ヒッチコック映画論：ドゥルーズ哲学と心的諸関係について

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H for Hitchcock: pure cinema and mental relations

BRADLEY Joff Peter Norman *

Any concept is a sign, of course. But we may take a sign in so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an action or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling. (Peirce, 1958, p. 332)

Oh, dear. We've become a race of Peeping Toms. What people ought to do is get outside their own house and look in for a change. (Stella, [Thelma Ritter], Jeffries' nurse, in Rear Window)

The great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts. (Deleuze, 1986, p. xiv)

Cinema tells stories with blocks of movement / duration. (Deleuze, What is the Creative Act?)

In recent years, Alfred Hitchcock's neuroses and pathologies have like dirty linen been aired for all and sundry to view. It is the fashion to discredit the man, not the artist. In doing so this often draws film studies away from the splendour of Hitchcock's vision and technique. I shall note two examples, although there are many more, both in academia, and in the press and media, the latter of which caters all-too-often for this kind of tediously reductive titillation and hearsay.¹ In the TV film The Girl (2013), based on Donald Spoto's biography,² Hitchcock, played by Toby Jones, is portrayed as a director obsessed with his lead actress Tippi Hedren (played by Sienna Miller), the American model and actress who also appeared in the critically-acclaimed masterpiece The Birds (1963). After Hedren declines Hitchcock's overtures, the film portrays Hitchcock subjecting her to moments of psychological torture and bullying.

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The infatuation is tortuously prolonged as Hitchcock works with Hedren in his next production, *Marnie* (1964), where unrequited desire effectively ruins their professional relationship. In the Fox-made film production *Hitchcock* (2012), starring Anthony Hopkins as Hitchcock, the director comes across as voyeuristic and covetous of his blonde lead, Janet Leigh, who plays Marion Crane, during the making of the shocker *Psycho* (1960), (See Picture A). Shown as a sexual predator, he is portrayed as violent and sadistic toward his crew. Both films construct Hitchcock as the archetypal plaything for psychoanalysis: the dirty old man, holding a preordained triangle of desire. However, this approach appears perfunctory and the author of this essay wishes to look to something more philosophical, to depict instead Hitchcock as a clairvoyant of sorts, as one of, if not the, great auteur geniuses of modern cinema. The above comments do not dismiss feminist or psychoanalytic analyses on the nature of the gaze per se, but the design of this paper is to retrieve the philosophical import of Hitchcock via Gilles Deleuze’s seminal cinema books, with rightful attention given to the effective closure of ‘classical cinema’ in Hitchcock and the unfolding of the time-image in the films of Japanese director Yasujirō Ozu (小津安二郎) and how Hitchcock shares much with Italian neorealism in the way he paralyses the character diegetically. In post-war cinema, Deleuze points to Italian neorealism, to Rossellini et al, as there is a perceived breaking of the link between perception and action. Characters are disorientated, situated in a catastrophic environment they no longer understand ethically. There is a resultant loss of faith or belief in the world, a loss in true narrative.

Using classical cinema (explained in terms of the movement image) – from the West and Japan (Ozu and the emergence of the time-image) - and Peircian semiotics as my starting point, and as a labour of love and love’s work of Hitchcock, Ozu and Deleuze, the focus of this paper is therefore on エイチ rather than エッチ. Looking beyond the triangulations of Freudian psychoanalysis, the over-coding of the male covetous gaze, the question arises how best to understand Hitchcock. Is it through the lens of the symbolic, iconic, semiotic, or psychoanalytic? Representative of what and to whom? My take on this is as follows: If one escapes the lowest common denominator of indulgent, lurid interest in the director’s erotic fantasy world, one is better suited to consider the more philosophically probing question of how films think. And as we know from Stanley Cavell’s analysis watching cinema is a philosophical act. It has much to do with thinking.

As will be seen, Hitchcock’s lesson is this: The spectator and the character are the lens. It is a question of the third eye and the fourth dimension of time. What Hitchcock’s work in effect produces is not only the scopophilia of the spectator, who derives pleasure from looking, but also, and more importantly, mental relations, a pure cinema or thought.
I shall examine an array of Hitchcock’s films through Deleuze’s philosophy and C. S Peirce’s semiotics, starting with the latter and the matter of the knife in *Blackmail*. In the famous knife sequence in *Blackmail* (Picture B) – Britain’s first ’talkie’ - there is already the expressionistic manipulation of sound, distortion in the ringing bells and the shrieks of language - techniques later to characterise much of Hitchcock’s oeuvre. The following is a brief synopsis of the scene: In a bid to maintain the semblance of normality, Alice White (Anny Ondra) eats breakfast with her parents in the shop’s parlour; the previous day she killed the man who tried to rape her. The camera hones in on the murderer; Alice’s guilt-ridden face signifies it is through her ears that we hear. A neighbour discusses the latest hearsay and repeatedly utterst ‘knife’; it sears into Alice’s and the spectators’ minds. Alice fights to resist the torment – the action stalls and the tension builds to the point at which the character is ready to act. The potential inherest in this moment until she cracks and throws the bread-knife out of her hand. The knife on the table is threatening. It can cut and kill. In this ‘mental image’ it is not so much that the thoughts of the character are revealed but the sound of the word knife is a sign that signifies the object which killed a man and the presence of a knife on the table (Colebrook, 2006, p. 70-71).

The audience establishes a relation of sign to its object (the sonic matter of the shriek to the ominous wielding of the knife). Alice and the audience are the third relation. This form of cinema produces an image of the virtual. The objects proper for the mental image are relations, symbolic acts, intellectual feelings. Using Peirce’s terminology we can say, there can be actions/reactions if there is a potential power to act (firstness), and there can only be perception of relations if relations have been actualised (secondness or actual fact); but the perception of relations qua relations opens the scene such that the spectator may finally think beyond the movements presented. In Hitchcock’s films, in the forces of relations there is an image of thirteenth (the being of law that govern facts in the future). The scheme firstness, secondness and thirteenth can be expressed more economically thus: possibility, existent and law. For Deleuze, there are not just movements or tendencies to move, but systems or frames which hold those movements together. Moreover, what we discover in the knife scene is the recombination of marks and
sounds, producing a surplus value of sense (Deleuze, 1990). Importantly, the actual and material forces produce an incorporeal transformation, a new virtual world of sense. It is a knife but one that recalls the killing of the rapist and the act that stabbed a knife into his body, cutting flesh and meat. Back in the parlour, the knife is for cutting a loaf but once wielded by the murderer, it creates a regime of crimes, criminals, laws and judgements, verdicts: it manifests an incorporeal event.

In the background there is the shrieking of pain words - knife! knife! knife! The affective qualities of the knife: sharpness in cutting not only bread, but the horror of a recent memory and the meat of a corporeal being constitute pure singular qualities or potentialities, pure 'possibles' (Rio, 2008; Deleuze, 1986, p. 102). The volume of the utterance 'knife' is increased, engineering a new thought in the spectator. The sonic matter opens out onto the virtual. At this juncture, let us remind ourselves how Deleuze rethinks Peirce in terms of his own semiology of signs. Firstness is an impressionistic and a sensible sign linked to the affection-image found, for example, in the expressions of Alice's face (faciality). Secondness is the sign to which this affection gives rise, namely a perception of action. Here the knife is held for a particular reason. The sign of thirdness goes beyond action to form mental relations, judgments, and so on. Here there is a complex interplay of knife, knife wielder, the repetition of sonic matter – knife! knife! knife! – and the intuition that something will happen.

As secondness or haecceity – which includes firstness as that which has been determined or brought into existence as a thing - it is a tool for brandishing, cutting, slicing, stabbing, lacerating. In terms of thirdness, symbolically it is the murder weapon, no longer a bread knife but the memory of the knife which killed the rapist. This symbolises meditatively quasi prospective action the threat of being caught, her actions exposed, her freedom curtailed. The knife interacts with the bread butter and is affected as such. There is a materiality of the relation, the knife affects the bread and is affected by the materiality of the brute thing as it has to 'resist' the bread's characteristics. The knife on the table can cut and kill. It threatens. It is 'a' threat. What is important to note here is the mental image's relation to the image of the virtual. On this point, Hitchcock explains to Francois Truffaut (1967) that he is opposed to actors or actresses simply conveying inner feelings to the audience through facial expressions. In this way, the audience comes to understand that they too are aware of the 'meaning' of the knife. Hitchcock explains to Truffaut:

_The wrong way to go about this scene would have been to have the heroine convey her inner feelings to the audience by her facial expression. I'm against that. In real life, people's faces don't reveal what they think or feel. As a film director I must try to convey this woman's frame of mind to the audience by purely cinematic means... Thanks to the camera, the public is now actually living the scene._

Referring to _Sabotage_ (1936)^9_ (Picture C), he says faces seldom reveal what people truly think or feel. Instead, the purview of the director is to convey a 'frame of mind' to the audience by 'purely cinematic means'. The scene
in *Sabotage* where Mrs. Sylvia Verloc (Sylvia Sidney) decides to kill her terrorist husband Karl Verloc (Oscar Homolka) with a knife is cited by Hitchcock to explain that the camera frames her hand, eyes, and moves back and forth between the two until ‘suddenly her look makes it clear that she’s become aware of the potential meaning of that knife’ (Truffaut, 1967, p. 111). The camera then pans to Mr Verloc, who is eating, and back to the hand and the knife.

This interpretation clearly compares well with Deleuze’s idiosyncratic reading of the history of cinema, which insists that ‘pure cinema’ conveys not only acts or emotions but also *the mechanisms of thought*. Cinema is a thinking machine. It follows for Deleuze that Hitchcock’s camera establishes the mental-image. This is not solely a close circuit of objects and signs but the interpretant or thought, the mental-image that is generated. At the beginning of *Rear Window* (1954), Deleuze writes that the camera pans around the courtyard and searches the apartment of the immobilised Jeff Jefferies as he sleeps. For Deleuze, it is the camera, and not the dialogue in Hitchcock’s films, which explains *why* (Deleuze, 1986, p. 201). Importantly, there is a kind of autonomous camera-consciousness motion independent of the characters’ desire. Mental relations pertain not to the analytical deconstruction of the Hitchcockian camera gaze but belong on the plane of affects and percepts. On this point, Hitchcock, in lengthy talks with Truffaut regarding *Rear Window*, says it is entirely ‘a mental process, done by use of the visual’. He insists:

*If you remember a film I made years ago called Rear Window, which was all from the point of view of one man, James Stewart, sitting in a window. Well, he had to look, then I had to cut to what he saw, then cut back to his reaction. Now, what I was really doing was showing a mental process of the man, by means of pictures, by what he saw.*

In effect, what he sees is a mental process ‘blown up in his mind’. James Stewart as Jeffries doesn’t emote as such but makes the camera show the viewer what he is in effect thinking and peering at. Expressed by the master himself, Hitchcock says in the first instance you have an immobilised man looking out. The second part shows what he sees. The third part how he reacts. Hitchcock says this is the purest expression of a cinematic idea. For him, *Rear Window* is ‘strictly pure cinema’ (Stevens, 2006, p. 268): “You do a close-up of James Stewart. He looks. You go back to him and he reacts. So you set up a mental process.” Put another way, this is what Deleuze designates as noo signs or thought-signs – which arise when movement unfurls beyond the conventions of spatial extension to intensive thought itself. For Deleuze, Hitchcock in effect perfected the action-image (secondness),
and in doing so destabilised the sensory-motor schema of classical cinema. Hitchcock is the inventor of a new kind of image which Deleuze calls the relation-image (mental-image/thought-image). The process of thought itself becomes the object of signification. As the harbinger of modern cinema (also to be found in the work of Antonioni, Godard, Resnais), Hitchcock engineers percepts and affects but doesn’t quite leave classical cinema behind. The reason for this is because Deleuze situates Hitchcock – quite rightly - as contributing to classical cinema (in terms of perceptive, affective, and active montage), and also to the modern cinema of time, despite privileging movement over time. In modern cinema, time is decoupled from movement in some sense. It appears through false movements and false continuity. Images are severed through irrational cuts. The immobile body is no longer the subject of movement or the instrument of action, but reveals time, through exhaustion or endless waiting, in spaces stricken by the trauma and horror of the modern world.

Contra Ishii-Gonzáles (Allen, 2003) who claims that the mental image was effectively perfected in the 1950s, in Rear Window, The Wrong Man, and Vertigo, I wish to argue that the mental image was already well formed during Hitchcock’s British phase of cinema in the late 1920s and 1930s, in Blackmail and Sabotage to name but two films – a point which Deleuze doesn’t make at all. There is a continuum in Hitchcock’s oeuvre from his early silent films - notably The Pleasure Garden (1925), The Lodger (1927), The Ring (1927) - leading right up to the Hollywood blockbusters. This is one of the main claims of this essay. Ishii-Gonzáles does have a point regarding Hitchcock’s American phase of cinema. The idea of camera-consciousness and mental images is indeed effectively and classically represented in the (in)famous shower sequence from Psycho (1960) – again with a knife used as the murder weapon. (Picture 1) The camera-consciousness plays a key role in articulating the thinking of the molecular and affective movement of Norman Bates’ knife-thrusts. For Powell (2007, p. 185), the camera articulates a liquid mode of perception when the camera focuses on Marion Crane lying dead on the floor. As the camera spins and falls back, it guides the spectator from corpse to the table/newspaper/money, and makes a connection, a relation; it engineers mental relations. In Cinema 1, Deleuze gives us a clever example of relations of firstness, secondness and thirdness vis-à-vis the Marx Brothers. The silent Harpo represents firstness as he is determined by affects. As such he is the pure affect-image. Chico represents secondness of the action-image since ‘it is he who takes on action, the initiative, the duel with the milieu, the strategy of effort and resistance’ (Deleuze, 1986, p. 199). Groucho is adjudged to represent thirdness: because he is the man of interpretations, a master of reasoning – using arguments, syllogism – ‘of symbolic acts and abstract relations’ (Deleuze, 1986, p. 199). For Žižek (Fiennes & Žižek, 2006), the triad of relations is explained – equally brilliantly – albeit through Lacanian psychoanalysis. Firstness represents the pre-Symbolic Real, secondness constitutes the duality of the Imaginary, and thirdness for the ternary nature of the Symbolic order (Jagodziński, 2012). Or put another way, Žižek finds this in the three Marx Brothers: it is Groucho who acts as hyperactive superego; Chico is ego, always rational, egotistic and calculating; Harpo is mute, silent, the id.
At this juncture let us summarise the above. In *Blackmail*, Hitchcock is already developing, improvising and creating new cinematic techniques; already manipulating the desires of the audience. Indeed, according to Jean Douchet,\(^10\) while Peirce considers that the interpretant sign\(^11\) is always produced by or for a rational being, for Hitchcock desire always intervenes in meaning and logical relations. The logical processes of induction and deduction are secondary to ‘to feelings of desire and fear’.\(^12\) In Hitchcock’s films, actions, affections, perceptions are a matter of interpretation, ‘from beginning to end’ (Deleuze, 1986, p. 200).

### a 1,2; a 1,2,3,4: Peirce’s ‘thirdness’\(^13\) and zeroness

The materiality of cinema is interpreted by Deleuze as a semiotic framework like any other. As such, he reinterprets Peirce’s classic semiology of triadic relations and finds a potentially limitless taxonomy of images and signs. Although he deploys Peircian terminology, albeit in maverick and sometimes contradictory ways, what is interesting is how his logic of deduction necessitates a perception image - the ‘set of elements which act on a center, and which vary in relation to it’ (Deleuze, 1986, p. 217). The perception of perception is the condition of possibility of the triadic relation. As is widely known, Peirce’s taxonomy of signs, the three fundamental Ceno-Pythagorean categories of being and consciousness are firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Yet even before firstness, Deleuze reinterprets Peirce’s conception of zeroness and finds a degree zero of images, a virtual plane of movement-images – a plane of immanence - from which signs take shape. Deleuze builds an interpretation of semiotics from Peirce’s taxonomy of signs - icons, index, symbols – which finds its way into his two cinema books and *The Logic of Sense* (1990). From this Deleuze makes the argument that Peirce and Hitchcock were both concerned with thirdness. Briefly expressed, icons, index and symbols form triadic relations consistent with firstness (the is of is\(^14\)), secondness (the existential: a physical force, a shock), and thirdness as a mediating, generating category. But, I argue, Deleuze reads the ‘sign’ contrary to Peircean orthodoxy.\(^15\) In terms of cinema history and through combining elements of Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* (1896) and Spinoza’s philosophy of the body and affect, and breaking crucially with the Saussurean linguistic semiotic tradition, what Deleuze finds is that Peirce’s triadic semiology of images is missing a relation to movement. His innovation is that Peirce’s taxonomy presupposes an image which must be deduced. He fills this conspicuous absence with the aforementioned perception image or degree zeroness – a virtual plane of movement-images from which signs form.\(^16\) Peirce’s observation about the nature of zero in *Objective Logic* (1898, p. 148) helps to clarify the nature of the pure zero:

*We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of negation. For not means other than, and other is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a first, while the present pure zero is prior to every first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which conies second to, or after everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward or inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it*
is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom.

For Deleuze, the three types of image are related to this movement-image (two intermediate types – impulse image, reflection image – and the perception image) and so we find six types of signs in Deleuze’s semiotics. Transposing Peirce’s scheme into the cinematic realm, we have the images of perception, affection, impulse, action, reflection and relation. Deleuze’s taxonomy adds to Peirce’s three categories that together define ten classes of signs (or 66 depending how you classify them, according to Liszka, 1990). Peirce’s semiotic system helps Deleuze develop a pure geometry of mental images. Building upon his study of ‘English’ analytic philosophy and the Scot David Hume in particular, Deleuze finds that relations are external to their terms. He places Hitchcock within the tradition of English thought - English empiricism - in the theory of external relations (1986, p. x). With Hitchcock, Deleuze claims, we find a new series of ‘figures’, figures of thoughts, which appear in film history. Hitchcock’s cinema of relation is situated squarely within this philosophy of external relations.

Crucially, in precipitating a crisis of the action-image it is Hitchcock who introduces the mental-image (Deleuze, 1986, p. 203). What is of interest here is the relation between thirdness, as an intermediary, because thirdness is essential for understanding the science of relations. Deleuze is interested in thirdness not so much in terms of actions as symbolic acts but in the sense of interpretation and intellectual relations, that is to say, how Hitchcock implicates the spectator in the sets of relations. The spectator does not engineer images on the basis of what is immediately presented but on the basis of memory and by themselves filling in the blanks. The spectator makes connections between the different images and forms rhizomatic, mental connections. Thirdness emanates from a complex interplay of relations between the look of the characters, the camera, and the spectator. Moreover, film manifests through the functioning of three parts: the director, the film in itself and the reactions of the spectator (Deleuze, 1986, p. 206). It affects the role of the audience and as such ruptures the sensory-motor of classical cinema, according to Deleuze’s schema. As a paradigmatic example, the screen of Rear Window reveals that the protagonist of modern cinema is the wandering ‘seer’, a voyeur, not the agent. It is the ‘seer’ who exhausts the conventional modes of perception but perceives as a consequence something intolerable, unbearable and overwhelming: it is this something that cannot but be responded to. Deleuze’s point is that there is no people to respond to the crisis of the age: no proletariat waiting for intellectual deliverance by the vanguard. No, it is the artists who must prepare for the arrivant as Derrida insists. This is the condition of possibility of difference, of politics, of responding to the intolerable, to the shame of our lot. In Cinema 2 (1989, p. 3), Deleuze finds in Rear Window and Vertigo and in Italian neorealist film the sense that the audience’s perceptions of the sensory-motor image have been inverted, in other words, the agent has been thwarted. Jeffries in Rear Window has been reduced to purely optical situations and little besides. Yet, modern – crisis-ridden - cinema is not judged pessimistically as such as it contains the seeds of the visionary, of thinking ‘the people yet to come’. The character themselves – for
example in Hitchcock’s films Rope (1948) - have become spectators. There is something to be extracted from this; something to be thought.  

At the neurological level, the mental-image engineers a 'relation' to its object in the brain. It demands an act of ‘interpretation’ from the spectator to think what the image pertains ‘to’ – that is to say, thoughts, emotions, further relations. In Rear Window, because the chair-bound Jeffries forms mental images through the lens of the camera: he is reduced to a pure optical situation. As the mental image and relation-image become the object of an image, and in weaving a ‘fabric of relations’, Hitchcock’s liminal art brings cinema to completion, or at least pre-war classical cinema whence understood as a passage from the movement to the time image. Affects are engineered by the relationship between body and brain (Marks, 1998), between perception and memory. Relations manifest as a consequence of the ‘paralysing’ of characters but also by forcing the spectator to have an active relation to the film. The spectator is affected and prompted to engage cognitively – to think afresh. It thus becomes a question of how one responds to images, both emotionally and neurologically.

For Barbara Kennedy (2000), Hitchcock qua director deliriously desires to touch the bodies of his audience – to make them sweat, jump, blush, feel nauseous. Hitchcock’s films - spine chilling and tingling, blood boiling, hair raising, heart thumping, skin crawling - demand an embodied reading – quite different from rigid psychoanalytic models - as film spectatorship is a multimodal experience – sounds trigger tastes, sights excite touch, smells provoke salivation. The sensory and perceptual ‘I’ that is the spectator is destabilised within ‘flows, energies, movements, and fragments’ (Kennedy, 2002). It is relational and machinic.

The idea of embodiment can be found in the cinema of Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948), which aims to find ‘new ways of creating bodily sensations’. Modern cinematic spectatorship is embodied, not as an autonomous ‘I’, but as an experiencing body full of kinetic rhythms, neuro-chemical balances. It has a relationship to the brain, to synaesthesia, to the haptic, to a polyvalence of semiotic chains, not to psychoanalysis. Reflecting upon this new ‘postmodern scopic regime’, Paul Elliot (2011, p. 13) insists with both the autonomous visual sense and a fixed ontological subject under assault, understanding the mechanism of vision is therefore premised more on a compositional grasp of the other senses, the body and the sensorium. This necessitates thinking the sensorium in terms of neuroscience – and more concretely, how touch, smell, taste and other sensual experiences work upon vision. On this matter it is Deleuze who has much to say on the brain’s relation to the image.

In brute everydayness, the action-image and movement-image tend to disappear. In pure optical situations, one discerns an emancipated sense, a ‘direct relation’ with time and thought. There is a delinking of perception and action, and an extension of the opsign - optical signs - a ‘sliver’ of time, rendering time and thought perceptible. Another example of how this cognitive demand is placed upon the spectator is found in Suspicion (1941) (Picture D), where the illuminated glass of milk being carried up the stairs becomes a focal point for the spectator. In Hitchcock’s films, we find the demarcation and perfection of the movement-image (in terms of the unbroken
sensory motor continuity of the protagonist) and the emergence of time-images, where time is no longer indirectly presented via the montage of movement-images. Thought is without image.

As mentioned previously, Hitchcock remains tied to the classical film paradigm because mental relations are regulated by the sensory-motor schema. Yet the images of thought Hitchcock engineers push the mental-image to its limit. Colebrook (2006, p. 71) explains this point well: "Faced with affects and actions, the spectator is presented with the power to think as such, what it means to think." Deleuze accords Hitchcock a pivotal place in cinema as he transcends the action-image to produce mental relations, exuding 'a kind of vision'. Deleuze (1995, p. 54) writes: "It’s not a matter of the look, and if the camera’s an eye, it’s the mind’s eye." It is a third eye. The spectator is not looking for representations of his own life, but is participating in the game of relations established by Hitchcock.

'The last of the classic directors', 'the first of the moderns' (Deleuze, 1995, p. 54) – this is Hitchcock. At the beginning of Cinema 2, Deleuze discusses camera-consciousness and how it produces mental connections in time. He says Hitchcock has a premonition of this, which will come true (1989, p. 23), adding Hitchcock envisions 'a camera-consciousness which would no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into'. Here then the role of the mental image is illuminated through the notion of the virtual as it describes the power to think as such, a power to form relations. Hitchcock presents an image of relations that forces the problem of the movement-image to crisis point. According to Deleuze, Hitchcock is thought-provoking because he refuses to repeat the clichéd set of whodunit gestures and instead examines 'the set of relations in which the action and the one who did it are caught' (1986, p. 200). Although Hitchcockian cinema remains classical in the sense that it is inextricably bound up to the sensory motor schema and the passage of logical relations, it also heralds the crisis in the movement-image.

**Automatism, fourth dimension and the thought-Image**

Filmmaker and film theorist Jean Epstein also finds in the automatism of the cinematographic image a resemblance with mental operations. In the genre of cinema itself, he finds a new way of thinking which is transformative of our relationship to the world. For Epstein, through automatism as photogénie one can evince a true cinema, for example, the way cinema captures a burning cigarette in an ashtray.24 For Epstein, this is demonstrated in the capacity of the camera to imbue 'beauty, grace and presence' in the most banal of objects and gestures. Both Epstein and Deleuze find in this new way of thinking a direct access to time.25 Time in the cinema is akin to the fourth dimension added to the other three spatial dimensions. Deleuze on this matter writes: "Time,
in cinema, seems to be in things." Camera’s automatism was the source of a new subjectivity ‘riveted’ to the machine.

H₂O

*For me never before and never again since has the cinema been so close to its essence and its purpose: to present an image of man in our century, a usable, true and valid image in which he not only recognises himself, but from which, above all, he may learn about himself.* (Tokyo-Ga, Wim Wenders)

Hitchcock to Ozu: In pre-war cinema, Deleuze also finds the slight breaking through of a ‘very pure time-image’, which emerges in Japanese cinema in the 1930s and 1940s. In the still-life moments in Ozu Yasujirō’s films, Deleuze finds an ‘unchanging form of time’ which aids him in explicating upon the loosening of the sensory-motor link. Ozu and Hitchcock become key conduits for the emergence of the time-image. In Ozu’s films, life is simple. It is man never ceases to complicate it, or as Deleuze says, by ‘disturbing still water’ (*agitant l’eau dormante*).

Deleuze writes (1989, p. 14):

*There is a time for life, a time for death, a time for the mother, a time for the daughter, but men mix them up, make them appear in disorder, set them up in conflicts. This is Ozu’s thinking: life is simple, and man never stops complicating it by ‘disturbing still water’.....*

There is no strict distinction between, on the one hand, banal, everyday life, and on the other, a moment of resoluteness or decision. Deleuze writes (1989, p. 15): "It is men who upset the regularity of series, the continuity of the universe.” It is therefore not only Hitchcock’s work that we find a mutation in the cinematic image. Ozu’s work is equally productive of a uniquely non-logocentric cinematic consciousness. In the still-life forms and everyday banality of empty spaces of Ozu’s exquisite cinema, Deleuze discerns the incipient time-image. Such a form of time does not itself change, but despite everything, everything changes in it. He writes (*Cinema II*, p. 18):

*In everyday banality, the action-image and even the movement-image tend to disappear in favour of pure optical situations, but these reveal connections of a new type, which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the emancipated senses into direct relation with time and thought.*

Deleuze therefore reads Ozu’s films and finds a relationship of time, a sense of *durée*, ‘a little bit of time in its pure state’ (*un peu de temps a l’etat pur*). In a philosophical sense, Ozu is read as depicting time in a pure state. The vase in *Late Spring* (1949) (Picture E) conveys pure time. The scene indicates how we inhabit and operate within time. Ozu is analysed by Deleuze in terms of the way he utilises space. Such disconnected spaces are
explored by the camera: they become any-space-whatevers (espace quelconque). One space becomes just as good as another and this disturbs Deleuze. Ozu's spaces afford pure contemplation. What remains is the any-space- whatever, the screen in front, the paralysis of relations, the non-place (Bradley, 2011). Chaos cannot be ordered in landscapes destroyed by war or in cities laid waste by mortar fire, aerial assaults or the A-bomb (Deamer, 2008, p. 371). Despite the somewhat arbitrary periodisation of cinema pre-or post- World War II, Deleuze claims that the Second World War marks the collapse of the sensory-motor schema and with that moment passed, the time-image in Western cinema begins to emerge. A more detailed breakdown of the transformation from classical to modern cinema is categorised by Deleuze as follows: around 1948 in Italian cinema, 1958 with the French New Wave, and around 1968 with New German Cinema. As the inventor of opsigns and sousigns (visual and auditory components of a time-image film), Ozu's cinema manifests purely optical and sound situations, which are strictly actionless. Deleuze will come to consider this event as provoking something intolerable and unbearable. He (1989, p. 19) writes:

*A new type of character for a new cinema. It is because what happens to them does not belong to them and only half concerns them, because they know how to extract from the event the part that cannot be reduced to what happens: that part of inexhaustible possibility that constitutes the unbearable, the intolerable, the visionary's part.*

Through the destruction of Italian cities, the shattering of the American dream (the action-image in definitive crisis), and the lack of trust in democracy, modernity signifies the collapse of trust and confidence in belief itself. In the preface of Cinema 2, Deleuze finds in the post-war period, a myriad of situations in which characters in films no longer know how to react, and a proliferation of spaces which they no longer know how to describe. The conditions of movement have changed. Deleuze writes (1989, p. 166): "We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film."

A broken link exists between man and the world (Deleuze, 1989, p. 172). Modern man has a being-in-the-world albeit one dominated and petrified by pure optical and sound situations. This is so to the extent that Deleuze finds a new race of mutant characters in early modern cinema who perceive rather than acted, 'they were seers'. Crucially, the power of modern cinema is not to produce illusions and dreams but to restore a belief in the world and to reconnect man to what he sees and hears. It is not so much the question of how cinema manufactures illusions but rather how it restores belief (Deleuze, 1989, p. 176). On this point, it can be said that although we might find ourselves uncomfortable with the reduction of the history of cinema into a broad distinction between movement and time-images, it is worthwhile to remember that Deleuze is not suggesting there is a precise historical distinction to be made between classical and modern cinema but rather is noting the lack of belief in the action-image as such – a point which, I think, Rancière (2006) and others crucially miss. In discussing how to
respond to the intolerable, Wim Wenders finds it is Ozu who depicts the transformation of life in Japan, the slow deterioration of the Japanese family and national identity. It is a function of cinema to make us feel that something isn’t right. On this point, Wenders echoing Deleuze insists Ozu gets to the truth of the banal.

Conclusion

This paper writes otherwise than a single focus on Hitchcock as the quintessential peeping Tom, the voyeur, or scopophilic as such, for it is the immobilised seer entangled within petrified relations that is worthy of further attention. Whilst Laura Mulvey’s critique (1989) of the male gaze produced a paradigm shift in film studies, the analysis of pure cinema and the thinking of mental relations need not necessarily adopt to what I see as a reductionist form of interpretation. The remark in Rear Window by Stella (Thelma Ritter), Jeffries’ nurse, on her patient’s and societal paralysis, mentioned at the beginning of the paper, captures much of the spirit of schizoanalysis. This is precisely Deleuze’s point also because for him it is a question of forging relations with the outside, not burying oneself ever deeper into the theatre and plague of the preordained unconscious.

Lurking or insinuating himself between Freud and Deleuze is Žižek, whose analysis whilst exceedingly interesting posits itself vis-à-vis Hitchcockian cinema at the level of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Yet as the schizoanalytic direction of this paper has been focused on affects using Peircean semiotics and Spinoza, it is at odds with Žižek. He is right to ask how do we know what we desire. But his answer that desire is artificial, because there is nothing spontaneous or natural about human desires seems unsatisfactory.

As we know with Žižek, spectators are taught to desire and cinema is the ultimate pervert art but this paper makes the case that Hitchcock at the beginning of his career – developing and extending the montage ideas of Sergei Eisenstein – created a cinema that thinks. Running throughout Deleuze’s explication of mental relations, we find Hitchcock as one of the founding fathers of cinema, an auteur genius. Moreover, I believe we can save Hitchcock from the reductionist bilge which fails to think film as philosophy, as a thinking thing, when we think less about the gaze of the man behind the lens and more to do with the lens that thinks, guides, desires, and directs the viewer to covet. To reduce Hitchcock’s masterpieces to another case of male triangulated desire and little else sadly misses the point. Hitchcock’s cinema is pure as it operates through mental relations. While Deleuze understands this and thinks it with Peirce’s assistance, Žižek has to reinterpret Lacan to get at the real.
We have found that Hitchcock plays a central role in Deleuze’s cartography of the cinema. Hitchcock remains thought-provoking primarily because of the perceptual innovations in his life’s work. The idea that the camera can manipulate the spectator is one which compelled Deleuze to think about film’s connection with the brain. The task of the philosopher is to think these concepts and to create signs which transcend their signification, to go beyond them, to form new ideas and couplings pertaining to both cinema and philosophy: to formulate a becoming-cinema of philosophy and a becoming-philosophy of the cinema. To fabricate the new. Fabricating and fabulating a fresh and unique way to view the relationship between philosophy, film and aesthetics, Deleuze thinks cinema _qua_ art form in terms of its encounter with philosophy: as a mutual becoming. Film alters our modes of thinking about movement and time because – as a manifestation of pure thought, pure immanence and sensation - cinema thinks with affects and precepts. In terms of neuroscience, the brain is seen as ‘a continuously changing process’ and one ‘fundamentally connected to movement and time’ (Pisters, 2012).

