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An Idea of *politeia* in Ancient Greek History

Sumio TAKABATAKE

Introduction

An idea of *politeia* appears to have played an important role in ancient Greek history. In 411 BCE, for example, when some of the Athenians in Samos decided to establish an oligarchy in their homeland, they dispatched Peisander to Athens to do what was necessary to set up the new constitution there. At the same time, however, they also ordered him to change the *politeiai* of allied subject states on his way into oligarchies. Then Diitrephes, who had been elected to take command of the Thracian district, arrived at Thasos and abolished the democracy there. But Thucydides let us know that “things at Thasos turned out just the contrary to what the Athenian oligarchs expected”; for the collapse of the democracy was the very state of affairs which some Thasians, who were banished by the Athenians and took the side of the Peloponnesians, coveted for and they revolted from Athens two months after Diitrephes left their country. And Thucydides concluded, “in my opinion this was the case in many of the other subject cities as well.”

This episode shows that the Athenians who aimed at oligarchical constitution must have thought that if they changed the constitution of the subject states into oligarchy, the same as Athens, they could gain a stronger relationship with them. This belief must have made them induce the upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government which the Samians had recently risen to avoid. Although their intention of making oligarchic Athens safer was unsuccessful, a strong belief in *politeia* can be seen here. Their conduct must have originated from a belief that friends can easily be turned into enemies and vice versa through a change of *politeia*, which we may call a strong “*politeia first*” belief.

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1 This paper is based on the manuscript titled “A Short History of the Idea of *politeia*”, which was read at the 11th Japan-Korea-China Symposium on Ancient European History held at Waseda University in Tokyo on 14-17 September, 2017. But the title was changed and some additions and modifications were made, especially section 3 is newly added in this paper.

2 A professor in the Faculty of Literature, and a research fellow of the Institute of Human Sciences at Toyo University.

3 Thuc. VIII 64. 2-5. Two citations are from 64. 5.

4 Thuc. VIII 63. 3.

5 This belief may have been based on a general idea that δῆμον ὁμοίῳ φίλον, but the crucial importance is given to the *politeia* is peculiar.
In this paper, some aspects of the idea of politeia will be examined; when and how it originated, how it affected people in classical Athens and how it worked in Antiphon and Aeneas the tactician.

1. The beginning of the politeia

In Homer and Hesiod, neither a word politeia nor passages which suggest such thinking cannot be found. Also, the poets and philosophers by the seventh century BCE had not seemingly told any of the ideas relating to the politeia.

In the sixth century BCE, Solon, who established a new politeia, should be examined. In his poetry he is proud that he had taken neither side of the commons nor the wealthy;

The commons I have granted privilege enough,
not lessening their estate nor giving more;
the influential, who were envied for their wealth,
I have saved them from all mistreatment too.
I took my stand with strong shield covering both sides,
allowing neither unjust dominance.

fr. 5 (=Arist. Ath. Pol. 11.2-12.1)

A cancellation of all debts, a prohibition of debt slaves and a confirmation of four classes and division of the rights into these four classes are thought to be a main point of Solon’s reform. Probably while he has made clear the civil class by first two policies about the debts, he intended to weaken the opposition among the citizens by dividing the wealthy by means of a creation of the new class of pentakosiomedimnoi as an uppermost class and allowing some political rights also to the poor. Inferring from his poetry, he laid the emphasis on the polis of Athens and had an intention to promote the unity of the Athenians by appealing to their pride. Recognizing two strata in citizens, the wealthy and the commons, he tried to make concord among them by inciting the patriotism and to strengthen the polis of Athens. For him Athens or the Athenians must be free and must not be in slavery of someone, a thought which appeared in his poetry of criticizing the tyranny of Pisistratus.

As from the cloudbank comes the storm of snow or hail,
and thunder follows from the lightning flash,
exalted men portend the city’s death: the folk
in innocence fall slave δουλοσύνη to tyranny.

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6 Translation of M. L. West is used for every citation of Solon’s poetry
7 e.g. fr. 2, fr. 3.
Raise them too high, and it’s not easy afterwards
  to hold them. Now’s the time to read the signs.

fr. 9 (=Diod.Sic.9.20.2)

If by your own fault you have suffered grief and harm,
  put no part of the blame upon the gods.
You raised these men up, by providing bodyguards,
  and that’s why wretched slavery’s your lot.
Your trouble is, each of you treads the fox’s way,
  but your collective wits are thin as air.
You watch a crafty fellow’s tongue, and what he says,
  but fail to look at anything he does.

fr. 11 (=Diod.Sic.9.20.3 : following fr.9)

