《論　　説》

Who Makes Who?

A Critical Review of *Paper Stones* and *Citizen Politics*

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Who makes who? Do political parties create voters' political identities or do voter demands create the platforms of political parties?　A critical review of two classics on this topic reveal that the question is as relevant as ever for liberal democracies. A review of Adam Przeworski and John Sprague's *Paper Stones* and Russel J. Dalton's *Citizen Politics* offers more than just insight into distinguished works in the literature of comparative political parties.　Knowledge of these two arguments is prerequisite to an informed discourse upon the relationship between parties and electorates.　*Citizen Politics* and *Paper Stones* depart from different points and arrive at antithetical conclusions. These works stand in contraposition to each other. They do not allow for ambivalence on the part of the reader and therein lies the great value in comparing them. One may not accept Dalton's assertion that parties respond to individuals' needs and demands as well as Przeworski and Sprague's thesis that the people's demands and needs are created by parties. These works present newcomers to the field of party politics the chance to discover which approach they would adopt as their own.

History supports the argument of *Paper Stones.* Przeworski and Sprague's object of study is Europe's socialist parties. After comparing their work to Dalton's, a brief summary of Carles Boix's *Political Parties, Growth and Equality* shows that the lessons of *Paper Stones* also apply to non-socialist parties as well.　Writing a decade after Przeworski and Sprague, Boix points out that Britain's Tories not only created a sense of identity among the electorate, but they virtually built a new middle-class in the United Kingdom during the 1980s.

Based on his large collection of opinion survey data, Dalton proposes that a new type of citizen is emerging in the advanced Western democracies. As the economies of countries such as France, Germany and Britain transform into a so-called post-industrial age, the value systems of their electorates are entering into an era of post-materialism. Standards of living are increasing concurrent with the movement of more jobs into the service sector while people are more concerned about issues not directly related to their material well-being, such as the environment and social equality. Dalton suggests that the modern electorate is becoming increasingly sophisticated: today's generation is better educated than preceding ones; people are thinking more critically and independently about political issues and they are relying less upon traditional party alignments and cues. Dalton's figures demonstrate that, while interest in politics is on the rise, the percentage of those who consider themselves political ideologues is on the decline. For example, American National Election data show that over 80% of Americans in 1995 had an "interest in politics" (Dalton, Figure 2. 3, p.27) while in the same year only 20% considered themselves ideologues (Dalton, Figure 2. 4, p.28).

Dalton takes aim at the notion of a democratic "super citizen" found only in the writings of classical theory and not in an actual electorate. The writings of Mill, Locke and Tocqueville posit the development of a well-informed, reasonable and politically interested citizen who seems to reflect the types of people these writers were (or, at least, imagined themselves to be) and who is declared to be the foundation for any healthy democracy. Scholars such as Almond and Verba pioneered the field of political culture studies and they phrased their survey research questions against the assumption that they were looking for a classical-type super citizen (Dalton, p.16). Much to their disappointment, early researchers found neither any ideological structure governing people's thinking on social issues nor any rational-choice models guiding their thinking. Experts found low levels of involvement in the public coupled with ignorance about the body politic itself. Dalton cites Berelson, Lazasfeld and McPhee from their work *Voting*:

> Our data reveal that certain requirements commonly assumed for the successful operation of democracy are not met by the behavior of the "average" citizen...Many vote without real involvement in the election...The citizen is not highly informed on the details of the campaign...In any rigorous or narrow sense the voters are not highly rational（Dalton, p.17）.

Dalton points out these early works put a positive spin on their findings and concluded with an elitist theory of politics. The original political culture researchers determined that all the apathy they found was good for democracy because the political system would become paralyzed if everyone tried to be involved all of the time. Almond and Verba decided that the model citizen "is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen," and Berelson, et al, agreed that "Some people are and should be highly interested in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be"（Dalton, p.20）. Remarking on the irony of anti-democratic prescriptions for what might ail democracies, Dalton launched his work from the position that elitist theory ignores the complexities of democratic processes. It is not voters in early studies who are unsophisticated, but the studies themselves.

Dalton observes that since the 1950s, advanced industrial societies have changed profoundly as have the methods and skills of public opinion research. He draws on the work of Ronald Inglehart to say that a process of "cognitive mobilization" had been underway for three decades since then（Dalton, p.21）. Thanks to improvements in education, and greater exposure to media and politics since Almond and Verba's day, the public now enjoys greater access to political information and can more skillfully process this information. People have become more sophisticated, and the research methods that measure people's attitudes and thinking have improved.

In Dalton's analysis, the post-war boom in the economies of Europe and North America set in motion forces of industrialization that would allow people's values to change. This change would reveal itself as the Baby Boomers began entering adulthood

in the 1960s. The industrial age that peaked between the 1920s and the 1950s tied the values of the Boomers' parents to material well-being more than any other value. People also respected hierarchy and deferred to authority in order to maintain social stability as necessary for the functioning of an industrial manufacturing economy. The high standards of living produced by the "Greatest Generation" have been taken for granted since the sixties and a new generation of voters is encourages attention to issues that would have been unimaginable a generation earlier. Support for minority rights, alternative lifestyles, and environmental protection has grown among voters whose outlook on life can be less materialistic precisely because their material well-being is comfortable and secure.

Traditional approaches to measuring voter participation in party politics were based on the notion that parties formed on the sides of social cleavages, an idea most famously developed by Lipset and Rokkan. The party system of the 1960s reflected the cleavages of the 1920s, when parties recruited people along class lines and had to mobilize quickly to capture the surge of new voters after the enfranchisement of women.

The organizational skills of parties once brought people to elections. Yet, elections limit and thereby blur choices. The modern electorate continues to mobilize around parties.（Even self-described independents tend to vote for a candidate from one party or the other, so few modern democracies have more than token numbers of "independent" candidates running or winning legislative seats.）Contemporary voters are more policy-oriented, less ideological and prefer involvement in community and civic groups to political parties, although many voters participate in other political activities outside of parties. As people grow older, they become more likely to vote and to give their time to politics, such as activism, campaigning or even running for office at the local level or higher. Younger voters reject party politics for the politics of protest. Party systems rooted in the materialist values of their grandparents are not responding quickly enough to their demands, in this view, so younger voters take to the street or sign-up for grassroots activities. Dalton refers to Scott Flanagan, one of Almond and

Verba's intellectual heirs, who points out that values are shifting in two dimensions: from material to non-material values and from slightly authoritarian to more libertarian（Dalton, p.94）. Dalton's data show that the older generation have, by and large, held onto the industrial-age values they acquired, even as their societies have entered a post-industrial era（See Figure 5. 3 in Dalton）.

Having set the stage for how mismatched modern parties are to the emerging new citizen, Dalton argues that parties are still the primary basis of public influence. No other group can match the representative nature of political parties. The social cleavages in earlier eras that allowed party leaders to plot individual preferences along a left-right spectrum have become less and less able to predict voter behavior, he says. Dalton explains the rise of new parties, such as the Greens and the National Front, as attempts to capture new citizens whose values do not align with established parties. Dalton even cites the fact that numerous third parties have appeared in America's recent history as proof that party systems are "in flux"（Dalton, p.152）. According to Dalton, social cues（the opinions and attitudes we hear around us daily）and social reference points, such as unions or churches, provide shortcuts for making political decisions. Voting along class lines, meanwhile, is declining, and the incomes and lifestyles of certain sectors of the working class are merging with those traditionally found in the middle class. At the same time, lower level white collar jobs are actually paying less. A new middle class that does not conform to Marx's analysis is forming. Political parties' attempts to broaden their appeal to attract the new middle class cannot keep up with the quickening fragmentation of the electorate into multiple, smaller fractions based on particular issues. In the resulting absence of clear cues from class and party leaders Dalton says that people will think about electoral choices more independently.

Citizen Politics is vulnerable to criticism on several points. First, considering that it is a study of political parties, the book seems to be organized backwards. Rather than analyzing so many changes in the electorate's behavior prior to any discussion of parties, Dalton's argument would be clearer had he first offered a working definition of

parties and a summary of the history of party politics. His most precise definition of a political party is to compare it to a sports team, loyalty to which "helps one to know whom to root for and which players to admire（Dalton, p.205）.

Second, parties appear as an afterthought in *Citizen Politics* because it is really a work of normative theory more than a social scientific study of voter behavior with attention to parties. Beginning with his critique of the original political culture studies, Dalton is more concerned with promoting a particular notion of democracy, than with demonstrating processes of dealignment. In Chapter Four he proclaims "I prefer a more Jeffersonian view of the democratic process. The logic of democratic politics is that expanding political involvement can also expand citizen's understanding of the political process" In Chapter Ten Dalton announces that "the future is in our hands" and he supports Rousseau's argument against representative democracy in Chapter Eleven.

Third, his normative emphasis allows him to overlook the need for any causal mechanism. For Dalton, class identify is constructed by material conditions, yet the actual nexus for change is not identified beyond assuming it necessarily follows economic growth. However, as anyone who follows US presidential campaigns knows, post-material and material values may co-exist, but even in an America that is wealthier than ever since 1945, political parties tend to respond to the latter more than the former. If that claim sounds as outdated as the mid-90s publication of the work cited here, consider that the popularity of 2016 US presidential candidates Hilary Clinton and Bernie Sanders was based more on their pledges to protect the middle-class, reduce wealth inequality and increase access to health care and less on their support for post-material values such as inclusivity across gender, race and sexual preference.

Fourth, Dalton underplays the possibility that parties, and not only churches or unions, may act as social cues and social references. He does not consider the possibility of a symbiotic relationship between organizations and individuals. Even if groups originally formed as a collective expression of individual wills, they perpetuate themselves by trying to persuade other individuals.

Finally, parties can do more than just people identities: they can also create economic identities. Where Dalton sees a new middle class merely emerging inevitably from economic growth, Carles Boix sees a political party perpetuation its existence by creating a new middle class.

The ability of parties to articulate demands for individuals is the point of departure for Przeworski and Sprague's *Paper Stones*. In this work we see that individual identities do not come from within but from without. Institutions make identities by articulating where people stand in relation to structures and to each other. Political parties, not individual people, make class an issue because only they can organize workers. *Paper Stones*, say the authors, "is a study of voting but not of voters"（Przeworski and Sprague, p.167）. In direct refutation of Dalton, they reject realignment. "Perhaps the social and cultural meaning of voting behavior has changed, but the numerical relations between class position and voting behavior remain remarkably stable"（Ibid.）.

Socialist parties have never won a majority of a European electorate. In the first place, the very group they represent- workers- has never constituted a majority of the adult population of any nation, with the exception of Belgium in the 1930s. Yet, whenever socialist parties have tried to broaden their appeal to include non-workers, they have lost the support of many workers. Przeworski and Sprague demonstrate mathematically that for every non-worker recruited by socialists, a greater number of workers give their vote to another party. Dalton cannot explain this phenomenon.

Why would people abandon their demands and needs just because their party was trying to include more supporters on the same platform?　When socialist parties attempt to reach out to that voters outside the working class, they must expand their platform to include issues that do not appeal to class and in so doing weaken the salience of class as an issue. When class becomes less salient, workers are open to appeals from other parties. Paper Stones uncovers and electoral trade-off between workers' votes and middle-class votes. "A party which receives votes from N allies…can never hope to conquer the votes of all workers if it received the vote of a single ally"（Ibid., pp.70–

71）. The logic of the electoral trade-off facing socialist parties reveal cross-national differences in electoral socialism. The degree of the trade-off varies across countries. In each of the subject nations in *Paper Stones* communist parties as well as religious and ethnic groups compete with socialist parties for workers' votes. Cross-national outcomes also show that the voter identification comes from above, i.e. from groups such as political parties.

In the Scandinavian countries（Denmark, Norway, Sweden）neither regional ethnic parties nor religious parties are as competitive as similar parties in Belgium, France and Germany. Once the salience of class weakens in these three countries, parties appealing to workers' regional or religious identity gain support. However, the greatest differences between the two groups of nations reveal themselves in the nature of labor unions and parliamentary organizations. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden union membership is high, is enrolled in high concentrations within a single federation and has powerful centralized bargaining bodies. Scandinavian unions create class membership and class identity. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, socialists can make braod-based appeals and lose few workers thanks to unions ability to capture and hold not only workers' votes but also their identities as workers（Ibid., p.13）. To the south, where unions are less corporatist, the electoral trade-off imposes a greater penalty on socialist parties and strong church and ethnic parties can pick up the workers lost by the socialists. Yet, Przeworski and Sprague note, the very cohesiveness of the unions prevents the Scandinavian socialists from maximizing their electoral potential, anyway. Unions control a large share of party funding and enough issues overlap between parties and unions that the parties cannot stray from their core membership.