Following on from Bergson, Deleuze considered cinema as a means to perceive time and movement as a whole. The question is what affects are created in art and what percepts are produced in philosophy. Philosophy becomes ‘cinematic’ as film-philosophy. Film becomes not just ‘philosophical’ but manifests affective and aesthetic thought - a kind of _cinematic thinking_. As such, cinema as a medium of thought thinks. Deleuze finds in Resnais’ films such as _Hiroshima Mon Amour_ (1959) a certain kind of philosophical activity. His characters do not talk about philosophy, they do not parrot the director’s Weltanschauung. What Deleuze insists upon is that Resnais ‘invents’ a cinema of philosophy and creates an unprecedented ‘cinema of thought’. He forms ‘a rare marriage between philosophy and cinema’ (Deleuze, 1989, p. 208-209) and this raises questions about the shame of being amidst the destruction and death of the 20th century and the utopian moment which considers the ‘people yet to come’.

On this point, Deleuze writes with great acumen, and in a vein at odds with the catatonia of Adorno’s thought: “The great post-war philosophers and writers demonstrated that thought has something to do with Auschwitz, with Hiroshima.” Cinema thus reveals, questions and probes in its own way. Affects on screen describes time. Film affects the spectator because the medium is not dominated by the content of the monologue, dialogue or oratory of a particular actor or actress but the perceptual and temporal medium which directly acts upon the brain (Deleuze and McMuhan, 1998). The body and the senses are affected as a whole. There is an interplay between affect and cognition; perception is enjoined with action. It is images which start to narrate: images form thoughts. Spurred on to think by the auteur genius of Hitchcock and the sheer timeless majesty of Ozu’s films, Deleuze’s philosophy asks many questions about how images affect the diagram of body and brain, perception and memory.
Bibliography


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**Filmography**


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Endnotes

1 Hitchcock is better interpreted without a sole focus on Catholicism, original sin, a guilty subject or a God demanding retribution (Deleuze, 1986, p. 202).


3 This is captured best in Richard Lindner’s painting Boy with machine (1954) which Deleuze and Guattari introduce in Anti-Oedipus.

4 Although it is widely known that Hitchcock referred to his actors and actresses as ‘cattle’ in the 1930s, the rendering of them as ‘automatons’ is not limited to the Englishman. French film director Robert Bresson (1901-1999) employed non-actors or ‘models’ as he wanted them to be automatons. He aimed to direct the spectator with ‘relations of images’, not with conversation or facial reactions. Deleuze (Cinema II, 1989, p. 172) describes Bresson’s automatic characters as pure, ‘bereft of ideas as of feelings, reduced to the automatism of segmented daily gestures, but endowed with autonomy’. Moreover, the relation between thinking and the cinematic image is transformed from the movement-image to the time-image. Both produce different affects in the spectator through an experience of shock. The ‘nooshock’ is consequently different in the two image-regimes. Through montage, Sergei Eisenstein’s shock is intellectual and consistent with the powers of rational and logical thought.

5 The time-image is a cinema of spectatorship, un cinéma de voyant. This is not much that the spectator sees what the director covets, but more a question of cinema of spectatorship. The character is reduced to a gaze – not in terms in what he covets – but in terms of impotence – again not in terms of sexuality – but in terms of movement. It is a misreading to see Deleuze as thinking Hitchcock in terms of a dirty little secret, a perverted scopophilia. The treatise on the time-image shows precisely that the character is somehow torn out of context and place. This is the cinema of the non-place. The character watches as a non-participant in time. His gaze in some way is blind: he has his eyes torn out. To understand relations correctly, it is through a novel reading of thirdness understood in the Deleuzian sense. My point is that the cinema of relations occurs in Hitchcock’s right at the beginning of his career. On this point Deleuze, in Cinema II: The Time-image, (1989, p. 205), says: ‘If one of Hitchcock’s innovations was to implicate the spectator in the cinema, did not the characters themselves have to be capable - in a more or less obvious manner - of being assimilated to spectators?’


7 If ‘A produces an event B as a means to the production of an event C’ (Misk, 2004, p. 21), the knife produces the event of the memory of murder, prompting Alice to throw the knife. The sonic matter of the word knife produces the unbearable, prompting Alice to lose control.

8 Hitchcock describes his films in terms of postulates, or set of relations, which undergo logical development.

9 Joseph Conrad’s novel The Secret Agent: A Simple Tale (1907) formed the basis for the 1936 film. This should not be confused with Hitchcock’s film, Secret Agent, also made in 1936, which was based on short stories by W. Somerset Maugham.


11 The interpretant in Peirce differs from Saussure’s dyadic conception of a sign, which consists of a signifier and signified.
12 Douchet, p. 63.

13 Let me explain a little further on the nature of thirdness and mental relations. Peirce argues that in any ordinary triadic relation, there will always be a mental element. While brute action is secondness, mental processing involves thirdness. Thirdness pertains to the category of continuity, regularity, habit, rule, law, interpretation, representation, and thought. Peirce insists thirdness is a conception of mediation, through which a first and a second are brought into relation. According to Bogue (2003, p. 67), speaking in terms of the affection-image, firstness is ‘something that refers to nothing but itself, quality or potential, pure possibility’. Secondness is ‘something that refers to itself only through something else, existence, action-reaction, effort-resistance’ and thirdness is ‘something that refers to itself only in relating one thing to another thing, relation, law, necessity’.