Around the time of Solon, the word tyrant τύρανος or tyranny τυραννίς started to appear, which suggests that a critical recognition against a politeia of the rule of one man had worked already. And for the part of tyrants they tried to find the way to cooperate with each other with a clear recognition of their status. This appears typically in a story of tacit advice of Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus, to Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, or in a story of a friendly converse about the good fortune of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, and Amasys, the king of Egypt. It is perceived even slightly that the same politeia attracts the same one. Then the dispute is said to be provoked regarding the three politeiai, monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, when Darius I came to the throne at last (c. 522 BCE). Although it is doubted whether this took place really at this time in Persia, some other evidences as well show that the classification of the politeia into three types, according to the number of its rulers, must have been established by the end of the sixth century BCE, even if proper terminology was not yet sufficient. The tyrants realized where their power came from and what politeia came out when such support disap-

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8 According to a TLG search, the earliest example appears in Hymn. in Marten of Homeric Hymn whose date is uncertain. The first appearances, the date of which is certain, are Archilochus’ (fr. 19, fr. 23) and Semonides’ (fr. 7 l. 69) in the middle of the 7th century BCE. In these examples, they show the person who likes and can enjoy magnificent and gorgeous life. Then in Alcaeus some examples are found, in which criticism against Pittacus, who was elected aisymnetes, is implicated. Solon’s Examples are in fr. 32, fr. 33 and fr. 34.


10 The place where this way of thinking clearly appears in Herodotus is the address of the Spartan envoys concerning the proposal of Alexander, the Macedonian king. Hdt. VIII 142. 5.

11 Hdt. III 80-82. Herodotus insisted on its historicity but “the dominant theory was once that the three speeches belonged to an Attic sophist treatise, inserted by Herodotus in his text with minimal adaptations” (D. Asheri et al., A Commentary on Herodotus Books I-IV, Oxford, 2007, 472).

12 Herodotus himself pointed out that some Greeks did not believe this story (III 80, 1). But the supposition that democracy appeared only in Greek world might be a kind of prejudice. Further, see ibid. 471-473.
In c. 499 BCE Aristagoras of Miletus changed his tyranny and set up a democracy ἴσονομία (where equality of political rights were allowed to everyone), “so that the Milesians might readily join in his revolt”\textsuperscript{15}. And he also banished the tyrants and established democracy in other Ionian poleis, and moreover, handed those tyrants whom he had taken out of the ships that sailed with him against Naxos to their respective poleis, with which he desired to build friendly relationships. These facts show the recognition that the states’ policy changes according to the politeia. This recognition made Sparta plan to return Hippias to Athens to resurrect tyranny in c. 504 BCE.\textsuperscript{16} The plan was stopped by the opposition of the Spartan allies, the most persuasive of which was a speech by Sokles, the envoy from Corinth. He pointed out the cruelty of tyranny, describing some episodes of Cypselus and Periander, the Corinthian tyrants, as an example. This was so effective that all the other allies entirely agreed with what he insisted on.

In the fifth century BCE, most people in Greece felt utter disgust with tyranny and indeed any notable tyrant is not known. Instead people felt tyrannical power in the Athenian conduct and regarded the whole of a polis Athens as a tyrant. The main politeiai in this century were oligarchy and democracy. The former was thought to be related to the rich πλοῦτοι and the latter the commons δῆμος. And generally, the former was the few ὀλίγοι and the latter the many πολλοί, while both were contrary to each other and often in conflict.\textsuperscript{17} This recognition appeared typically in the insistence of Diodotus in the debate on Mytilene; “The people δῆμος in all the poleis are now on your side and either do not join in rebellion with the few ὀλίγοι or, if they are forced to do so, become at once the enemy of the insurgents”\textsuperscript{18}.

In the following section, what kind of idea of politeia can be found in classical Athens will be examined.

2. The politeia in Athens

After Solon the Athenians experienced the tyranny of Peisistratus and his son and then went on to democracy. Based on the constitutional reform of Cleisthenes and having survived the sufferings of the Persian war, Athenian democracy was completed with Pericles. Then on the way to completing democracy, what took place on the politeia? Aristotle said, “The Athenians everywhere destroyed the oligarchies, the Lakedaemonians the democracies”.\textsuperscript{19} But if we closely examine the facts, it may become clear that what Aristotle said is not always the case.

At first an example of Samos will be looked into. When the Samian revolted at the end of the Fifty Years in

\textsuperscript{13} The movement mentioned next proves the existence of the idea of politeia. The earliest evidence in classical texts may be Pinder, Pyth. 2. 86-88. Heraclitus was said to write “not on the nature but on the politeia” (T 1 (15) D-K). If it is true, it seems not impossible for him to classify the politeia according to the number of rulers.

\textsuperscript{14} Hdt. IV 137-138. Also the case of Coes of Mytilene, Hdt. V 11, 38.

\textsuperscript{15} Hdt. V 37. 2.

\textsuperscript{16} Hdt. V 91-93.

\textsuperscript{17} cf. Arist. Pol. 1291b 7-13. Conflicts had already appeared in the sixth century, e.g. in Naxos, