, the free objective idea as the measure of all things, and so brought back duty and all moral action in general, from the opinion and caprice of the individual, to the true principle, the principle of universal objective spirit.

The Socratic method has two sides, the one negative and the other positive.

The Socratic Doctrine of Virtue. – The only positive tenet which has come down from Socrates is that virtue is knowledge, wisdom, intellectual discernment. In other words, virtue is an act that proceeds from a clearly understood recognition of the notion of whatever any particular action contemplates, of the ends means and conditions that belong to this action, and not, therefore, any merely innate or mechanically acquired power and ability. Action without perception is a contradiction, and destroys itself. Consequently, there can be nothing bad that happens with perception, and nothing good that happens without perception. Defect of perception it is that leads men into vicious acts. There follows from this the further proposition, nobody is willingly wicked; the wicked are wicked against their own wills. Nay more, whoever knowingly does wrong is better than he who does so unknowingly; for in the latter case, as knowledge is wanting, virtue in general must also be wanting, while in the former case were it supposed possible, virtue would be only temporarily inquired. （智徳同体ノ倫） Socrates would not admit that anybody could know the good without immediately doing it. The good was not to him, as it was to the Sophists an arbitrary law, but that on which unconditionally depended the well-being of the individual as well as of the race, and this, because it was alone an intellectual art. Thus we get the three propositions that virtue is knowledge it is something universally human, and something through instruction and practice to be attained to every one. With these propositions which comprise all that can be called Socratic philosophy, Socrates laid the first stone of a scientific theory of morals which accordingly dates only from him. He conceived virtue as the road to the realization of the specific objects of well-being, happiness, contentment, power and honour. A freedom from desire such as lifts man nearest to God, a calm of mind whose equilibrium is never to be

baffled, a glad consiousness of undiminished strength and integrity of soul – these, in his own person, no doubt, he exhibited as the highest happiness, and thus already identify the notions of virtue and happiness. But he expressed thus, not as a universal, but as an individual principle; he lived too much in the old way of looking at things to be able to deny the authority of actual concrete ends, and to sacrifice them to his personal ideal of happiness.

「ソクラテス」氏ノ哲学タルヤ其ノ一生間ノ事業ヨリ外ナシ。所謂ル氏ノ傳以テ哲学トナスベシ蓋シ氏ニ先ッテ「ソフィスト」ナル学派アリテ靈想空理ヲ談ズルヲ以テ，氏ノ客観上ノ実理ヲ用ユ，即チ衆人ノ理想ニヨリテ是非ヲ定ム，而シテ，前学世一般ノ学風ニ異ナルハ，前学派大抵宇宙ノ造先ノ現象ヲ審定シテ更ニ人心ノ如何ヲ問ハス，「ソクラチス」氏ハ人心ニ本ツキ，其理想ヲ考ヘ，道義学ノ基ヲ開ク。故ニ氏ノ論スルトコロ，専ラ道義人倫ヲ主トス，氏曰ク，人ノ徳ハ智識ナリト。智識ノナキモノニシテ善ナルコトナク智識アリテ全ク悪ナル事ナク，智徳即一ノ説ナリ，幸福ト称スルモノ又，智識ニ外ナラズ，智識ヲ離レテ幸福ナルベキナシ，幸福ハ智識ヲ以テ立ツベシ。

(b) The Incomplete Socrates

Socrates had many scholars, but no schools. But, in regard to the subjective conception of the personality of Socrates whose life was very many-sided, there are three of these reflexes or-types which have specially become historical. They are the Cynic, Carenaic, and Megaric schools, founded on the conceptions of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Euclid respectively. Each of these three conceptions possesses a true moment of the Socratic character, but, separated from each other, they break asunder what in the master lay in harmonious unity, and ennunciate isolated elements of the Socratic character as the true nature of the whole. They are thus one-sided, and give a false picture of Socrates.

Antisthenes and the Cynics. – As strict literal adherent of the doctrine and as zealous, nay coarse and often caricaturing imitator of the manner, Antisthenes stands nearest his master. He was at one time a disciple of Gorgias, and himself a sophistic teacher, but he attached himself, apparently in advanced life, to Socrates, becoming his most inseparable attendant, and after his death, founded a school in the Cynosarges, whence his disciples and adherents received later the name of Cynics. The teaching of Antisthenes is only an abstract expression for the Socratic moral ideal. Like Socrates, he regarded a moral life as the ultimate end of mankind, as necessary, nay as alone sufficient for happiness; and like Socrates too, he held virtue to be knowable, teachable and one.

Cynicism, as was natural, took on later a more decided disregard of all know-

ledge, yet greater contempt for public property, and became often a disgusting and shameless caricature of the spirit of Socrates. Such was, particularly, Diogenes of Sinope. These Cynics retained, in their high estimation of virtue and philosophy a memory of their original; but they sought virtue in complete independency and freedom from deisre, in renunciation of art and science, and of every definite and in gene–f al. Philosophy and philosophical interest alike vanish in the case of such beggar philosophy; what we have from Diogenes are but anecdotes and sarcasms. Cynicism is, therefore, the negative side of Socraticism.

Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. – Aristippus of Cyrene, up to the death of Socrates considered one of his adherents but styled a Sophist by Aristotle. Socrates had pronounced virtue and felicity as co-ordinately the highest human end. That is to say, he had given the highest authority to the idea of moral action. But Aristippus pronounced pleasure to be the ultimate end of life, the supreme good. This pleasure, as Aritstippus understands it, is only the special, present, bodily sensation of pleasure, not happiness as a condition that comprehends the entire life; and consequently, according to him, all moral limitations and obligations are, as against this pelasrue, of no account. Nothing is wicked, chameful, Godless, if it procures pleasure; what denies this is mere opinion and prejudice. But when Aristippus recommends judgment, self-control, and moderation, the power to resist the mastery of any special desire, as the means for the attainment and preservation of enjoyment, he demonstrates that the spirit of Socrates is not wholly extinct in him. The remaining members of the Cyrenaic school, Theodorus, Hegesias, Anniceries developed the more particular definition of the pleasure to be aimed at. Theodorus declared for the supremacy of that mutual joy which arises from judgment, and from the ability, in all relations of life to direct one's self in perception of a rational purpose, and in freedom from all the bonds of prejudice and superstition. Hegesias found a pure life of pleasure unattainable, and, therefore, not to be sought; prevention of pain, with exertion of every faculty, was, according to him, the aim of the sage, and the only one that was left us, for life was full of evils. Lastly, Anniceries taught that withdrawal from family and society is incapable of being realized, that the true aim rather is to get from life as much enjoyment as can be got; he endeavoured to reconcile again the principle of pleasure with those demands of life and circumstances, to which it stood in such irreconcile again the principle of pleasure with those demands of life and circumstances, to which it stood in such irreconcilable antagonism. This principle was called Hedonism.

Euclid and the Megarics. – Combination of dialectical with ethical elements is the character of all the imperfect Socratic schools. The distinction is only this, that

here ethics subserve dialectics, there dialectics ethics. The former is particularly the case with the Megaric school, whose special peculiarity was designated by the ancients as a combination of the Socratic and Eleatic principles. The idea of the good is the same thing ethically as that of being physically. It was only a Socratic transformation of the Eleatic doctrine, then, when Euclid of Megara maintained that only that which is , self-identical, and one with itself, is good and that only this good is, while all change, plurality, divided ness, that is opposed to this good, is only apparent. This self-identical good, however, is not sensuous, but intellectual being, truth, reason which for man also is the only good. The only end, as Stilpa of the same school taught later, is reason and knowledge, with perfectly apathetic indifference to all that has nothing in common with knowledge of the good. This plainly is but a one-sided exageration of the tendency of Socrates towards a thinking consideration of things, with concomitant peace of mind, and is only a finer, more intellectual Cynicism. The later Megaric Eristic, indeed, constitutes the transition to Scepticism, and the Hedonism of the Cyrenaics to the Creed of Epicurus.

Plato as the completed Socrates. – The attempts which we have hitherto to build further on the main pillars of the Socrates' doctrine, being from the very beginning without any thriving genus of end, ended fruitless, resultless. The complete Socrates was understood and represented by only one of his disciples, Plato. Proceeding from the Socrates' idea of knowledge he collected into a simple focus all the elements and rays of truth which lay scattered, not only in his master, but in the philosophers before him, and made of philosophy a whole, a system. The proposition that thought is the trice being, and alone real, was understood by the Megaric school only abstractly, and by Socrates only as principle. The latter, indeed, proposed cognition by means of universal notions only as a posturate, and gave it no further development. His philosophizing is not system, but only seed and genus of logical analysis and philosophical method. Systematic exposition and analysis of the absolutely valie notions, of the world of ideas, this was left for Plato.

The Platonic system is the objectivized Socrates, the conciliation fashion of all previous philosophy.

「ソクラテス」死后，其門弟中ニ，種々ノ学派起リ皆夫子ノ真意ヲ承傳スルモノト称スト雖モ，其説各々一遍ニ偏シ,「ソクラチス」氏ノ全教ヲ傳フルニアラズ，其学派中,「アンチセニス」氏ノ「セニク」学,「アリスハロス」氏ノ「カレトーリ」学,「ユークリット」氏ノ「メガリック」学最モ名アリ，先ツ第一学派ノ「セニク」ノ主義トスル所,「ソクラチス」氏ノ道義学ヲ一層抽象シ，其極点ニ偏シ，以テ其実ヲ離ルノニ至ル。其派ノ主タル「アンチセニス」氏未ダ其極度ニ陥ラスト雖モ，其同派ノ「ダイオゼニス」氏ニ至リテハ，全徳ヲ求ムルニハ，衆妄

念，欲情ヲ脱去セザルベカラズト云フ。第二派ノ「セレターリ」ハソノ主タル「アリスパス」氏ノ説ニヨルニ，人間畢生ノ目的ハ快楽幸福ニ外ナラズト云フ。
故ニ道徳上ノ権利義務ハ皆此ノ快楽ヲ全フセンタメノミ，能ク其快楽ヲ来スモノニ悪邪不正ト称スルモノナントス，「セオトラス」「ヘゲンヤス」「アンニセリス」ノ三代之ヲ敷行スリ。コノ楽ヲ主トスルノ教ヲ名ケテ，「ヘド・イズム」ト称ス。是レ「ソクラチス」氏ノ教ニ本ッテ，其意ヲ得ザルモノナリ。第三「メカリックス」学派ハ，「ユークリッド」氏ノ唱フ所ヲ尋ヌルニ，「ソクラチス」「エリヤチック」両氏ノ学ヲ混和スルモノナリ。ソノ人生ノ目的ヲ立ツルヤ，道理ト智識ヲ本トス。故ニ人ノ善ト称スルモノ決シテ五官ノ快楽ヲ云フニアラズト云フ。
以上，諸家ノ説皆「ソクラチス」氏ノ一片ヲ得テ全局ヲ知ラザルモノナリ，故ニ「プラトー」氏ニ至リテ，独リ其真意ヲ探リ，余論ヲ修メテ一学派ヲ開ク。
其学タル思想ヲ本トシ，之ヲ規成証明シテ，理想ノ真理ヲ討究ス。是レ「プラトー」氏ノ「ソクラチス」氏ヲ承ケ前代ノ諸学家ノ説ヲ総括シテ，哲学ノ新礎ヲ開ク，所以ナリ。

(c) Plato

That the Platonic philosophy is essentially an historical development, that it is not to be conceived as completed at once in the form of an individual system, to which variety of writing are as supplementary fragments, but that the several writings are rather stages of evolution. The philosophical and literary activity of Plato falls into three periods, they are the periods of apprenticeship, travel, and mastership. In reference again to the dominant outer influence and points of junction respectively present in each these periods are the Socrates, the Heraclitico-Eleatic, and the Pythagorian. In reference lastly to their subject matter, they are respectively the antisophistico-ethical, the dialectical or conciliative, and the systematic or constructive periods.

There is now a division of the Platonic system into theoretical and practical sciences, again into philosophies of the beautiful, the good and the true. Better than these, perhaps, another division, which has some support in certain ancient intimations. Some of the ancients say, namely, that Plato first collected the various parts of philosophy from their dispersion among the earlier philosophers, and so obtained these parts of philosophy, — Logic, Physic, Ethics. Plato virtually employed this classification, but had not definitely expressed it; it is only his disciples Xenocrates and Aristotle who shall have expressly recognized this distribution.

Dialectic or logic is considered as the foundation of all philosophy. The position of the other two parts would seem doubtful. But, as physics culminate in ethics, while ethics have physics for foundation, the latter will necessarily precede the former. From philosophy the mathematical sciences have been expressly excluded by Plato.

The Platonic Dialectic. – (a) Idea of dialectic. – Dialectic or logic has been used by the ancients mostly in a very wide sense, by Plato frequently as interchangeable with philosophy. Nevertheless he treats it at other times as only a branch of philosophy. He separates it as science of the eternal and immutable from physics as science of mutable. He separates is also from ethics, so far as the latter consider not the good in and for itself, but only in its concrete application in morals and the state. Plato defines expressly dialectic in the usual sense of the word, as the art of developing knowledge conversationally by question and answer. In a word, Dialectic is the science of all the other sciences, and so conceived, it may be briefly designated as the science of what absolutely is, or of the ideas.

(b) What is science? Protagoras said that all knowledge is perception, and that both are one and the same. From this it follows that the things are as they appear to me to be, that perception or sensation is infallible. In opposition to this doctrine, Plato calls attention to the following contradictions and counterinstances: Firstly, the Protagorian proposition leads to the most startling consequences. Being and seeming, knowledge and perception being one and the same, then any irrational brute that is capable of perception is equally the measure of all things. Secondly, the Protagorean proposition is a logical contradiction. Thirdly Protagoras annihilates all knowledge of the future. Fourthly, the theory of Protagoras demolishes perception itself. Fifthly, Protagoras knows not the prior element of knowledge. According to Plato, we see with the eyes and hear with the ears, but to conjoin these perceptions into the unity of self-consciousness is not an affair of the senses. We compare the various perceptions of sense with one another, and this is a function also which can not be performed by the senses themselves, for it is impossible for us to receive through sight the perceptions of the ear, or conversely. Of the perceptions themselves finally, we affirm qualities, such as being and non-being, likeness and unlikeness, which plainly cannot be derived by means of sense itself. These qualities to which belong also the good and the bad, beauty and the reverse, constitute a peculiar sphere of knowledge, which the soul itself creates in independency of all perception of sense, and through its own spontaneous action. The soul perceives things in their purity, as they are in their eternal essence, in their own immutable nature.

Hence it is that the desire of death, the longing to escape from the body as an obstacle to true knowledge and to become pure spirit, is portrayed as the true mode of philosopher. Science, after all this, then, is the thought of the veritably , or of the ideas. Dialectic, as the art of joining and disjoining ideas, is the organ of their apprehension, and means of their discovery and recognition; and conversely, the ideas

are the true object of dialectic.

(c) The ideal theory in its genesis – The Platonic ideal theory is the common product of the Socratic method of national formation (universalization), of the Heraclitic principle of an absolute becoming and of the Eleatic doctrine. 1. Of an absolute being. Plato owes to the first the idea of notional knowledge, to the second the conception of the sensuous world as were becoming, to the third the assumption of a sphere of absolute reality. Plato connects the ideal theory else where with the Pythagorean thoughttaht all consists of unity and plurality, of the limited and the unlimited. If a false conception actually exists, a non-existent, in truth and actuality, also exits. Having established in this way the reality of non-being, Plato proceeds to discuss the relation of non-being and being, or the relation of notions in general, their capacity of combination, and their antithesis. If, namely, non-being has no less reality than being, and being no more than non-being. The reciprocal relation of notions, as at once and non- , by means of which is to decide what notions shall be combined together, and what not. Plato shows by example of the notions, being, motion and rest, what results from the combination of notion and their reciprocal exclusion of one another. Of the notions named, for example, those of notion and of rest can not be combined together, but with the notion of being, either way.

(d) Positive exposition of the ideal theory. – The ideas may, according to the various sides of their historical connection, be defined as the common element in the manifold, the universal in the individual, the one in the many, the fixed and permanent in the mutable. The ideal theory originates in the desire to express the essence of things, and to comprehend the real world as an intellectual world organized within itself. It is Plato's opinion that neither a true knowing nor a true being is for him possible without the absolute notions, the ideas. Thus Plato assumed for every class of existence as idea.

(e) The relation of ideas to the world of sense. – In opposition to the idea Plato distinguished the things of sense or the world without by the names of many, the divisible, unlimited, indeterminate, and measureless, the relative, the non- , . The question, however, in what relation the two worlds of sense and of the ideas stand to each other, Plato has answered neither satisfactorily nor in agreement with himself. But he finally would seem to regard the phenomenal world as only subjective appearance, as product of subjective conception, of a confused mode of conceiving the ideas. In this view, the phenomena as opposed to the ideas are quite deprived of self subsistency; besides this they are no longer anything but the idea itself in the form of non-being. In fact, the Platonic system is a futile struggle against dualism.

(f) The idea of the good, and the Divine Being. – If the truth of existence is expressed in the notions and these again are so related that a higher notion comprehends and combines within several lower ones, the ideas must constitute as a whole an articulate organism, or a gradual series. This series must terminate in an idea which shall require for its support no higher idea. This highest idea – ultimate in cognition without any presupposition – is for Plato the idea of good. The idea of the good is the ultimate ground at once of knowledge and of being, of reason and what is reasoned, of subjective and objective, of ideal and real but it is itself raised above this disjunction. In what way this idea of the good, and the ideas in general, are related to god, is a difficult question. All things considered, it must be held probable that Plato conceived both (god and the idea of good) as identical. The absolute idea or god must also be absolutely universal.

5. The Platonic Physics

(a) Nature – Plato's explanation of nature, in contrast to the earlier mechanical ones, is thoroughly teleological; it is constructed according to the idea of the good. Plato conceives the world as the work of unenvious devine goodness, which wills to create what shall be like itself. The world is the product and copy of reason, that it is an organism of order, harmony and beauty, that it is the self-realization of the good.

(b) The Soul – The individual soul possesses the same nature and character as the universal soul; and it belonged to the perfection of the world, that there should be a plurality of soul, through which the principle of reason and of life might be individualized in a plenitude of particular beings. The shoul in itself is indestructible, and through reason, in which it participates, of a divine character. But the soul, on the one hand, sways and controls the body; but on the other hand, the body no less sways and controls the soul. This interaction of soul and body is brought about by a lower, sensuous faculty, and Plato distinguishes, therefore, two constituents of the soul, one divine and rational, the other mortal and irrational.

6. The Platonic Ethics

The question in Plato's ethics, which ethics is nothing else than the ideal theory practically applied, is to assertain and establish the summum bonum, the end or aim, which it shall be the object of all will and of all action to realize. It is in accordance with this principle that the theory of virtue is determined.

(a) The supreme good – What is the ultimate end is the simple result of the entire idea of the Platonic system. The exaltation to ideal being is that which is the good absolutely. Philosophy, in Plato as in Socrates, is not something merely theoreti-

cal but the return of the soul into its true being. The path of soul to its true nature is withdrawal from sensuous imaginations and appetities, retirement into thought, into the cognition of truth, in a word, philosophy. Therefore, the task and destiny of the soul is flight from the inward and outward evils of sense.

(b) Virtue – In his theory of virtue, Plato is at first quite Socratic. That virtue depends on knowledge, and is, therefore, capable of being taught. He still accentuates the unity and natural connexion of all the virtues. The virtue of reason is wisdom, for in the soul it is reason that must rule; The virtue of heart is courage; the virtue of sensuous appetite is temperance; and finally there is virtue of justice.

(c) State – The Platonic state is usually regarded as a so-called ideal. His republic is the sketch of the pure idea of a political constitution. The general character of the Platonic state is the reduction of moral to political virtue.

7. Retrospect

With Plato, Greek philosophy has attained to the culminating point of its development. The Platonic system is the first complete scientific construction of the entire natural and spiritual universe under guidance of a philosophical principle; it is the first type and pattern of all higher speculation, of all metaphysical as well as of all ethical idealism. Reard on the simple foundation of Socrates, the idea of philosophy has here for the first time gained an all-embracing realization. The spirit of philosophy has, indeed, raised itself here into full consciousness of itself, a consciousness which first awoke in Socrates only as a dim and uncertain instinct. At the same time with Plato, philosophy exhibited an idealistic antithesis to the given actuality, demanded the supplement of a more realistic theory of things. This was supplied by Aristotle.

「弗拉」氏ハ索拉氏ノ門弟ニシテ，ソノ哲学ヲ承ケテ之ヲ拡張セリ。氏ノ哲学分ツテ三科トナス，第一ヲ論理学，第二ヲ物理学，第三ヲ道義学トス。而シテ，論理学ヲ以テ哲学全体ノ基址トナス。夫レ氏ノ哲学ヲ立ツル大ニ「プラトゴラス」氏ニ反スル所アッテ我人ノ外物ヲ知ルハ唯，感覚力ニヨルニアラズ。其感覚ヲ結合順応セシムルノ力ナクンバ，アルベカラズ。其他善悪醜美ノ思想ノ如キ，又，決シテ感覚力ノ能クスベキニアラス是レ則精神作用ニシテ理想力ニ由ルノミ，故ニ人身肉体上ノ感覚苦楽ノ情妄ヲ排シテ，真純ノ知識ヲ開キ，理想ノ妙界ニ達スルヲ哲学ノ真法トスベシ。此理想ノ体ニ本ツキテ論ズルモノ之ヲ論理又ハ「ダイヤレクデック」ト名クルナリ。

凡ソ氏ノ理想説ヲ立ツルハ，先儒「ソクラチス」氏事疑ナシ，氏ノ理想ノ現存ヲ証スルヤ事物ノ現存スルヲ以テス，事物ハ理想アルニアラスンバ，断乎トシテ，現見スル能ハザルベシ，故ニ一物ノ理想ニ出デザルナク一事理想ニ関セザルナシ，然レトモ氏ハ，此事物界ト理想界トノ関係ヲ証明スルニ至リテ極メテ精密ナラズ，終ニ事物界ハ理想界中ニ存スルモノニシテ，此

界ヲ離レテ事物存スル能ハズト云フト雖モ二元両存ヲ証スルニ至リテ疎ナリト云フベシ。

凡ソ宇宙向ニ存スル万物万事皆各ゝ其理想アリテ存スルナリ。而シテ其諸理諸想之ヲ要スルニ遂ニハ一大理想ノ中ニ存スルノミ此最高至大ノ理想ヲ純善ノ理想（ idea of good ）トシ，主客両観霊実両想皆此中ニ胚胎スト立ツルナリ，其定ムル所，神ハ此最高至大ノ理想体ニ外ナラザルナリ。

氏ノ物理学ハ，則チ哲学ノ一部ニシテ此純善ノ理想体ヨリテ立ツルナリ，氏ノ説ニテハ物界ノ諸象ノ唯此理想ニヨッテ成ルモノトス，即チ，物々互ニ相有スル秩序，順応，醜美等ハ皆其ノ理想ノ本源ヨリ生ズルモノトス。

精神（ Soul ）ハ合シテ一トナリ，分レテ数多トナルト雖モ，各人ノ精神ハ其源一体ノ全精神ト同一ナルモノトス，即チ其本体ヲ以テ，神体トナスモノゝ如シ。

氏ノ道義学ハ，唯此理想説ヲ実際ニ応用スルモノニ過ギズ，之ヲ以テ人間ノ目的及ヒ国家ノ本義ヲ定ムルナリ。人進ンデ理想ニ近ツキ之ヲ求ムルヲ欲シテ善行トナス。之ヲ為サント欲セバ，私欲感覚等ヲ脱去セザルベカラス，余故ニ以為ラク，此辺多ク対象ノ所説ニ似タリ，氏ノ国家ヲ論ジ，政治ヲ論ズル，即チ此理想ノ　　ヲ推シテ一身ヲ修ムルヨリ一国ニ及ボスマデニ過ギザルナリ。

之ヲ総ブルニ，氏ノ哲学ハ索氏ヨリ起リ，之ヲ拡充スルヲ以テ希挽哲学ノ最高度ト謂フテ可ナル。

然ルニ，氏，始メニハ，哲学ヲ論ズルニ理学の組織ヲ以テシ，物理ト理想ヲ合考シテ，全体ヲ構成セント雖モ終ニ索氏哲学中に朦乎トシテ胚胎セル意志理想ノ一辺ニ走リ霊理空想ノ一点ニ傾クノ弊アリ，故ニ之ヲ矯ルニハ事物ノ実理ヲ拡張セザルベカラズ，是レ亜里徳氏ヲ待ツ所ナリ。

(d) The Older Academy

After the death of Plato, Speusppus, his nephew, taught in the academy for the period of eighty years; Xenocrates succeeded him; and Polemon, Crates, and Crantor followed. Crantor is named as the first expounder of the Platonic writings. As Plato was the only true disciple of Socrates, so in turn the only true disciple of Plato was Aristotle.

(e) Aristotle

1. Life – Aristotle was born in Greek colony, 385 B.C. Early deprived of his parents, he came in his seventeenth year to Athens; and here in Plato's society he remained twenty years.

2. General character of his philosophy – With Aristotle, philosophy, which in Plato's hands remained popular both in form and matter, becomes universal. The

faculty which in Plato was intuitive is in Aristotle discussive; the direct vision through reason of the one is replaced in the other by reflection and logic. Turning from the Platonic unity of being, Aristotle prefers to direct his regards to the variety of the world; he seeks the idea only in its concrete realization, and seizes the individual fact in its characteristic quality and differences, rather than in its relation to the idea. He receives with equal interest the fact of nature, or of history, or of the soul of man. But he proceeds always by reference to what is individual. His whole philosophy is a discription of the given and eipirical; only as to absolute empiricist is that Aristotle is the true philosopher. Hence Aristotle is the founder also of natural history, of empirical psychology, and of the theory of morals. He is not only the founder of Logic, but the founder of several sciences unknown before him. The love of facts in Aristotle explains further his predominating inclination for physics. Aristotle is, moreover, the first philosopher who designs to bestow on hostory any exact attention. It is clear from this that likewise the method of Aristotle must be different from that of Plato. He proceeds not synthetically and dialectically like the latter, but almost exclusively analytically and regressively, that is to say, passing ever backwards from what is concrete to its ultimate grounds and principles. If Plato took his stand on the idea, in order from that position to explain the data of experience, Aristotle, on the contrary, takes his stand on these data in order to discover in them and demonstrate in them the idea. His method is, therefore, induction, that is, the derivation of general inferences and results from a sum of given facts and phenomena. Philosophy has for him the character and the value of a culculation of probabilities; and hence no trace of Platonic ideals. In his philosophy, sometimes he places with these a third science, named of artistic production, and sometimes he speaks of three parts, eithics, physics, and logic. Theoretical philosophy itself he divides at one time into logic, and physics, and at another into theology, mathematics, and physics.

3. Logic and Metaphysics

(a) Notion and relation of both – The name of Metaphysics is a creation of the Aristotelian commentators. Plato's word for it was Dialectics, and Aristotle uses instead of it the phrase 'first (fundamental) philosophy,' while physics in a like connection are for him 'second philosophy.' The relation of this first philosophy to the other sciences is defined by Aristotle as follows. Every science selects for investigation a special sphere, or a particular species of being. There must be, therefore, a science which shall make as its object the inquiry of what other sciences accept from

experience. This is the office of the first philosophy which occupies itself with being as being; whereas the other sciences have to do with special concrete being.

(b) Logic – The business of Logic, natural or scientific, as faculty or art, is to be able to prove through syllogisms, to form them and to pronounce on them; but syllogisms consist of propositions and propositions of notions. Aristotle's object, property, was only to collect the logical facts in reference to the formation of propositions and the process of syllogisms; and he has supplied in his Logic only a natural history of finite thought.

(c) Metaphysics – Of all the writings of Aristotle, the Metaphysics present in the least degree the appearance of a connected whole. Seven chief groups may be distinguished.

(aa) The Aristotelian criticism of the Platonic Ideal Theory– It is in Aristotle's opposition to the Platonic ideal theory that the specific difference of the two systems is to be sought.

Plato conceived the idea of all that is real. But in truth such an idea is not wrought into life and the process of nature. It is thus rather itself finite. Aristotle means this, when he objects to Plato that his ideas are only things of sense immortalized and eternalized; and that they are incompletely to explain the being and becoming of nature. Plato had led no competent proof of the objective reality of the ideas, independence of the things of sense, and thus his theory is not verified. The ideas are devoid of any special independent matter of contents. But at last, Plato assumed the things of sense in a universalized form as ideas. And thus it happens that his ideas are so little different from the actual units of sense that participate in them. The ideal duality and the empirical duality have one and the same import. But we can not believe Plato's theory of substance that it is imperishable, because it is besides the things of sense which participate in them.

斯ク云フトハイヘトモ普氏ノ之ヲ証スルヤ分明ナラス，故ニ「エッセンシャル，ジュアリチー」ヲ論ゼレハ，「ヘーゲル」ヲ祖トスルナリ。（前掲英文）

蓋シ普氏ハ感覚物ト理想ノ関係ヲ証スルニ「サブスタンス」ヲ以テス，此「サブスタンス」ナルモノ感覚物ヲ離レテ能ク存ン生滅ナキヲ以テ理想トソノ体ヲ同フシテ，而シテ又能ク感覚物ヲ組成スルナリ，感覚物ハ即チ，其外相又ハ一部分ナリト云フニアリ，是レ普氏ノ「リヤリスロ」ノ始唱者タル所以ナリ，然レトモ普氏之ヲ駁シテ曰ク，如何ニシテ感覚物ヲ離レテ「サブスタンス」ノ実体存シ得ルヤ又之ヲ知ルベキヤ.

The entire distinction between them is limited to an in-itself or its own real nature which attaches to the latter; istead of a man a horse, we have a man in himself, a horse

in itself. Only on this formal alternation, does the ideal theory rest. Thus in Plato the sensuous thing is only assumed as unsensuous. Accordingly, in Aristotle the idea is called as the eternalized thing of sense. That is to say, what is sensuous, is exalted into what is now sensuous. In short, the immanence of the universal in the singular, is the result of the Aristotelian critique of the ideas. However sound it was in Socrates to insist on the discovery of the universal as the true soul of the individual, and on the consequent assignment of the logical definition, the Plato's theory that would transform these generic notions into real, individual substances, existing independently and by themselves, is quite wrong. A universal or a genus is not a thing that exists apart from the singular and the individual. A thing and its notion can not be separated from each other. Despite all apparent antagonism to his master, his main proposition is the same as Plato's one, namely that the true nature of a thing is known and shown only in the notion. But still fro him the universal, the notion, must be as little separated from the particular exemplification of it in sence, as form from matter; and essence or substance in its strictest sense, is for him only that which is not predicated of anything else, but of which all else is predicated – whatever, namely, is a this thing, an individual thing, a special unit but not a universal.

(bb) The four Aristotelian principles or causes, and the relation of form and matter – From the critique of the Platonic ideas, there directly result the two main characteristics of the Aristotelian system, that is, form and matter. Aristotle enumerates four metaphysical principles or causes, – the formal, the material, the efficient, and the final. In the case of a house, for example, the building materials are the matter, the idea of it the form the efficient cause is to builder, and the actual house the end. (final cause) The effieient cause, namely, is what conducts the transition of potentiality into actuality, or the realization of matter into form. The efficient cause of matter is consequently the form. Thus man is the efficient cause of man. The builder is the efficient cause of the house and the efficient cause of the builder is the end to be accomplished the house. There remain to us only the two principles, matter and form. Matter is, for Aristotle, conceived in its abstraction from form, as what is without predicate, determination, and distinction; what is permanent subject in all becoming, and assumes the most contradictory forms; what however in its own being is different from everything that is become, and has in itself no definite form whatever; what then in everything in possiblility, but nothing in actuality. Everything which exists in nature is therefore a possibility that has attained to actuality. Matter is to Aristotle, accordingly, a much more positive substance than to Plato, who pronounced it the absolute non. This explains how Aristotle could conceive matter

in contradiction to form, as a positive negative. As a matter with potentiality, so form coincides with actuality. Pure form is what, without matter, in truth is, or the notion of true being, the pure notion. Such pure form exists not, however, in the kingdom of definite being: Every given being, every individual substance is a compound rather of matter and form. Matter, then, it is that prevents the existant from being pure form, pure notion; it is the ground of the becoming of plurality, multiplicity and contingency; it is at the same time what prescribes to science its limit. What in one reference is matter, is in another form. Wood in relation to the finished house is matter, in relation to the growing tree, form; the soul in relation to the body is form, in relation to reason which is the form of the form, it is matter. In this way, the totality of existence must constitute a graduated scale, of which the lowest degree will be a first matter entirely without form and the highest a last form entirely without matter (pure form). What finds itself between these extremes will be in the one direction matter, in the other form, which amounts to a continual selftranslation of the former into the latter. This is the conception that all nature is an eternal graduated conversion of matter into form. Since Aristotle expressly maintains that matter, as privation of form, can never wholly attain to actuality nor consequently to understanding, he fails to explain how all matter should become form, all possibility become actuality and all being become knowing. So, then, the Aristotelian system ends also in an insurmountable dualism of matter and form.

(cc) Potentiality and actuality – The relation of matter to form has, logically taken, manifested itself as the relation of potentiality to actuality. The Aristotelian system is one of becoming. He then has made an important step here towards subjugation of the Platonic dualism. In relation of the potential to the actual, Aristotle illustrates by the relation of the raw material to the finished article, of the proprietor to the builder, of the sleeper to the waker. The seed is the tree potentially, the tree potentially, the tree the seed actually. In this conception of the form as actuality or entelichie, there lies the chief distinction between the system of Aristotle and the sustem of Plato. To Plato the idea is stable, self-subsistent being, the opposite of motion and becoming; to Aristotle it is the eternal product of becoming, eternal energy, acutality in completed actuality.

(dd) The absolute, divine spirit – Aristotle has attempted to determine the idea of the absolute spirit. (a) The cosmological form. (b) Ontological form. (c) Moral form. (d) So far as the relation of potentiality and actuality is identical with that of matter and form, these arguments for the existence of a being who is pure actuality may be put in this shape also. Since the notion of form divides into the

three fundamental distinctions of the efficient, the notional, and the final cause, the eternal Being is also similarly absolute efficient principle, absolute, notion and absolute end. Aristotle, on the whole, has not, as already appears from these contradiction, with completeness and consistency established the relation between God and the world. As in his theory matter is never quite resolved into form, there manifests itself here too the unreconciled dualism between the divine spirit and the incongnixable in-itself of matter.

4. The Aristotelian Physics

The physics of Aristotle continue the consideration of the rise of matter into form of the graduated series which nature, a living being, describes in order to become an individual soul. All process, namely, has an end in view; an end, however, is form, and the absolute form is the spirit.

(a) In his physical books, Aristotle considers the universal conditions of all natural existence – motion, space and time. These physical principles he reduces, also, to the metaphysicals of potentiality and actuality. Motion is defined, accordingly, as the action of what potentially is, and consequently as mediatrix between potential being and entirely realized actuality. Space is defined as the possibility of motion, and possesses the quality, therefore, of being – potentially, not actually – divisible and infinitum. Time, as the measure of motion, equally divisible ad infinitum, and numerically expressible, is the numbering of motion in reference to an earlier and a later. All these are infinite, but the infinite that displays itself in them is only potentially, not actually, a whole.

(b) Aristotle derives from the notion of motion his theory of entire universe. The world, as a whole, is the circular or the most perfect motion; it is globe-shaped, and self-contained. Heaven, as the seat of spherical movement and of imperishable order, is meanest to the first moving cause, and stands directly under its influence; it consists not of perishable matter, but of higher elements – the ether. Its parts, the stars are impassive, changeless, and eternal being. Under the sphere of fixed stars, comes the lower sphere of planets, among which Aristotle enumerates besides the five usually acknowledged by the ancients, the sun, and the moon. Lastly, in the middle of the world there is the earth. There are thus assumed as necessary for the explanation of nature three species of beings, representing, at the same time, three degrees of perfection: An immaterial being, that itself unmoved, imparts movement, namely, the absolute spirit or God; secondly, a being that moves and is moved – though not without matter – eternally, imperishably, in a constantly univorm circle,

the super-terrestrial region of heaven; and lastly, in the lowest sphere, the perishable beings of earth, to which belongs only the passive role of receiving movement.

(c) Nature in the stricter sense, as scene of elemental action, exhibits to us a progressive transition of the elements into planets, and of planets into animals. The lowest step is occupied by the inanimate thing of nature. Soul we find operative in plants only as force of conservation and nutrition; the plant has no other function or vocation than to nourish itself and propagate its kind. In animals which also exhibit a graduated series according to the mode of their propagation, the soul appears as sensitive. Animals have senses, and are capable of locomotion. The human soul, finally, is nutritive, sensitive and cognitive.

(d) Man, as goal of universal nature, is the central and combining ganglion of the various grades, in which the life of nature exhibits itself. If nutrition fell to plants, sensation to animals, and locomotion to the higher animals, all thus belonging to the human soul. The soul itself is nothing else than the unification of these various functions of organic life into a single common designful activity, the designing unity of the organic body. The soul is related to the body as form to matter; it is animating principle. Simply for this reason the soul can not be taught without the body; neither can it exist by itself, and with the body it ceases to be. The soul, however, is quite different from the fourth power, thought or reason: The latter is not the product of the lower faculties, it not requires the intervention of any bodily organ, but it is absolutely simple, immaterial, self-subsistent, it is what divine in man. But there certainly exists a sonnection between thought and sensation; for the sensations meet inwardly in a centre, where they are transformed into images and conceptions, and further again into thoughts. And it might seem from this as if thought were only a result of sensation, as if the intelligence were only passibly determined, nay, Aristotle himself distinguishes between an active and a passive reason, which latter is only gradually developed into thinking cognition.

5. Aristotle's Ethics

(a) Relation of the ethics to the physics. Led here by his tendency to nature, Aristotle has united ethics more closely with physics than his two predecessors Socrates and Plato did. If Plato found it impossible to discourse of the good in the affairs of man without being to introduce the idea of the good in itself, Aristotle, on the contrary, held that the good in itself was of no assistance towards a knowledge of the good that was practicable in actual life, good for us.

此辺ノ思想即チ英国人ノ脳中ニ入ルナラン。

Only the latter (practical good in actual life) or morality in the life of man was for him the object of ethics.

道徳学ノ実験ヲ基趾トスルハ此辺ノ思想ヨリ起ル。

Hence, Aristotle prefers to consider the good in its relation to the actual constitution of man, as the aim appointed by nature herself. He conceives the moral element as flower, as spiritualization of the physical, rather than as someting purely intellectual; virtue as normal development of natural in stinct rather as dependent on knowledge. Man is a political animal by nature. This conjunction of the ethical with the physical element explains the polemic of Aristotle against the Socratic notion of virtue. (Socrates, looking for the foundation of morals in the action of intelligence as in superiority to sense, had set virtue and knowledge as one.) According to Aristotle, man is good through three things: Through nature, through habit, and through reason. He is in these respects directly opposed to Socrates. Whilest the latter, viewing morality and nature as opposed, made moral action the result of rational insight; the former, holding both to be steps of development, makes rational insight in moral things a result of moral action.

(b) The summum bonum – All action has an end in view: There must be a last and highest one, that is, Happiness. What is Happiness? The sensuous pleasure is not essential to man. What is specially human is the exercise of reason rather. Man, by nature and intelligence is formed for action, for rational action. Action and pleasure are inseparably united, then, by natural bond and constitute in their union, if carried out throughout an entire life, happiness. Hence, the Aristotelian definition of happiness, that it is a perfect activity in a perfect life. He holds that riches, friends, children, noble birth, personal beauty &c. are more or less necessary conditions of happiness, which, then, depends in part on contingencies. This moment of the Aristotelian theory has its foundation naturally in his empirical tendencies.

(c) Notion of Virtue – As results from the Aristotelian polemic against Socrates, virtue is the product of frequently repeated moral action, it is a quality won through exercise, an acquired moral ability of the soul. That there must be as many virtues as there are relations of life, follows of itself from the very notion of virtue. The virtue of a man is one thing, but that of a wife, a child, quite another. In like manner there must be consideration of time circumstances, and relations.

(d) The State – Neither virtue nor happiness, according to Aristotle, can be attained by the individual himself. By nature an is born for a life in common; he is a political being; life for him is only possible with his fellows. The state, then, is higher than the individual, higher than the family; individuals are only accidental parts of the

political whole. The character of his entire philosophy is on the ground of experience and it is the probable and practicable.

6. The Peripatetic School

The school of Aristotle, named Peripatetic, can be only mentioned here. Theophrastus, Endemus, Strato are the most celebrated leaders of it. Strato, the physicist, abandoned the dualism of Aristotle between the intelligent and the natural principle of things and upheld nature as the one, sole, all-productive all-formative might of existence.

7. Transition to the Post- Aristotelian Philosophy

The productive power of Frecian philosophy is exhausted with Aristotle. Instead of the great and universal systems of a Plato and an Aristotle, we have now one-sided subjective systems, correspondent to the general breach between the subject and the objective world which characterizes the time after Alexander the Great. The principles of subjectivity that first showed itself in the sophists, stands now after long struggles triumphant over the ruins of Grecian politics and Grecian art. The Post-Aristotelian systems denote a spiritual progress. The result is that now above all things certainty is aimed at difinitive knowledge. The effort is towares a fixed foundation; the transcendentalism of the Platonic idealism, and the hypothetical philosophizing of Aristotle, are abandoned; position is taken on the realistic terrain of immediate outer and inner experience in order to reach thence a theory of things that shall be logically established, and that shall leave nothing undecided.

普亜両氏ノ高尚ナル学次第ニ廃シテ実地目前ノ浅近ナル学ノ行ハルヽニ至レリ.

The endeavour in particular is to abolish the dualism of the Platonico-Aristotelian philosophy, and finally solve the problem of the reduction of all the differences and contrarities of existence, subject and object, spirit and matter, to a single ultimate ground. On the other hand, again, there fails even so to the post-Aristotelian philosophy, all simple scientific devotion to the object; it is a dogmatism that demands truth only for the subject, and is therefore one-sided.

「ポストー, アリストートル」, 哲学ハ遂ニ客観ヲ去リテ楽観ノ一見ニ偏依スルニ至レリ

The chief system of the Post-Aristotelian period is stoicism. In it subjectivity appears as universal, thinking subjectivity; and so, reason, one and universal, is taken as the essential principle of things. Man is, therefore, to seek his well-being only in a life above all circumstances according to nature and reason, not in individual enjoy-

ment.

人ノ目的トナル所，各自肉身ノ快楽ヲ主トスルニアラズ「ユニボルサル，リーゾル」ヲ求ムルニアリトス，是レ「ストイック」派ノ主義也.

The direct contrary of this is maintained by Epicureanism. In it the subject retires into the individuality of pleasure, into the bliss of philosophical repose, enjoying the present, and free from care, interested in the objective world only so far as it extends means for the satisfaction of his individuality proper.

「エピキュラス」派ノ学者ハ之レニ反シ，専ラ各己自己ノ快楽ヲ主トシテ内ノ道理等ヲ論ズルナシ，故ニ，以上ニ 派ハ共ニ一局ニ偏シテ正当ヲ得タルモノニアラズ

Scepticism agrees with these two systems in aiming at the undisturbedness and unmovedness of the subject by anything external; but it would attain this in negative way, through indifference to the objective world, through resignation of all definite knowledge and particular will.

The same character of subjectivity, finally, is exhibited by the last of the ancient philosophical systems, Neo-Platonism; for here, too, the exaltation of the subject to the absolute, forms the cardinal point of the system. When Neo-Platonism speculates objectively in regard to God and his relation to the finite, this has its motive in the desire to demonstrate the graduated transition from the absolute object to the personality of man. Here, too, then, the dominant principle is the interest of subjectivity, and the greater wealth of objective specifications has its ground only in the enlargement of subjectivity into the absolute.

Fate, Destiny and Necessity
天 命 論

(under destiny)

Voltaire's Dictionary of Philosophy

(a) Of the old books of the west, Homer is the most ancient, in which we find the idea of destiny and necessity. Among the nation of Jews the idea of a destiny had not been adopted until many ages after. Some of them who adopted this idea, mixed up a portion of the dogmas of the stoics with their ancient Jewish ideas. But that this idea would prevail, the aid of Homer and the Jews is not required. The idea that everything is performed according to immutable laws, that everything is ordained, that everything in fact is necessary, must arrive naturally among mankind. The manner in which we reason is as follows.

Either the world subsists by its own nature, by its own physical laws, or a supreme being has formed it according to his supreme laws. In both cases these laws

are immovable; in both cases everything is necessary; a heavy body tends towards the centre of the earth without having any power or tendency to rest in the air. Pear-trees can not produce pine-apples. The instinct of a spaniel can not be the instinct of an ostrich; everything is arranged, adjusted and fixed.

Man can only have certain number of teeth, hairs and ideas; and the period arrives when he necessarily loses them.

Profound politicians assure us that Cromwell had assassinated eight days before Charles I had his head cut off, that King would have continued alive and have died in his bed; and they may add that if all England bad been swallowed up in the sea, that King would not have perished on a scafford before white hall. But things were so arranged, that Charles was to have his head cut off.

Your physicians saved your aunt from certain malady, but in so doing he certainly did not contradict the order of nature but followed it. It is clear that your aunt could not but apply to the physician and that he could not but prescribe medicine which cured her, or were thought to cure her, while nature was the sole physician.

A peasant thinks that it hailed upon his field by chance; but the philosopher knows that there was no chance, and that it was absolutely impossible, according to the constitution of the world, for it, not to have hailed at that very time and place.

Some caution us by saying, "Do not believe in Fatalism; for, if you do it, you will exert yourself for nothing; you will sink down in indifference; you will regard neither wealth, nor honours, nor praise; you will be careless about acquiring anything whatever; you will consider yourself meritless and powerless; no talent would be cultivated, and all will be overwhelmed in apathy.

(V. 191, Voltaires)

Cahmber's Encyclopedia G. 15

necessity	VI	science	VII
philosophy	VII	fate	IV
religion	VIII	destiny	II & III

That the will is not free, is discussed by Haeckel in his History of Creation. VI. Page 237. He says; "the will, as well as the other mental activities, in higher animals, in this respect is different from that of men only in quantity, not in quality.

Logic

Definition. Logic is the science of the regulative laws of human knowledge. Knowledge comprehends both cognition which rests on perception and also cognition which is attained by thinking.

The act of knowing is conditioned in two wasy:

1. a subjectivity by the essence and natural law of human mind
2. an objectivity

The Aim of Knowledge is Truth

(a) Knowledge arrived at certainty of truth is science.

Logic is an integral part of the system of philosophy.

Philosophy may be defined as the science of the universe, not according to the individual existence but according to the principles which condition every individual, or the science of the principles of what is to be known in the special science.

Perception is the immediate knowledge of things existing together and in succession.

Thinking is the immediate knowledge.

(b) Trichotomy usually finds application where a development occurs which is independent and rests on internal causes; because such a development is accompanied in the form of an opposition of two manners and their fusion in a third.

Sir William Hamilton

心理学 He takes the science of mind as philosophy proper.

Philosophy necessarily tends the first cause.

氏曰ク，哲学ハ知識，学ナレバ其知識，根元タル心ヲ研究スルモノ之ヲ哲学ノ本部トセサルベカラス論理，倫理等ハ，其心理学ノ部分ニ過ギスト思フ。

"Man" says Protagoras, "is the measure of the universe." 氏ハConsciousness 哲学者ニ於ケルハ Bible, 神学者ニ於ケルガ如シ both are reveleations of the truth. Truth is equally the end of both christianity and philosophy coincide.

Consciousness can not be defined, for it lies at the root of all knowledge.

(c) Consciousness and knowledge involve each other. (I know = I am conscious)

(d) The physical basis of mind by Lewes (George Henry Lewes)

He devides the modes of existence into force and mind, first exhibited by all systems, second by organized substance, third by organized animal substance.

活力生む

Life may be defined as the mode of existence of an organism in relation to its medium.

Vitality is characterized by incessant movement, both of composition and decomposition in the building up of structure and the liberation of energy. In the nourishment of every organism there is an accumulation of molecular tension, that is to say, stored up energy in a latent state, ready to be expendid in the activity of that organism.

生カハ外ヨリ摂収シタル食物中ニ含ム所ノ衆力ノ発シテ活力トナルニヨル

(e) Leckey's Rationalism

社会、智力、親達

As men advance from an imperfect to a higher civilization, they gradually sublimate and refine their creed.

It predisposes men, in history to attribute all kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes.

全ク霊想ニ属スルモノ近世ニ至リ一般ノ開明ト共ニ萬有ノ理法ヲ以テ証明シ道明始メテ霊想ヲ制スルニ至ル。

生力其元

其滅シタル熱ハ活力ノ一部分ナルヲ以テ運動ヲ営ムナリ。チレタル氏説宣シカラズ

(f) Bray's Anthropology

Our earth and planetary system and indeed the whole cosmos, are supposed to have existed originally as nebulous matter – that is, a sort of "fiery mist" like the tails of comets.

斯ル者カ漸々其熱ヲ発散シテ今日ノ如クニ至ル。然シ今日ノ目ハ死シタル世界ニシテ地球モ亦此ノ如クナルベシ。而シテ，最後ニ太陽ニ合スベシ。

地球進化

planetory bodies are gravitating towards the sun,

斯クシテ太陽ハ亦諸恒星ト合シ（別ニ宇宙一体ノ

nebulous fiery mist ニ帰スベシ（帰元）

其時運動シトムヲ以テ大熱ヲ生スヘシ

命ノ帰元ノ例ニナル

(g) ○物質一体論 Spectrocope ノ助ニヨリテ太陽ハ地球ヨリ其……不明……

he says "The atoms of matter are suddenly urged together, by their own perfect elasticity they recoil; and thus is set up the molecular oscillation which announces itself to the nervers as heat.")

心理ハ物理ト同一ノ理法ニスルベシ

Heat, light, electricity, chemical affinity, life, mind are forces known to us only in their modes of motion which is shown by grove. No force is destructable is proved by Farady.

Huxley says, "Planets are the accumulators of power which animals distributes and disperse.

Huley considers that as world and systems have grown out of a comparative chaos of matter, so all animal life has been evolved from a shpeless mass of what he calls protoplasm. Life has probably existed on this earth 100 million, while man about 100 thousand years.

Broy，説ニテハ物心ハ初メヨリ共ニ存ルベキ元素アリテ，其成長ニヨリテ分ル故ニ曰ク

非心非物 The whole world is one complete and living organism. The tendency on the part of matter to organize itself to grow into shape, to assume definite forms in to the definite action of force is all-pervading. 又曰ク Incipient life manifest itself throughout the whole of what we call inorganic nature.

之ハ非物非心ニ入ルベシ 人動ノ別ハ度ニアリテ類ニアラス 故ニ死ハ其死ニアラス

(h) What we call Death is the mere grinding up of old and useless bodies to make into new and more perfection.

Kant's Metaphysics of Ethics

a marked distinction between { intellectual or theoretical part / moral or practical part

(i) Decartes, Locke, Mallbranche, Leibnitz, Hume the philosophy of Locke was triumphant in Britain. Condillac held the same philosophy in France.

In Britain, Shaftesbury, Butler and Hutchson maintained a moral philosophy based on a foundation against Locke's psychology.

其后Hume出デテ懐疑ヲ開キ，ツトニ感覚ヲ用ス，斯ク一方ニ僻ヘ心理学ヲ立ツベカラザルニ至リ「リート」氏人ノ普通ノ考ニ従ッテ哲学ヲトクニ至ル「カント」深認感ヲ以テHumeニ反シテ真覚教ヲ聞ク

Kant (speculative) Reed (common sense)

経練家ニ反シテ起ルモノ其他

Sterwart, Hamilton, Cousin

此哲，「リード」及「カント」氏ノ説ヲ進展増補スルモノナリ。「カント」派「ソフィーテス」「セーリング」「ヘーゲル」ニ傳ハルカントハ自由意志ヲ以テ道義トス。善意ノ元来ヲ論ス

(j) He says, "a good will constitutes apriori conditions, without which no one is dumed to be happy.

Hamilton's Logic

(k) Logic is the science of the laws of thought as thought.

He says. "The end which all our scientific efforts are exerted to accomplish is Truth and Certainty. Truth is the correspondence or agreement of a cognition with its object; its criterion is the necessity determined by the laws which govern our faculties of knowledge; and certainty is the consciousness of this necessity."

"The criterion of truth is the necessity determined by – That the necessity of a fognition that is, the impossibility of thinking it other than as it is presented.

斯寛氏ノ標準之ニ○リ

物心一体ノ処ニ及ブ

(l) Stirling's Secret of Hegel

He says that "Hegel's system is a universe of thought in which nature, the ego are but moments; or the universe is an organon of thought into which all particular are absorbed as moments; and the aggregate of these moments constitute the organic whole.

(m) Mandsley's Physiology of Mind

心理組成ノ処

The characteristic of living matter is the complexity of combinations and the variety of elements in so small a compass that we can not yet trace them; and in nervous tissue this complication and concentration is carried to its highest pitch. Nervous tissue with its evergy is dependent for its existence on all the lower kinds of tissue that have preceded it in the order of development. All the force of nature could not develop a nerve-cell directly out of inorganic masses. The highest energy in nature is really the most dependent.

心理ハ物理ナリ

是ヲ以テMind as the most dependent of all the natural forces. ト結ビ心理ハ物理ヲ以テ証セリ。

Stewar's Conservation of Energy

1. Mechanical or molar
2. Molecular
   1. heat
   2. light
   3. chemical
   4. electricity

(o) 心力ハ大ニ物力と異ル所アルノモ其高低増減毎ニ物力ヲ伴フヲ以テ勢力保存ノ理法ノ中ニ入ルヘシ 云フ

Romanes Intelligence

心理、物理、人類造化

Peschel's The Races of Man　人種ノ動物ヨリ進化センヲ論ズ
Lubock, Origin of Civilization
Haeckel's Evolution of Man　野蛮ヨリ開明ノ活歩シタルコト

(p) Huxley's 論文
Darwin's expression of emotion
Hickok's logic of reason

氏ノ説ニテハ，経験ノ前ニ要スルモノアリテ，其者　絶対ヨリ来リ人ノ経験スヘテ其中ニアリ，而シテ我人論義シテ其体ノ自知，自立，自道ノモノタルヲ知ル之ナクンバ経験ヲ施スコト。能ハサレバナク。

Ribot's psychology

従来ノ哲学ハ universal science ニシテ事物一般ノ理ヲ論ジタルモ，今後ハ心理学其ノ範囲ヨリ脱シテ哲学ハハ……不明……

氏ノ説ニテハ，心理モ初メハ哲学ノ範囲ニアリシモ従来，其範囲ヲ脱シテ一般ノ心理学トナリシト云フ。

其中ニ Hartley 氏ハ The theory of vibration ヲ以テ神経ノ現象及物心ノ関係ヲ説キ The theory of associationヲ以テ心テ心性ノ組織作用ヲ明セリ，蓋シニュートン氏—optics Lockes Association of ideaヨリトナラン尋テ「シル」ノ感覚理連想，スペンタル氏ノ進化尋デ「ベーン」「モノスレーフリー号，物理ヲノベテ心理ヲ証シタルコト，「ステワルト」氏亦然リ。

智力進化

Draper's intellectual development

Dpaper is litellected development 氏ハ人智ノ発達ハ偶然ニアラスシテ，従フコトヲ証セントセリ。

(r) Bain's Mind and Body

心身ノ関係ヲ論セリ

第一ニ感應ハ言語又ハ外貌ニ顕ハル。

第二ニ身体上ノ変化ハ心性上其影響ヲ生レ，心性上ノ変化ハ身体上ニ其……飢餓労働睡眠・憂霊 患恐，慣習，症病○○心性ニ影響アルガ如シ。

健康上ニ影響アルガ如シ。

脳ト心ノ関係。

(s) 1. a blow on the head which suspends conscious
2. increase of the product of nervous waste, mental exertion
3. quality and quantity of bood supplied to brain
   (a) no organ is active without blood
   (b) deficiency in circulation's effect
   (c) demand by brain corresponds with its function in degree
   (d) in sleep, diminution of its supply
   (e) 血量ノ少キ手ハ心用ヲ弱ウス。

之ニ反シテ Vice Versati abcd

哲学ト心理学

(t) History of Philosophy by Ueverweg

Philosophy is the science of principles. It is not occupied with any special limited province of things nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full extent, but with the nature, laws and connection of whatever actually is

「クラトフ」及「アリストテレス」ハ哲学ヲ義スルニ広狭ノ二様アリ，広義ニテハ，諸理学ヲ合スルナリ○

「ストイック」ハ哲学ハ物理，倫理，論理ニ分ケ Eplanta 道理上，幸福ヲ求ムルヘシetc

Wolf ハ哲学ト positive science 区域ヲ定メタリ。

Kant 学理上ノ諸学ノ統界トシ，諸学ト人理ノ目的トノ関係ヲ論ズル学トス。

Herbert defines it as the elaboration of conception

Hegel the science of the absolute in the form of dialectical development or the sceince of the self-comprehending reason

1. Modern Empirical Bacon
   Hobbes
   or rationalistic (1) Descartes Genliux
   Malebranche
2. Dogmatic (2) Spinoza
   (3) Locke, Berkely
   (4) Leibnitz, Hume

(u) Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Herbart, Beneke

(v) George Henry Lews, History of Philosophy

Science is defined as:

The systematization of our knowledge of the order of phenomena considered as phenomena.

智力ハ性力

Philosophy is the systematization of the conceptions furnished by science. Eache distinct science embraces a distinct province of knowledge. But philosophy has no distinct province of knowledge. It embraces the whole world of thought.

Ribot's Heredity

Thus, he defines instinct is an unconscious mode of intelligence. Instincts are only habits fixed by heredity.

性力ハ慣習ノ遺伝ンタルモノニ過ギストスル。

遺伝ハ生理上ノ一理法トス（是ヲ以テ，又心理ヲ証明スルコトヲ得）。

Buekle ハ遺伝ハ偶然ニ尾スルカ如ク論スルヲ以テ Ribot 之ヲ駁ス Ribot 遺伝法ヲ分ケテテ直接ノ問題，間接，影響。

(w) Galton's Hereditary genious

氏ハ天才 Genius ノ全ク遺伝ニ属スルヲ論ズ。

（発育ハ）

氏ハ斯クシテ「タレウキン」氏ノ論ニ会照セリ。

(x) Henry Mandsley's Body and Mind

(y) Flint, History of Philosophy

French
- Bodin
- Bishiop Bossnet
- Montesquieu
- Turgot
- Voltaire
- Condorcet
- M. Ballinche, M. de Bonald
- Saint Simon and
- Cousin and

Pascal
Persault

Birchez and Leboux
Comt
and Guinet

German
- Leibnitz, Iselin, Wegelin, Schozer von Müller
- Lessing
- Herder
- Kant and
- Fichte, Schelling, Stutzmann, Steffens and Goerres
- Frederick
- Krause
- Hegel

Bunsen and Lasaulx
Lazarius, Lotze and Hermann

Sidgwieks Fallacies

循環ニ入ルヘシ

氏ハ定義ノ循環ヲ論ジテ一二者全ク相反対シタルモノニ義解ヲ下スノニハ，互ニ他ノ義解ヲ仮リルベカラズト云ヒ，「ベーン」氏ノ語ヲ引テ宇宙ノ最大点ニ達スレバ畢竟二者ニ帰シ，其二者ハ互ニ相仮リテ解スルヨリ外ナシ」故ニ我人ノ注意スベキハ未ダ其極点ニ達セザル小範囲中ニアリテ，義解循環ヲ用ヰザルニアリ。

物理ニテ物力ニハ義解ヲ下スベカラザルヲ此ニ入ルベシ。是皆二者一体ナレバナリ

唯物唯心ニ入ル

(z) laws of thought { that of identity (A is A)
contradiction (A is not not-A)
excluded middle (A is either B or not-B)

Science of Thought by Everett

氏曰ク思想ハ其……

思想ハ木石ノ如キ，死物ニアラザレバ，自体ニ具スル所ノ力ヲ以テ発育スル事ヲ得ト云ヒ又，自ラ其形ヲ外ニ規スルハ現況自体ノ性質ナリ。

氏曰ク，外物ハスヘテ其形ヲ思想ノ上ニ現スルニアラザレバ我人之ヲ知ル能ハズ。

唯心

Kirkman's philosophy without assumption

氏ハ我在（ I am ）ヲ以テ……者我在ハ諸論諸説起ル。

……之ヨリ出ルモノナレバナリ。

Bower's modern philosophy

……理学ハ事物ノ一部分ニ関シ，哲学ハ一般ニ……

Ferrier's system of philosophy

氏ハ哲学ヲ形而上学ト同一ニシテ，其目的ハ真理ヲ論究……

道理上ニ真理ヲ立……

Murphy's Habit and Intelligence

氏ハ Habit ヲ以テ Uuconscious & conscious life ノ 原理トシ，又 life of mind ノ原理トス連想ノ理法モ其一部ナリ

Caird's Philosophy of Kant

リユース氏ノコンド氏性学説ニハ，哲学ニハ

哲学ハ The explanation of the phenomena of the universe Philosophy is inherent in man's nature.

理学ハ Principle of Science by
Identity & diversity, discovery

ヨリ起コル其規則ハ即チ
law of Identity
law of Contradiction
law of Duality/excluded middle

理学ノ起ルニハ
Power of discrimination
Power of detecting identity
Power of retention

Hume's Human Nature

Fiske's Outline of Cosmic Philosophy

理学ノ義解

氏ノ説ニテハ，理ハ宇宙現象ノ一二ノ部分ニ属スル真理ヲ研究スルモノニシテ全体ニ亘ル真理ヲ研究スルニアラズト。

Knowledge of science is only an aggregate of parts, not an organic whole. But the universe of phenomena is an organic whole.

之ヲ確認スルモノヲ哲学トスルノ説ナリ。

While science studies the parts, philosophy studies the world.

Wright's philosophical discussion

Mansel's metaphysics

Aristotle divides speculative philosophy

1. Physics, M

History of the inductive science (by Whewell)

X345, V84, V92, V79

Dynamic Sociology by Ward

The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however, a its study, is lifeless.

He takes life as the result of the aggregation of matter.

生活ノ基礎

Explains the basis of the universe by three fundamental elements, matter, motion, energy.

Dynamists resolve matter into centres of force.

Materialists reduce all forms of energy to modes of motion in matter.

The object of all science is truth and that of philosophy also matter and its relation (the most important one is motion) that is change in apce and time.

理学ノ基礎

Force may be defined as molecular impact. It is the effect which matter in its motion through space exerts upon other matter with which it comes in contact.

Whewell's History of the Inductive Science

To the formation of science, two things are requisite: facts & ideas, sense and reason.

That is observation of things without, & inward effort of thought

理学ヲ博シテ，心理ニ入ルベシ。

自然理論ノ定限

(c) Wright's Philosophical Discussion

Hamilton's psychology object = that which is thought about
subject = that whice thinks

Wright says:

Natural selection is not essentially concerned in the first production of

any form, structure, power or habit, but only in perpetuating and improving those which have arisen from any cause whatever.

Newtonian theory of gravity or Harvery's theory of the circulation of the blood.

See, Physical Theory of Universe, V. 79.

Sir. W. Herschel's nebulas hypothesis is that

地質論

"Assuming a self-huminous substance of a highly attenuated nature to be distributed through the celestial regions, he endeavoured to show that, by the mutual attraction of its constituent parts, it would have a tendency to form itself into distinct aggregation of nebulous matter, which in each case would gradually condense from the con action of the attractive foreces, until the resulting mass finally acquired the consistency of a solid body, and became a star."

自然陶汰ノ定限

Laplace applies this hypotesis, by an ingenious but simple use of mechanical principles, to the explanation of the origin of the planetory bodies, and of the general features of their movements in the solar system.

Wright says "Nebular hypotheses belonged to that class of theories of which it is sometime said that if they are not true, they deserve to be true.

He says, "natural selection is not a cause at all, but is the mode of operation of a certain quite limited class of causes. It applies to no part of inorganic nature and is very limited even in the phenomena of organic life.

Lecture on Evolution of Philosophy

学界進化論

Lobbock's Origin of Civilization and Primitive Condition of Man.

He concludes thus: (p. 323 at the end)

"The facts and orguments mentioned in this work afford, I think, strong grounds for the following conclusion; namely,

That existing savages are not the descendants of civilized ancestors.

That the primitive condition of man was one of utter barbarism.

That from this condition several races have independently raised themselves. These views follow, I think, from strictly scientific considerations. We shall not be the less inclined to adopt them, on account of the cheering prospects which they hold out for the future."

"Here I will only add that if the past history of man has been one of deterioration, we have but a groundless expectation of future improvement: On the other hand, if the past has been one of progress, we may fairly hope that the future will be so also;

that the blessings of civilization will not only be extended to other countries, and to other nations, but that even in our own land they will be rendered more equable and more general: so that we shall not see before us always, as now, countrymen of our own living in our very midst a life worse than that of a savage; neither enjoying the rough advantages and real, though coarse pleasures of savage life, nor yet availing themselves of the far higher and more noble opportunities which lie within the reach of civilized man."

此意若シ社会愈々退歩シテ来リシモノナラバ，余輩将来ニ望ヲ属スベキナシ，然レドモ世ハ益益進化スルモノナレバ，是ヨリ益々余輩ノ幸福ヲ増進スベキヲ知ルベキナリ

余案ズルニ開明愈進メハ益々貧富ノ懸隔多カルベシ

拉氏ノ論ト大イニ反スルアリ

p. 256 at the end of Chapter VI, Lubbock says: "The immense service which science has thus rendered to the cause of religion and humanity, has not hiterto received the recognition which it deserves. Science is still regarded by many excellent, but narrow-minded, persons as hostile to religious truth, while in fact she is only opposed to relighous error. 理学ハ宗教ノ真理ヲ駁スルニアラズ

其正理ニ反スル点ヲ破スルノミナリノ意ヲ明ス

No doubt her influence has always been exercised in opposition to those who present contradictory assertions under the excuse of mystery, and to all but the highest conceptions of Divine power. The time, however, is approaching when it will be generally perceived that so far from science being opposed to religion, true religion is, without science, impossible; and if we consider the various aspects of christianity as understood by different nations, we can hardly fail to perceive that the dignity, and therefore the truth, of their religious beliefs is in direct to the knowledge of science and of the great physical laws by which our universe is governed.

耶蘇教ノ真理トナリテ，世間ニ行ハルヽニ至リシハ，理学真達ノ力ニ由ル

Draper's conflict between Religion and Science

In the preface, it is said: That faith is in its nature unchangeable, stationary; science is in its nature progressive; and eventually a divergence between them, impossible to conceal, must take place:

是即チ宗教ト理学トノ争論起ル所以ナリ

Draper says, at the end of the book: "Faith must render an account of herself to Reason. Mysteries must give place to facts. Religion must relinquish that imperious, that domineering position which she has so long maintained against Science.

There must be absolute freedom for thought. The ecclesiastic most learn to keep himself within the domain he has chosen, and cease to tyranize over the philosopher, who, conscious of his own strength and the purity of his motives, will bear such interference no logner.

理学ノ進ムニ従ッテ宗教其威権ヲ減殺スベキ所以ヲ論ズルナリ

Origin of Science (Chapter I)

Religious condition of the Greeks in the fourth century before Christ. – Their invation of the Persian Empire brings them in contact with new aspects of Nature, and familiarizes them with new religious systems; the military, engineering, and scientific activity, stimulated by the Macedonian Campaigns, leads to the establishment in Alexandria.

Haeckel says: Where faith commences, science ends.

Buckle says: "Man is affected by four classes of physical agents; namely, climate, food, soil, and the general aspect of nature."

"History is the modification of man by nature, and of nature by man." Influence of religion on the progress of society – page 184–191.

"These ignorant tribes have adopted, indeed, the ceremonies of the new religion, but have by no means adopted the religion itself. They receive the externals, but they stop."

愚人ハ宗教ノ外容ヲトリ其真味ヲ知ラズ

宗ノ害ヲナスハ教ニアラズシテ人ニアリ

斯氏最大幸福説ヲ駁シテ曰ク

(Social Statics)

So, we may say, not only that every epoch and every people has its peculiar conception and of happiness, but that no two men have like conceptions; and further, that in each man the conception is not the same at any two periods of life. 人ノ幸福ト考フル所，各（異ニシテ，其体トスル所又異ナリ，是レ只人ト時ト共ニ異ルニ由ルノミナラズ一人ニテモ時異ナレバ其考フル所又異ナラザルヘカラズ

Happiness signifies a gratified state of all the faculties. The gratification of a faculty is produced by its exercise. （中　略） There is, however, a point up to which increase of mental activity produces increase of happiness, but beyond which, it produces in the end more pain than pleasure.

In Spencer's Biography

Definition of Life

1. Schelling's definition: "Life is the tendency to individuation."

2. Rickerand's definition: "Life is a collection of phenomena which succeed each other during a limited time in an organized body."

3. De Blainville: "Life is the two-fold internal movement of composition and decomposition.

4. G. H. Lewes: "Life is a series of definite and successive changes, both of structure and composition, which take place within an individual without destroying its identity."

5. Definition of Life by Spencer: "Life is the coordination of actions;" or more exactly; "Life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive."

Hechael's creation

About the Descent of Man – Those processes of development which led to the origin of the most ape-like men out of the most man-like apes must be looked for in the two adaptational changes which above all others, are distinctive of man, namely, upright walk and articulate speech. These two physiological functions necessarily originated together with two corresponding morphological transmutations, namely, the differentiation of the two pairs of limbs and the differentiation of the larynx.

Caird Kant V 184
Comte Science V 22
Cousin History of Philosophy V 66
Dall Evolution
Day Ontological
Flexning V 166
Greg V
Hume Human Nature V 190
Huxley Ninilism
Jevon Science V 63
Lemge Materialism V 180
Lewes Biological V 71
Wilkinson Materialism
Alden V 28

Friswell V 160
Reid V 130
Tube V 211

（円了稿録の末尾から始まる部分）

Mill's Three Essays of Religion

Meaning of Nature

Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them; including not only all that happens, but all that is capable of happening; the unusual capabilities of causes being as much a part of the idea of Nature, as those which take effect.

The word Law has distinctly two meanings, in one of which it denotes some definite portion of what is, such as the law of gravitaion, or the law of motion, in the other, of what ought to be such as moral laws or law of justice. The law in the expression of Law of nature is used in the first meaning, that is, of what is.

1. what is 2. what ought to be

It will be useful to sum up in a few worda the leading conclusions of the essay on Nature.

The word Nature has two principal meanings; it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregates of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be, apart from human interaction.

In the first of these senses, the doctrine that man ought to follow nature is numeaning; since man has no power to do anyting else than follow nature; all his actions are done through, and in obedience to, some one or many of nature's physical or mental laws.

In the other sense of the term, the doctrine that man ought to follow nature, or in other words, ought to make the spontaneous course of things the model of his voluntary actions, is equally irrational and immoral.

Irrational, because all human action whatever, consists in altering, and all useful action improving, the spontaneous course of nature.

Immoral, because the course of natural phenomena being replete with everything which shen committed by human beings is most worthy of abhorrence, any one who endeavoured in his actions to imitate the natural course of things would be universally seen and acknowledged to be the wickest of men.

The schme of Nature regarded in its whole extent, cannot have had, for its sole or even principal object, the good of human or other sentient beings. What good it brings to them, is mostly the result of their own exertions. Whatever, in nature gives indication of beneficient design, proves this beneficience to be armed only with limited power; and the duty of man is to cooperate with the beneficient powers, not by imitating, but by perpetually striving to amend the course of nature – and bringing that part of it over which we can exercise more nearly into with a high standard of justice and goodness.

A Note from Tokio Lecture by J. A.

Ewing, on the religions of the Christian religion to natural sciences, especially to the theory of evolution.

What is Science? The materials out of which we build up science are the facts which we learn through our senses. But these in themselves are not science any more than a pile of tiles and timber is a house. We must not only observe; we must measure and compare; we must collect those facts together which have something in common, and decide what that common feature is, and we must try to explain them by pointing out that they follow from some sipler or more general results of our experience.

What is Religion? Turning now to Religion, and more particularly to the Christian religion, we find, I think, four elements which are combined under that name. These are (1) certain beliefs: (2) certain moral precepts; (3) certain rites or observances, with an organization which carries these into effects; and (4) a certain habit of mind which for want of a better name we may call devout.

Relation of these two – Science shows us the order of nature, its method and history; religion shows its origin, and to some extent, its purpose and destiny. If we ask how things happen, we appeal to science; if we ask why they are so, science can not help us, but religion is ready with at least a partial answer.

A host of workers. – Not to mention a host of minor workers, we find amongst the Christian Newton, who supplied the key to the solar system; Boyle, the father of modern chemistry; Dalton, who discovered the laws of chemical combination; Young, one of the greatest developers of the undulatory theory of light; Faraday, the prince and pattern of all experimentalists.

As to Slobe Development – The nebular theory of Laplace assumes that the material which forms our sun, the earth and other planets, and their moons, was a long time ago differed in very much smaller pieces throughout a vast extent of space. Those particles attracted each other by ordinary gravitation and therefore fell together,

but besides this motion towards a common centre we must suppose they had a motion of rotation about that centre. In rushing together they generated heat by their collisions, or, in more learned language, their potential energy was changed to heat.