Przeworski and Sprague highlight the causal relationship between parties and voters' preferences. In so doing they cast light on the shadowy causality of psychologically-work such as Dalton's. Works like *Citizen Politics*:

> cite individual attributes to explain individual attributes... In this logic some social distinctios are first objectified as cleavages. Places in these cleavages are attribut-

> ed to individuals, and after this reduction the locations in the structure of society appear as individual trains such as worker, Catholic, or woman. These traits are thought to determine acts because they are viewed as representing interests, internalized norms, psychological attachments and the like... Through this reduction the locus of causality is placed within the individual（Ibid., pp.6−7）.

Where *Citizen Politics* is unable to explain the nature of the relationship between the invididual and the group, or between the voter and the party, *Paper Stones* notes, “In nature causes are causes no one can do anything to alter them. The causal structure of the natural world is given, but the causal structure of society is not. The causes of individual behavior are produced by people in interaction with one another（Ibid., p.7）. Przeworski and Sprague demonstrate that parties formulate with demands for voters. Carles Boix proves that parties can not only create a sense of class identity, such as European socialists do, but may also create a class itself.

Boix’s *Political Parties, Growth and Equality* examines ways that political parties mediate the forces of economic globalization. For this purposes of this review, we may dispense with a summary of Boix’s entire argument and concentrate on his analysis of Britain’s Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher.

On the one hand, the Tories’ situation in the 1970s fits Dalton’s descriptions of dealignment. Throughout the post-war period, the Conservatives and Labour had each drawn support from their “natural” class: Tories and Labour were receiving two-thirds of middle-class and working class votes, respectively（Boix, p.182）. By the mid-seventies, notes Boix, only fifty percent of the electorate was voting along traditional class lines, and, “［a］s result, the voters’ opinions on both policies and parties’ performances in offices started to have more weight in explaining the vote than all structural socio-economic characteristics combined”（Ibid.）.

From this statement we may concede Dalton the point that dealignment contains at least a partial basis in voters’ preferences. Throughout this period, as Dalton observes,

the number of workers changed their social position from working class to middle class and, as Boix notes, this transformation fed the Tory ranks while starving the support base of Labour. However, dealignment was incomplete at best as the inability of the Liberal Party to win pluralities, much less majorities, demonstrates. In 1979 nearly two-thirds of professionals and managers, and 62% of people in intermediate-level jobs voted for the Conservatives. By 1992 these numbers declined slightly to around 50% among voters in all non-manual sectors, yet these losses were balanced by the growth of these jobs as a proportion of the population（Ibid., p.183）.

The statistics prove that economic factors outweigh post-material values. The most convincing point in support of Przeworski and Sprague's thesis is found in the Tories' electoral strategy. "The growth of an electorate more inclined to choose Conservative was also the work of an explicit political strategy devised by the Thatcher government"（Ibid.）. Boix adds that:

> the Conservative government engineered a vast sale of council houses in the hope of securing more votes to the cause of free markets and to the defense of property. Similarly, home mortages were granted a privileged tax statement, and the interest rates were carefully managed to favor homeowners. Second, the sale of public corporations was consciously designed to maximize its impact on the population. As［Chancellor Nigel］Lawson put it, 'The widespread ownership of private property［would give］the citizen a vital sense of identification with the society of which he is a part（Ibid.）.

The Thatcher-led Tories, then, consciously formulated a strategy that would not only provide voters with material benefits but also a strong sense of identity from those benefits that would, of course, secure and stabilize the Conservative Party's incumbency.

Where Paper Stones demonstrates identification flowing from socialist parties to voters, Boix shows it can come from conservative parties. Contrary to the bottom-up

notion of political will and identities in Citizen Politics, Boix, and Przeworski and Sprague proves political parties can create political identities and even classes.

Works cited

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