14 See Laura Marks’s essay ‘Signs of the Time’ (Flaxman 2000, p. 196) where she explains the notion of firstness very clearly. For Peirce, she says, it is ‘a mere quality’, such as ‘red, bitter, tedious, hard, noble’. Firstness as prereflexive and atemporal is both a simple quality and possibility: it is being-in-itself. It can be a feeling, a ‘raw’ feeling, an immediate, pure perception. It is only possible rather than actual because it is consciousness which interprets it. It is pure possibility (of actions, relations, or interpretations to come) rather than consciousness. being-in-itself.


16 The genetic sign of the perception-image is the degree zero or ground on which all other images are based. It is deduced from thinking the function of the movement-image. Deleuze insists there is a ‘zeroness’ prior to ‘firstness’. The sign can be understood in terms of Bergsonian philosophy as the construction of an interval between two movements opens an empty place. The zeroness is the ground for ‘firstness’ (affection-image), ‘secondness’ (action-image) and ‘thirdness’ (relation-image).


18 We can express Peirce’s triadic schema of semiosis, the production of meaning, as follows: A is red (firstness), A collides with B (secondness as existence or actuality, brute fact), A gives B to C (thirdness). For Peirce, as we know, everything can be reduced to these categories. As representational beings, we are signs. Importantly, thirdness as representation (intentionality forms the basis of representation) is irreducible to firstness or secondness.


20 Contra Badiou (2005), Deleuze is resistant to the idea that there remains some potential to transform men’s minds and souls via the classical constructions of the sensory-motor image. Although both Badiou and Deleuze concern themselves with locating a fitting subject of modern cinema, a subject of political cinema, it is Deleuze who concludes that our lot is futural. Transformation belongs to those yet to come, those who are yet to be constructed. Julian Reid in his timely edition on the critique of fascism by Deleuze (Evans, 2013, p. 84) suggests that the time remains out of joint, not yet right for those who will respond to the intolerable, to the unbearable, to the shame of the lot of being human. Reid writes: “This is a cinema of incapacity, of paralysed and traumatised characters who, living in the margins, struggle to muster the courage to fulfil their own convictions. Of characters who, overwhelmed by what they have seen, fail to extricate themselves from the abyss with
which they are then faced.”

21 For Kennedy, cinema grapples with experience in fresh ways outside the purview of restrictive codes and the orthodoxies of the psychoanalytic model. Kennedy (2000, p. 46) claims that because film is a ‘visceral vital and dynamic aesthetic experience’, it is the Deleuzian paradigm which is able to chart ‘a post-semiotic post-linguistic paradigm’ (p. 5) to engineer different ways of interpreting the screen. She finds in Deleuze’s notion of Spinoza-inflected affect, a neo-aesthetic theory beyond the psychoanalytic language of desire and pleasure and shrink-rapped notions of subjectivity and identity. In other words, Deleuze’s philosophical endeavours can be harnessed to orchestrate what Rodowick calls ‘an exuberant new aesthetic’ of the cinema (1997, p. 11).

22 Deleuze thinks cinema in terms of haptics - how we see and feel: the viewer perceives with all the senses. The spectator thinks with the skin, and bodily emotions connect to thinking as consciousness is nothing more than a sensual filter.

23 In Cinéma 1, Deleuze explains that in classical cinema, action imposes itself upon time; it determines the duration of a scene and as such the next scene is a reaction to this action. In Cinéma 2, he will say that the time-image is based on pure thinking. It does not follow the scheme of action-reaction, but it can evoke a time that is prior to movement. Time-images exhibit different layers of time, which converge within single points of present.


27 Ozu’s films are classified as bearing witness to the ‘crisis of the movement-image’, or crisis of the action-image, while heralding the ‘direct’ time-image. It is in Ozu’s film, the ‘inventor’ of opsigns, according to Deleuze, where we see the breakdown of the sensory-motor scheme, in the sense that what is seen can no longer be extended into action.

28 We can say actionless because in Ozu everything is ordinary or banal. As Deleuze (1989, p.14) says: “[E]ven death and the dead are the object of a natural forgetting.”

29 Deleuze writes in Cinéma II, p. 14: "An ordinary term goes out of sequence, and emerges in the middle of another sequence of ordinary things in a relation which takes on the appearance of a strong moment, a remarkable or complex point. It is men who upset the regularity of series, the continuity of the universe.”

30 Mulvey explains the obsessive voyeurs and Peeping Toms gain sexual satisfaction from watching, ‘in an active controlling sense’, an objectified other (1989, p. 17). This is the Lacanian objet petit a, the object cause of desire which signifies the unattainable object of desire in the other. This is expressed in Lacan’s matheme of fantasy $<>a$, which describes the link between the split subject (torn between consciousness and unconsciousness) and the object of desire.


This paper examines the significance of film director Alfred Hitchcock (1899-1980) within Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical oeuvre (1925-1995). I think Hitchcock’s contribution to ‘pure cinema’ in particular in terms of what Deleuze isolates as thirdness and ‘mental relations’. Using Peircian semiotics, we shall refer to Hitchcock’s first ‘talkie’, Blackmail (1929), as a starting point to show that proto-’mental relations’ were a feature of his art at the very beginning of his cinema career. I shall examine Ozu’s films to consider the idea of ‘a little time, in its pure state’ and the notion of the time image. Lastly, I shall explore the crisis of the movement-image and situate Hitchcock as straddling the divide of classical and modern cinema in order to ask the question of how and in what respect cinema thinks or how does film do philosophy.

Keyword: Hitchcock, Deleuze, cinema, Peirce, semiotics

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