As the condensing mass cooled by radiation it split out partly, and portions became detached from the main body which repeated the process for themselves on a small scale. These formed the planets, while the main body continued to condense ito the sun. As the planets condensed, they in like manner, threw off, or rather I should say left behind, moons, or rings as in the case of Saturn. Owing to its vastly larger mass, and partly perhaps on account of its originally higher temperature, the sun has cooled less completely than the smaller bodies of the system. It is still enormously hot, so hot as to be a grand dispenser of radiant energy, but it is a spendthrift living wastefully on its capital: It is radiating out energy without receiving anything like the equivalent of what it gives so that its store is steadily diminishing. The earth, though still enormously hot in its interior, has long ago cooled sufficiently to admit of life on its surface. We know, however, with much certainty that it was formerly in a molten state, far too hot to admit of life. The question then arises – and it is a question of no small interest – how long ago did the earth cool down sufficiently to be a hanitation for living beings? Sir William Thomsome has succeeded in giving an approximate answer to this question. Three independent lines of reasoning have led to the conclusion that something like fifteen millions of years is the longest time during which life can have existed on the earth. The calculation is at best a rough one, and perhaps we should say fifty millions instead of fifteen. At any period much earlier than that, the surface of the globe must have been too hot for the existence, not only of such living things as we now find on it, but of any conceivable form of organic life.

And now, if we look forward instead of looking back, we see that the separation of the planets from the central mass which occupied during the ordinal contraction, is only a temporary thing, only a postponement of their ultimate fate. Their speed of rotation round the central sun diminishes continually, and they tend to fall in towards it with a slow spiral motion. The earth will by and by be engulfed, and when it falls in, it will at least serve this good pupose, that it will supply the sun with a large addition to the stock of heat energy which is radiated out for the use of such of the other planets as will still be outside to receive it. I need not say that this catastrophe would put an end to all terrestrial life; if, indeed, that had not died before from an altogether different cause. The processes of growth and nourishment depend essentially on the radiation which we receive from the sun; and if that were greatly diminished

no life could exist on the earth. Now, the sun is a hot body in the act of cooling, so a time must come when, even if the earth be still pursuing an independent path the sun's rays will be too feeble to keep up animal and vegetable life. Life, then, may be frozen out or it may be burnt out; but one way or other it will come to an end within a finite length of time.

Now we saw that some fifteen or it may be fity millions of years ago the earth was too hot to permit of life on its surface. And when it cooled, if life did not originate on it by spondaneous generation, must we suppose an act of creation to have taken place? Not necessarilly; for as Helmholtz and Thomson have suggested, the germs of life may have come to the earth from other globes borne by those stary fragments which we know sometimes strike our planet.

Conclusion – Obviously in all this we have no proof of a future life. What I contend is merely that science does not disprove it. What she teaches me is that I am more than a countless aggregate of molecular, more than a collection of cells, more than a highly organized individual units of vitality. She teaches me that there is something which is more truly myself than any of these, and transcend them all.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has been admirably summed up by Clerk Maxwell in a single sentence: "The progress of science," he says, "so far as we have been able to follow it, has added nothing of importance to what has always been known about the physical consequences of death, but has rather tended to deepedn the distinction between the visible part, which perishes before our eyes, and that which we are ourselves, and to show that this personality, with respect to its nature as well as to its destiny, lies quite beyond the range of science."

From Tyndall's Address (p. 56)

(His thought of religion)

He says, "it will be wise to recognize them (religion) as the forms of a force, mischievous if permitted to intrude on the region of objective knowledge, over which it holds no command, but capable of adding, in the region of poetry and emotion, inward completeness and dignity to man.

"Feeling, I say again, dates from as old as origin and as high a source as intelligence, and it equally demands its range of play. The wise teacher of humanity will recognize the necessity of meeting this demand, rather than of resisting it on account of errors and absurdities of form. What we should resist, at all hazrds, is the attempt made in the past, and now repeated, to found upon this elemental bias of man's nature a system which should exercise despotic sway over his intellect.

Education

F 54	Alcott, Methods of Moral Culture
F 102	Arnold, German Universities
F 64	Arnold, Popular Education of France
V 119	Bacon's Literary and Professional Works
V 119	Bacon's Literary and Professional Works
V 81	Bain's Emotion & Will
V 314	Balfour's Defence of Philosophical Doubt
V 95	Bixby's Similarity of Phusical and Religious Knowledge
V 183	Bowen's Modern Philosophy
V 169	Bray's Manual of Anthropology or Science of Man
V 216	Bray's Philosophy of Necessity
V 184	Caird's Philosophy of Kant
V 123	Calderwood's Philosophy Infinite

Names of Books

Philosophy in General

V 119	Bacon	Literary & Professional Works
V 81	Bain	Emotion and Will
V 314	Balfaur	Defence of Philosophical Doubts
V 95	Bixby	Similarity of Physical & Religious Knowledge
V 183	Bowen	Modern Philosophy
V 169	Bray	Manual of Anthropology or Science of Man
V 216	"	Philosophy of Necessity
V 184	Caird	Philosophy of Kant
V 123	Calderwood	Philosophy Infinite
V 368	"	Relation of Science and Religion
V 167	Carpenter	Spiritualism
V 109	Combe	Relation between Science and Religion
V 22	Comte	Philosophy of Science
V 247	"	Positive Philosophy
V 186	"	System of Positive Philosophy

V 66	Cousin	History of Modern Philosophy
V 212	〃	Kant
X 266	Day	Outlines of Ontological Science
P 128	De Quincy	Essays
V 259	Descartes	Method Meditation
V 292	Doberty	Organic Philosophy
V 13	Draper	History of Conflict between Religion and Science
V 25	〃	History of Intellectual Development
V 209	Ferrier	Philosophical Works
V 307	Fichte	New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge
V 173	〃	Science of Knowledge
V 350	Fiske	Darwinism and Other Essays
V 67	〃	Outline of Cosmic Philosophy
V 166	Fleming	Vocabulary of Philosophy
V 317	Flint	Philosophy of History in Europe
V 296	Frothingham	Transcendentalism
V 218	Galton	English Men of Science
P 570	Greg	Enigmas of Life
V 376	Grote	Aristotle
V 377	〃	Plato
V 84	Haeckel	History of Creation
V 89	Harris	Civilization Considered as a Science
V 256	Hegel	Lecture on the Philosophy of History
V 150	Henry	Epitome of the History of Philosophy
V 312	Herbert	Realistic Assumption of Modern Science
P 366	Hobbes	English Works
V 294	Hodgson	Theory of Practice 2Vol.
V 295	Time and Space	
V 190	Hume	Treatise on Human Nature
D 83	Huxley	More Criticism on Darwin and Others
V 63	Tevon	Principle of Science 2Vol.
V 163	Kant	Critique of Pure Reason
V 110	〃	Religion within the Boundary of Pure Reason
V 301	Kilkman	Philosophy without Assumptions
V 180	Lange	History of Materialism
V 26	Lecky	History of the Spirit of Rationalism 2Vol.

V 366	Le Conte	Religion and Science
V 75	Leggl	Chinese Classics 8Vol.
V 71	Lewes	Biographical History of Philosophy
V 72	〃	History of Philosophy
V 12	Loonus	Chinese Classics
V 291	Mahaffy	Kant's Philosophy
V 20	Masson	Recent British Philosophy
V 373	Materialism	
V 136	Body and Mind	
V 213	Mill, J.	Fragment on Mackintosh
V 115	Mill, J.S.A.	Comte and Positivism
V 70	〃	Examination of Hamilton
V 83	〃	Positive Philosophy of A. Comte
V 69	〃	Utilitarianism
V 10	Paine	Age of Reason
V 11	〃	Theological Works
V 76	Plato	Dialogues 4Vol
V 114	〃	〃 5Vol
V 248	Savage	Religion of Evolution
F 4	Schmid	Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism
V 162	Schwegler	History of Philosophy
V 185	Shields	Final Philosophy
V 52	Spencer	First Principle
V 51	〃	Illuminations of Universal Progress
V 49	〃	Philosophy of Style
V 5	〃	Principle of Biology 2Vol
V 50	〃	Recent Discussion in Science
V 189	Stephen	Liberty
V 275	Stephen	History of English Thought 2Vol
V 210	Stevenson	The Join Religion and Philosophy
V 118	Stewart	Dissertion
V 118	〃	Philosophical essays
V 17	Sterling	Lectures on the Philosophy of Law
V 120	〃	Secret of Hegel
V 310	Stoughton	Worthies of Science
V 188	Ueberweg	History of Philosophy

V 113	Upham	Salem Witchcraft
V 191	Voltaire	Philosophical Dictionary
V 176	Von Schlegel	Philosophy of Life and Language
V 154	Whewell	History of Scientific Idea
V 92	〃	History of Inductive Science
V 153	〃	Philosophy of Discovery 2Vol
V 132	White	Warfare of Science
V 178	Winchill	Reconciliation of Science and Religion
V 79	Wright	Philosophical Discussions
V 264	Zeller	Plato and Other Academians
V 23	〃	Socrates and Socratesian School
V 24	〃	Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

Psychology

V 39	Abercrombie	Intellectual Power of Truth
V 28	Alden	Elements of Intellectual Philosophy
V 37	Aristotle	Metaphysics
V 175	Bacon	Physical and Metaphysical Works
V 40	Bain	Mental and Moral Science
V 15	〃	Mind and Body
V 34	〃	Science and Intellect
V 138	Boole	Investigation of Laws of Thoughts
V 135	Brodie	Mind and Matter
V 86	Burton	Anatomy of Melancholy
V 35	Carpenter	Principles of Mental Phsiology
V 82	〃	Classical Studies
V 157	Combe	Lecture on Phrenology
V 260	Courtney	
D 54	Darwin	Experessions in Men and Animals
D 65	〃	Origin of Species
D 57	〃	Descent of Man 2Vol
X 122	Fichte	Science of Right
V 160	Friswell	
V 19	Fowler	Memory and Intellectual Improvement
F 14	〃	Self-Culture and Perfection of Character
V 77	〃	Lecture of Metaphysics

V 42	Haben	Mental Philosophy
V 31	Hazrd	Freedom of Mind in Willig
V 32	Hickok	Empirical Psychology
V 29	Hopkins	Outline Study of Man
V 161	Kant	Metaphysics of Ethics
V 6	Kidd.	Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical condition of Man
V 181	Lewes	Physical Basis of Mind
V 30	"	Problems of Life and Mind 2Vol
V 155	Locke	Essay Concerning Human Understanding
V 36	Mansel	Metaphysics
V 124	Mandsley	Physiology of Mind
V 121	Mill	Analysis of Human Mind
V 344	Morell	Introduction to Mental Philosophy
V 303	Murphy	Habit and Intelligence
V 165	Porter	Elements of Intellectual Science
V 73	"	Human Intellect
V 130	Reid	Essays on Intellectual Power of Man
V 380	Ribot	Disease of Memory
V 33	"	English Psychology
V 144	Ribot	Heredity
P 372	Ruskin	Nature, Art, Morals and Religions
V 182	Smee	Mind of Man
V 168	Suviles	Character
V 54	Spencer	Psychology
V 118	Stewart	Philosophy of Human Mind
V 217	Sterling	Hamilton
V 379	Sulley	Illusions
V 271	Tuke	Mind up on the Body

Logic

V 88	Bain	Logic
V 91	Baynes	Port Royal Logic
V 59	Boyd	Elements of Logic
V 143	Coppee	
V 60	Devey	Logic

V 57	Fowler	Elements of Deductive Logic
V 58	〃	Elements of Inductive Logic
V 65	Hamilton	Lecture on Logic
V 142	〃	Logic
V 139	Hegel	Logic
V 61	Hickok	Logic of Reason
V 56	Jevons	Elementary Logic
V 146	〃	Logic
V 55	Killick	Handbook of Logic
V 80	Mill	System of Logic
V 378	Morgan	Formal Logic
P 223	Swinbourne	Picture Logic
V 137	Thomson	Necessary Laws of Thought
V 64	Ueberweg	System of Logic
V 286	Venu	Logic of Chance
V 148	Matts	Logic
V 147	Whately	Elements of Logic
V 141	Wilson	Elementary Logic

Ethics

V 38	Abercrombie	Philosophy of Moral Feeling
V 27	Alden	Textbook of Ethics
V 174	Alexander	Outlines of Moral Science
V 262	Aristotle	Nicomachean Ethics
V 313	Bascom	Ethics
V 219	Bentham	Principle of Morals

The Races of Man (Peschel) Mis. 10

The Evolution of Man (Haeckel) 2V. Mis. 11

Origin of Species

Origin of Civilization (Lubock) Mis. 9

The Dexcent of Man (Darwin) Mis. 12

Expression of the Emotions of Man (Darwin) Mis 13

Animal Intelligence (Romanes) Mis. 29

Animal Locomotion (Pettigrew) Mis. 30

It is at present generally acknowledge that society is an organism. The same truth may be said about the system of philosophy which is I think also a living being. It grows from a very rudimentary germ to a higher complex structure through successive stages. There is still another truth, when we examine the history of every country, that philosophy has the most close relation with social and political institution, so we find in every history the elements when philosophy develops, all of civilization are in propgress. From this fact we infer that philosophy is the internal spirit or force which animate the whole society and promoted its civilization. If we compare the whole construction of a society to an individual organism, we may compare the philosophy prevailing in it to the nervous system. But as the nervous system can not be developed without the development of all other systems, so in society the growth of philosophy is impossible without the growth of the whole system. What is then the condition which is most necessary to the development of civilization in society? It is certainly a struggle between different elements. This is also true to the development of philosophy. In the world of philosophy we find a continued struggle or dispute between two opposite views when it is in process and a perfect harmony or equilibrium when it is declining. After the struggle for some time, there is made a synthesis by which the dialectic antithesis in united. Thus appears another different view opposed to that synthesis and thus a new struggle takes place. The whole process now forms what we (call) trichotomy or in Hegel's words. In this way philosophy develops from time to time, the fact which we see the development of Chinese philosophy.

When in studying philosophy we begin with the western philosophy and then turn our eyes to the oriental philosophy, we are every time surprized at the antiquity and profound idea of the latter. We have Indian philosophy far before Greek philosophy. The origin of Chinese philosophy is also earlier than the west. When we trace its origin we must go back more than four thousand years from the present time. According to the Chinese writers, it is believed to have been discended from the successive emperors, Gio and Shinn, who reigned at least four thousand years ago. But what we call philosophical school is certain to have originated about 600 B.C. During three or four centuries after that date every kind of civilization not only philosophy but every kind of institution was in great progress. It is true that the germs of all theories which have appeared in the later years came to existence at this time. This age is therefore the most important part of Chinese history. Let me then illustrate how China began to rise up so suddenly. In that country there is no complete history

founded on philosophical principles, such as the history of civilization which deals with the causal relation of every event. All the histories which we ever find are only the enumeration of succcessive events. So it is very difficult to trace each cause and condition of Chinese civilization. Still I will boldly try to trace it. Everyone knows that before the Kan-dynasty, which began about 200 B.D., there was no intercourse with other nations. Therefore the rudimentary elements of Chinese civilization would not be intruduced from any other countries and it should be originated in its own country. In examining carefully its history we find some causes and conditions which I believe led the whole system to civilization. It is certain that its primary elements were contained in the remaining books which had descended from a very ancient time. But without any favourable conditions those elements are impossible to develop tomaturity. From the middle part of the Shin dynasty all the states which constitute the empire were always engaging in war with one another. This is doubtless the chief external cause of Chinese civilization. Stimulated by this external accident the internal spirit of intellect of the Chinese began to spring up with great activity. The force thus evolved out is the cause which yielded to the development of philosophy a quick movement. In short the Chinese spirit was at that time changed by war from its latent state of activity. Philosophy thus being advanced, all their institutions, moral and political, were at once to higher state. Then there arose a competition between the two great systems, military and literary or practical and intellectual. From this condition each of them derived an additional energy through the other. Thus proceeding on the external side. There was internally a continuous struggle between each division of the intellectual part, such as politics morals and other philosophical doctrines and also a dispute between different parties of each division or school. Now we may arrange in order the causes and conditions of Chinese civilization as follows.

1) The remaining works of ancient civilization which had descended from antiquity

2) The external disturbance caused by war

3) A competition between the militant power and the intellectual power

4) A struggle between different school of the intellectual or philosophical system

5) A dispute between different parties of each school

Such are the principal causes and conditions of the civilization of China and of the development of its philosophy.

Chamber's Scripture Geography

The division of Canaan among the tribes of Israel took place about 1440 years B.C.

The Egyptians are descended from Mizraim, the second son of Ham; and hence the name by which the Hebrews designated the country. The Egyptians very early turned their attention to science and art, and Egypt became for a time the academy of the world. Learning was, however, chiefly confined to the priestly caste, who were the astrogers, physicians, and judges of the country. Among the lower classes, the principal occupation was husbandry.

The Arabians lived, for the most part, a wandering life, seeking pasture for their flocks; but they were also to some extent a commercial people, consisting of caravans.

The Persians were probably descended from Flam, son of Shem, and appear early in Scripture history as a ruling nation. After a period of independent rule, they became subject to the Assyrian power, and subsequently to the Medes. The Persian Empire rose again into power in 560 B.C. under Cyrus, who had subdued the Babylonian Empire.

Gazetter of the World J 66

Greece = the 3rd volume	Hindostan = 4th volume
Arabia = 1st volume	Egypt =

Chemistory of Creation ニ曰ク，化学ハ埃及ニ起リ拉比亜ニ入リ，而後欧洲ニ入ル。蓋シ其埃及ニ起リシハ三千五百年前ナリ。而シテ欧洲ニ入リシハ「ムール」人ノ西班牙ニアリシ比ナリト云フ。　七曜ノ事古代ヨリ亜細亜渚邦及ヒ埃及「ヘブリユ」人中ニ知ラレタリ。然シテ希臘ノ暦中ニハ見エス。羅馬モ「セオドシュース」帝ノ代マデ之ヲ用キズ。英国ノ七曜ハ「サキソン」ヨリ入ル。「サキソン」ハ東方（亜細亜）ヨリ其ノ分ヲ取リ自国ノ神名ヲ以テ之ニ配ス（埃及ニテハ星ノ名ヲトリテ之ニアツ）此七曜ハ「イスレール」人ノ亜拉比亜人等皆之ヲ用キルナリ。蓋シ，「バイブル」ニテ天神創造ヲ七日ニ定メシモ其比一般ニ七日ヲ以テ一期ト定メシニヨルナリ。

An Epitome of the History of Philosophy

V. 1. (page 15) In other countries of the East philosophical conceptions soon arose. Some of them, and above all, the primitive philosophy of India, appear to ascend to an epoch so near the Deluge; they exhibit, at the same time, such a character of grandeur and elevation, as to make it scarcely probable that in the midst of their physical wants and of their continual conflicts with the animals and the forces of a disordered nature, men could so rapidly have risen to speculations so lofty if they had not been supported by some relics of the anterior science.

(page 16), (page 19) China, Persia, and Egypt form, as it were, the three angles of a luminous triangle, within which the oriental genius exerts its activity, and of which Chaldea and India occupy nearly the middle.

Neither of these angles, in the actual state of our historical knowledge of the Oriental mind, presents any traces of a philosophical development on a large scale. To find this we must go to India.

印度希臘両哲学ノ起源ニ関シテノ疑問

(page 22) The object of religion is to procure more favourable transmigrations, or to abridge the duration of them or to secure even a complete exemption from them, provided one has followed with perfect fidelity the prescriptions of the Vedas. (宗教ノ目的) 婆羅門

(page 24) The Roman Catholic missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had already made some contributions to the knowledge of the philosophy of India, when the investigation of the Dalcuta Academy, in Bengal, began gradually to throw new light upon this important portion of the history of the human mind.

(page 34) As the word Sankhya signifies Number, it has been thought to furnish ground for the conjecture that there was more or less of analogy between this system and the Pythagorian, in which numbers play so important between this system and the Pythagorian, in which numbers play so important a part. But what we know of the Sankhya doctrine does not confirm this conjecture.

印度哲学ト西洋学ノ比較

(page 51) Have the Hindu and the Greek logic a common origin? Was the one derived from the other at the period of the expedition of Alexander? Or were fragments of the doctrine of the Brahmins carried into Greece, while at the same time, some of Greek systems succeeded in penetrating beyond the Indus? Is it the Hindu logic which became Greek or the Greek logic which become Hindu? Or was it a parallel development, without any influence of one upon the other? These questions are not yet resolved. The last supposition appears the most probable.

(page 58) The philosophical opinions of the Buddhist schools agree much more than most of the other Hindu doctrines which we have reviewed, with the systems professed in Europe in modern times. The spititualism of the first school resembles that of Berkely; the principles of the second coincide in many points with the materialism and sensualism of Cabanis; the individual pantheism of the third has been reproduced in Germany by Fichte.

(page 89) There are reasons for believing that the germs of Egyptian civilization

埃及文明ノ起源

and science were brought from Ethiopia, which country itself, on this supposition, must have been peopled by one of the first migrations from the East.

It (Ethiopian city) boasted the possession of a high and antique philosophy, and regarded itself as in some sort the eldest daughter of Intelligence. You are nothing but childre, it said to the Greek; there is among you no wisdom grown gray through time.

(page 97) Phaenicia. If we rely upon some indications furnished by Greek writers, Phaenicia was not entirely a stronger to philosophical systems analogous to some of thos which were subsequently developed in Greece. They speak of the Phaenician Moschus as the inventor of the doctrine which explains the formation of the universe by the combination of atoms. It is probably the first attempt at a material cosmology which was produced in western Asia; at least we know of none more ancient. This tendency was favoured by the peculiar genius of the Phaenicians, an industrious and commercial people, whose mental activity was particularly confined within the circle of material things.

希臘学ノ起源

(page 98) Greek Philosophy

Greek civilization had its origin in the East, from whence it spread into Greece by three different channels, at the north, the south, and the east. Three names appear prominent in the origin of this civilization: Orpheus, from Thrace, Pheroneus, from Egypt, and Cadmus, from Phaenicia.

(page 106) Antiquity speaks of his (Pythagoras) travels in Egypt and in Babylonia; and according to the common opinion, he penetrated also as far as India.

(page 107) Pythagoras set out with the most general ideas and proceeded by the methos of deduction. The Monad includes spirit and matter, but without separation.

(page 108) The progress of creation has for its object the gradual enlargement of spirits from the bonds of the dyad.

The will is involved in the Dyad by our love for particular and mutable good things, which, as particular and mutable, are only illusive good things.

(page 109) The will ought to free itself from this false love, just as the Intelligence should strive to free itself from the false science of the multiple and mutable.

中 略 Such are the fundamental points of the Pythagoras' philosophy. It is needless to remark its analogies with the Hindu system.

(page 110) The universe is there represented as one sole being, uncreated, immutable, imperishable, under forms subject to change by death and by perpetual renovations.

From this time its development continued to the Min dynasty, accompanied by

some rising and descending flux through nearly two thousand years. We divide the whole course of philosophical development into the great periods as the following:

1) The first period which extends from the middle part of the Shin-dynasty to the first part of the Kan-dynasty

2) The second period which extends from So-dynasty to the latter part of the Min-dynasty

The philosophy of the first period we call philosophy of the Shin-dynasty and that of the second period we call philosophy of So-dynasty. Then we divide all the philosophical which have appeared during these two periods, into 3 great schools. Namely;

1) Jiu-kio or the School of Koshi or confucius
2) Do-kio or the School of Roshi
3) Buts-kio or the School of Buddha, derived from India

In the first period there was a constant struggle between the first and the second school and also between the different philosophers of each school. But in the second period, Buddhism being introduced, there arose the struggle between all the three schools, some philosophers depending one against another and some philosophers endeavouring to unit and reconcile all of them. Thus the historical development of philosophy in China is nothing a continuous struggle of the three schools against one another, sometimes one gaining power and sometimes another. Or in other words, philosophy develops in trichotomical way. Let me now consider the general aspect of the first period.

At the begining of the first period we have already the establishment of the first and second schools. The first school was formed by the most famous philosopher in Chinese history called Koshi or Confucius; and the second school was founded by another noted one called Roshi. These two appeared in the world at the same time, but their doctrines are just opposite to each other in every respect. All those philosophers who lived near the same time or after them are only their direct or indirect disciples and the doctrines held by these disciples are nothing but the modification or elaboration of these antithetic principles. Still we find some new ideas produced from the mixture or synthesis of these principles. Thus we have one intervening school. Let me then mention the advocates of each school.

(1) The first school
- Koshi (Confucius)
- Moshi
- Jiunshi
- Ioshi

(2) The second school { Roshi, Retsshi, Soshi, Kanpishi }

(3) The intervening school { S. Yoshi, Bokushi }

At first I will examine the nature of each school and then its relation with the other. The first school is established one moral and practical principles. All subjects that are in this school are nothing else than ethics and politics. The object of its founder is to instruct the people how to manage toward their own parents, masters and friends. Love and justice are his sole principles. In regard to the eternity of human soul, the of the the existence of is given by him. On some point his doctrine agrees with Socrates or Aristotle and on the other it agrees with Stoic. But the nature of the second school is quite different. Its founder views human affair on the negative side. He denies all positive duties toward others. He takes as the fundamental principle of his doctrine reason or law out of which all phenomena, celestial and terrestrial, appear, and he endeavours to imitate it and to identify himself with it. Thus his principles have some resemblance with those of Pythagoras and Plato. I may compare the contrasts of these two schools in a tabular form.

	The first school		The second school
(a)	positive view	(a)	negative view
(b)	practical	(b)	speculative
(c)	common sense	(c)	metaphysical
(d)	moral and political	(d)	pure philosophy
(e)	altruistic	(e)	egoistic
(f)	constructive	(f)	destructive
(g)	to keep humanity of human law	(g)	to imitate nature or nature or natural law
(h)	about the finite and knowable principles	(h)	about the absolute and impossible principles

On the practical point of view the first school is more valuable than the second. But on the philosophical point of view the former stands far short of the latter. Thus I will say, if possible, that the first school is inclined to the applied philosophy and the second to the pure philosophy, both of which are equally one-sided. To make a synthe-

sis is now required. So there happens a third one. But the syntheis made by this intervening school is not the true unity. The one branch of the school is advocated by S. Yoshi who differs from the first and the second school by his taking too extreme egoistic view. The founder of the other branch Bokushi also differs from the first school by his opposing to its moral principle and from the second by denying natural law. Bokushi, however, seems to unite the egoistic of S. Yoshi and the altruistic of the first school. These three form a trichotomy as the following:



So the second school also has a tendency to egoistic feeling, we may form trichotomy in another way.



But Bokushi finally fails to unite the two antithetic views. S. Yoshi also fails in establishing his epicurian principle over others. Thus the third or intervening school, though once flourished, was soon died out; and then there only remained as before the two great philosophical parties. All the philosophers who appeared in succession taking one side or the other, the struggle between them had still continued to the end of the first period.

While externally each school was striking against the other, there was internally also taking place a dispute between different philosophers of the same school. After the death of Confucius whose philosophy exclusively relates to human nature, the great question whether it is good or evil, was brought into discussion. Moshi who is an adherent follower of Confucius, maintained that human nature is originally good. He proved this by taking the existence of conscience or moral sentiment, which is possessed by every man. Jiunshi, another follower, on the contrary, asserted its wickedness. According to him it is only through experience and education that man becomes good. In this point his view agrees with Locke. Then came a third one by name of U. Yoshi who appeared in the Kan-dynasty. His oppinion is that in human being the good and the evil nature are originaly mixed together and that when educated, man may develop the good one over the evil. Thus he made a synthesis by

uniting the two one-sided views. Still the discussion is not put to an end. It arose again in the second period.

Turning to the other side I examined the nature of the second school. Roshi, its founder, took natural law or more exactly universal reason as the mose fundamental principle of his doctrine. This view was held first by Roshi and afterward by Soshi. The latter added a new idea to it and developed it. Thus doing, his philosophy differs in many points from his master, but it is more profound. He discussed the eternity of human soul and proved the existence of the absolute. But we must confess that his philosophy is too metaphusical and therefore too difficult to make practical application. Then came Kanpishi whose philosophy seems to connect the one-sided view of Roshi and Soshi with that of the first school and to apply the former practical sciences such as law and politics. Still he is one of the followers of the second school for his fundamental principle is derived from it. But he is also practical. If we take the doctrine of Roshi as standard, he is inclined to its political side nearly in the same degree that Soshi is inclined to its metaphysical side. Thus here a synthesis is also needed. The great synthesis of all those antitheses was, I believe, made by the philosophers of the second period. We must thereafter wait for it until we came to the philosophy of the So-dynasty. It is here sufficient to say that the development of philosophy in the first period is not due to the struggle between the two great schools only, but to the contrasts and disputes between different philosophers belonging to the same school.

Such is the general state of the first period. In this period Chinese philosophy attained to its highest point not only philosophy but the whole matter of civilization was highly improved about that time. It is not improper to date this period as the most enlightened age of Chinese history. But when we approached to the end of this period, its civilization began to decline and the development of philosophy was stopped. This is not without its causes. At the beginning of the Shin-dynasty which came after the Shin-dynasty, all intellectual and philosophical books, moral and political, were burned out and all philosophers were buried alive by the order of the Emperor Shiko. On this account the struggle between the two schools were put to an end and the development of philosophical ideas were shut out from its forward movement. The state of Chinese civilization as a whole began to decline. But when the Kan-dynasty was established in the place of the Shin-dyansty, there was some tendency of philosophy to restore its previous state. Unfortunately to the Chinese, only the first school was restored. In regard to this sole restration we may account many causes as follows:

1. that the politicall of the government at that time were constructed on the Confucius' principle

2. that the Confucius doctrine is common-sense view and easy to understand

3. that the Confucius' books were first found out in the walls of an old house when it was destroyed, while all other philosophical works were not yet discovered

4. that the government of the Shin- dynasty mostly refused the Confucius' doctrine and most cruelly its adherents so that sympatheric feelings were everywhere aroused among the people to hope for its restoration.

On these accounts throughout the whole empire the doctrine of the first school alone began to predominate. No other schools at this time stood in rival to it. The result was a perfect harmony or equilibrium in the philosophical world. As we said that struggle is the most favourable condition to development, and that harmony is the greatest hindrance to it, the Chinese genius from this time had been stopped to grow and continued to decline to the time shen a new element of philosophy was introduced from India. This is the result of the first period. We have nothing to deal with until we come to the begining of the second period.

The second period began with the latter part of the So dynasty. In this dynasty we have only to notice someting in regard to literature. Therefore, as to what is properly called philosophy, we must directly pass to the So dynasty which was dated as the great revival of the former philosophy. The chief cause of this revival is clear to everyone. It is nothing else than the introduction of the Indian philosophy, that is, Buddhism, which we before classed as the third sxhool. Though it first came into China in the latter part of the Kan dynasty, it is between the To dynasty and the So dynasty that it gained the power to compete with the other schools. Irritated by the external stimulas the first school and also the second school betan to start up with a vivid energy. Now there necessarily occurred a great struggle between these three schools. Thus proceeding, Chinese philosophy, agin, attained to its highest point. The most famous philosophers in the So dynasty are the following;

(a) Shushi
(b) Cnioshi
(c) M. Teishi
(d) I. Teishi
(e) Rikushi
(f) Shiushi
(g) O. Yomei (in the Min dynasty)

We must here notice that all such philosophers belonged to the first school. But it

is certain that their principles are the mixture or synthesis of all the three schools; the greater part of which was derived from Buddhism. The discussion of human nature which is the main problem of the Confucius' doctrine was taken by all those philosophers. The solution of this problem was made by them in applying the principles of the second and the third school to the Confucius doctrine. Then the doctrine that all is one or that all phenomena in the universe appear from one single principle or reason and exist in it, was discussed so the human nature or spirit was taken as the same thing with that universal reason. Thus the principle of essential duality that all is one and one is all was even at that time partly known. Though this principle was suggested in the book of Iki which was composed by Confucius, still its greater part was externaly derived from the third school. Among the others there were some philosophers who endeavoured to unite and reconcile directly or indirectly all the three distinct schools. So doing, a new philosophical idea was produced in each school. On the side of Buddhism its doctrine also made a great advance by competing with the first school. About the second school the same thing may be said. Thus we dare to conclude that the development of philosophy in the second period depended on making a synthesis between the three schools and thus creating a new thought. On this account the philosophy of the second period had contined to grow from the beginning of the So-dynasty down to the latter part of the Min-dynasty with a law declining intervals? When the Min-dynasty was put to an end, it utterly sunk to insignificance. What causes are there? The chief cause of this decline is the extinction of struggle and the completion of harmony which resulted from the conquer of Confucius party over the rest. Even the Min-dynasty the Confucianism was always getting unparalleled influence through the Chinese Empire. Whenever struggle took place the first school finally gained the power. Though this result was fatal to the Chinese, the doctrine of Confucius was mostly fitted to their nature because their ideas are generally narrow and their attentions are always exclusively directed to the practical sciences such as ethics and politics. In short the nature of the Chinese are generally not philosophical. Thus China continues to decline to the present time of the Lin-dynasty. At present, not only philosophy but everything of civilization is in a decaying state. So far we have seen the growth and decline of the second period.

It is now clear that the whole course of development of Chinese philosophy is in a trichotomical order. In the greater scale the second period makes a synthesis between the two great antitheses of the first period, by introducing the principle of the third school from India while in the smaller scale each party of the same school always goes on to make syntheses. We have seen the rise or decline of philosophy is

always accompanied by the same state of the social and political civilization. The time when philosophy is at the greatest advancement is the time at which the civilization of every kind attains to the highest. It is therefor very important to
Let me draw a diagram. In the following diagram the line A-B represents the length of time which extends from the beginning of the Chu-dynasty to the present dynasty.

We have also seen that in the ascending line there was a constant struggle between many elements and that in the descending line there was a harmony so that the former is the cause of development and the latter is the cause of decaying. Now it will be right to conclude that philosophy is a living organism. If this conclusion be also true, we may expect that China is at present decaying in every respect. It will be soon rise up with much grater activity if its original elements be combined with the western elements and thus destroy its harmonic state; and we may also expect that we can have a more complete philosophy if a synthesis be made between these two grat elements, the oriental and the wester

Unconscious Cerebration, or Laten Mental modiiication. The cerebrum may elaborate intellectual results, attained by the intentional direction of our minds to the without any consciousness on our own part. 是ハ恰モ，手足ヲ動カス事，続ク○ハ unconsiously 動カス事ト同一理ニシテ習慣不断ヨリ生ズルナリ。不覚ノ生ズル事ハ

May originate our of the following cause become conscious, may go on below the plane of consciousness, either during profound sleep, or while the attention is wholly engrossed by some entirely different train of thought.
即チ，○全部休止スル○カ（眠時）又ハ一方ニ全力ヲ会得スル中ハ，他ノ部分不足ヲ生スルナリ

Each of the nervous centres has an independent reflex activity of its own, while our consciousness of its exercise depends upon the impression, which it makes up on the sensorium, which is the instrument alike of the external and of the internal senses.

The condition of unconscious operation is that the receptivity of the sensorium shall be suspended the changes in question; either by its own functional inactivity, or through its temporary engrossment by other impressions. They can scarcely be designated as reasoning processes, sinc unconscious reasoning seems a contradiction in terms.

不覚論究ハ不足運動ノ水龍ヨリ生スルト日一理ニヨリテ，大脳中ヨリ起ルナリ。
人名又ハ事柄ヲ再ビ出出サン事ヲ務ムルモ終ニ自然ニ発スル様ニナシ。其ノ向ノ連想ニヨリテ思ハス知ラズ色々思出ツル事

The train of action, which we volitionally set going in the cerebrum in the first instance, continues to work by itself after our attention has been fixed upon some other object of thoughts; so that it goes on to the evolution of its result, not only without any continued exertion on our own parts, but also without our consciousness of any continued activity.

又今マデ覚エタル事カ一時他ノ思考ノ入リ来ルガ為メニ忘ル，」アリ。其　漸ク思ヒ出ス事ハ沢山アリ。又一時ノ疲労ノ為メニ思ヒ出サルヽ」アリ。熟眠ノ後，思ヒ出ス」アリ。不覚ハ一体ノ休止，又ハ一部ノ休止ヨリ生ズルナリ。

Table-turning

Ideas, which have passed out of the conscious memory, sometimes express themselves in involuntary muscular movement.

思ヒ出サルヽ思想ガ運動トナリテ現スル事アリ人ノ年ヲ問ヘバ答ヘ (table-turning)（店ノ人数ヲ問ヘバ答ヘル）

或ル時，店ニ来人アルカヲ尋ネタル○，table ニテ三回大意ヲ以テウチ二回，小言ヲ以テウツ。然ルニ店ニハ四人ノ大人ト二人ノ小供アリタリ。依テ三，四ウチタルハ誤リナル事ヲ知リタルモ暫時后考フルニ，四人ノ内一人ハ不在ナルコトヲ思イ出セリ。

是ヲ以テ Spiritual agengy ヲ想出スニ至ル。

The idea, which was contrary to the belief of the questioner at the time, was the correct reproduction of one which had been formerly recorded, but which had passed out of the conscious memory.

先キニ覚エタルモノニテ一タビ忘レタルモノ，自ラ知ラスニ其ノ思想ヲアラワス事アリ。

There are other cases, again, in which two distinct trains of mental action are carried on simultaneously, – one consciously and the other unconsciously. The latter guiding the movements which may express something quite unrelated to the subject that entirely and continuously engrosses the attention.

同時ニ二ツノ事ヲナスアリ（其一ハ知覚ニ其一ハ不覚ゴ用）

（例ヘハ筆ヲトリテ手紙ヲカリニ其心ニテハ他ノ事ヲ一心ニ考ヘオル事アリ而シテ手ハ筆ヲトリテ他ノ思想ヲ記出スルナリ。（又我々ハ書ヲ音読シツツ他ノ事ヲ考ヘオル事アリ）

In these cases, we unconsciously cerebrate – while we are all the time consciously buried in our subject that it will not answer to begin two consecutive sentences in the same way.

Another example of "latent" mental action. One idea A, comes directly to suggest another idea C, to which it is not unrelated, the link of conection being supplied by a former intermediate idea, B, which has passed altogether out of the consciousness.

例ヘハ友人ノ常ニ相尋ヌルモノ一日官用ノ為ニ地方ヘ出張シタル其事ヲヤメテ其人ヲ尋ネント欲シ其役目ヲ忘レテ其名ヨリ直チニ不在ヲ思出シタル事アリ。役目ハ即チB也。

又，一部分ニツイテ不覚ニシテ全分ヲ知ル限リ

例ヘバ We acquire the meaning of one sentence after another, without any conscious recognition of the meaning of each of its component words. Yet it is certain that a particular impression must have been made by each of these words upon the cerebrum, before we can comprehend the notion which they were collectively intended to convey.

然シ，子供ノ時ハ然ラズ算術家亦然リ。

Most persons who attend to their own mental operations are aware that when they have been occupied for some time about a particular subject, and have then transferred their attention to some other, the first, when they return to the consideration of it, may be found to present an aspect very different from that which it possessed before it was put aside. 一ツノ事ヲ考ヘテ他ノ事ヲ考ヘ更ニ初ノ事ヲ回考スルトキハ異ナリタル思考ヲ生ズル事アリ。

例ヘバ初メ考ヘテ記志セザル事モ一時ノ他ノ事ヲ考ヘテ，后ニハ記憶出ス事アリ　眠腫ノ后ニ思イ出ス」最モ多シ。

モ亦然リ　例ヘハ演説ノ組立ヲ考ヘント欲シテ其時能ハサルモノ一週間位之ヲ止メテ他ノ事ニカヽリ其后再ビ其組立ヲ考フルニ不知ニ成立チオル事アリ。

The tree you are sticking in'will be growing when you are sleeping' so with every new idea that is planted in a real thinker's mind: it will be growing when he is least conscious of it.

The same mode of action seems to have a large share in the process of invention.

p. 536　Examples of solution of geometrical problem

It is not intellectual work alone, that is done in this manner; for it seems equally clear that emotional states or rather states which constitute emotions when we become conscious of them, may be developed by the same process; so that our feelings towards persons and objects may undergo most important changes, without our being in the least degree aware, until we have our attention directed to our own mental state of the alteration which has taken place in them.

Here again, it would seem as if the material organ of these feelings tends to form itself in accordance with the impressions habitually made upon it; whilst we may be as completely unaware of the changes which have taken place in it, as we are of those by which passing events have been registered in our memory, until some circum-

stance calls forth the conscious manifestation, which is the 'reflex' of the new condition which the organ has acquired.

The unconscious influence of what may be called the moral atmosphere breathed during the earlier period of life, in forming the habits, and thereby determining the mechanism of thought and feeling, is a subject of such great practical importance, as to have required separate treatment.

Table turning

The examples of table talking.

299 西洋ニテモ Spirit ノナス所ナリト信ス。

Explanation of table turning

第一因 (1) The continued concentration of attention upon a certain idea gives it a dominant power, not only over the mind, but over the body; and the muscles become the involuntary instruments whereby it is carried into operation.

第二因 In the case the movement is favoured by the state of mascular tension. which ensues when the hands have been kept for sometime in a fixed position.

第三因 It is by the continued influence of the dominant idea that the performers are impelled to follow the revolution of the table, which they really maintain by their continued propulsion.

It is the characteristic of the state of mind from which these idea-motor actions proceed, that the volitional power is for the time in abeyance; the whole mental-power being absorbed in the high state of tension to which the ideational consciousness has been wrought out.

Its motion was solely due to the unconscious muscular action of the performers.

The hands slid over its surface when stop table.

Muscular movements are continually being executed without conscious effort, as in the case of a man who continues to walk, to read aloud, or to play on a musical instrument, while his whole attention is given to some train of thought which deeply interests him. But the table turners would seldom listen to common sense so completely were they engrossed by their dominant idea.

The movements which they involuntarily and unconsciously gave to the tables are the expressions of the ideas with which their own minds are possessed, as to what the answers should be the questions propounded.

外 史 評 論

一第 政治ノ得失ヲ論ズルニハ，先ツ其目的ヲ定メザルベカラズ。目的定ッテ而後利害得失相分ル。即チ其目的ニ適合セザルモノハ，之ヲ不可トシ，適合スルモノハ之ヲ可トシ得トス。山陽翁ノ所謂政治トハ

何ヲ目的トスルヤ。要スルニ，氏ノ目的ト定ムルモノ王家・富強ト云フナラン。

或ハ人民ノ安寧ヲ云ウカ，且ツ其安寧トハ恬澹無事ト云フカ，又王家ノ富強ノ人民ノ安寧ヲ兼ネテ云フカ，然レトモ其一編ノ論主，王家ノ衰頽ヲ憂フニアレバ，氏ノ意王家ヲ富強ニスルニアルナリ

二第　氏ノ利害ヲ論ジ抑揚褒貶ヲ其所帰ヲ知ベカラズ　平氏ヲ悪シク，又之ヲ賞シ，源氏ヲソシリテ，又之ヲホム。

三第　三陽ハ藤氏ヲ責メ　清盛ヲ論ジテ曰ク，世稱清盛功不償大罪不臣者申取以為稱首向不知相家不臣己什倍清盛視而学元否則何邊至此（中略）清盛所為無一不似彼王氏者而加以驚悍其意曰以無功之人擅権寵如此君之　大造於王室何為而不可也云之，

其ニ由リテ之ヲ見レバ清盛ノ擅権其来ル所すりとスレバ，藤原氏ノ為ス所亦来ル所アリ。清盛ノ有功ノ人ナリ　藤原氏亦王家ト大切アル知ルベシ　加フルニ天子ノ外戚ナレバ其寵ヲ擅スヘキ風情アリ。清盛若シ功アルヲ以テ無罪トナスナラバ藤原氏亦無罪トスヘシ。（藤氏ノ功豈平氏ニ滅センヤ）　山陽曰，清盛所以至此　由后白河帝養成其勢爾ト藤原ノ寵ヲ攬ニスルモ亦列代ノ帝王，固ヨリ其勢ヲ養成スル所アリ。　山陽又，義家ヲ稱シテ曰ク，朝藤白舎其征伐刑賞之柄而付之源氏遂令東北豪傑曰，寧背天子勿負源氏当是之時，使義家一日重手起　則函嶺以東非朝廷之者不必待軟朝也而不敢失臣篆以終其身，而シテ又曰ク，源氏以清和之胄世勤労王事以至於軟朝経営艱苦刱津大業以致天下少康而不敢僭踰（中略）頼朝為天下萬世創不得已之事以立不可踰之限而君臣之際而得其宜不　……　可也

源氏ノ勢力天下ヲ左右スルニ餘リアリテ敢テ，臣節ヲ失セズ，ト藤原氏亦其権天子易置スルニ至リテ而シテ亦臣節ヲ守リテ神器ヲ　　セズ是萬世ノ為メニ不可踰ノ限ヲ立ツルモノナラズ，故ニ，其利ヲアリレバ源平ニ氏ノ独リ害ナキニアラズ　然シテ，山陽ハ一ヲ貶シテ一ヲ揚クルハ何ゾヤ　吾ヨリ之ヲ論論ズレバ　……（以下ナシ）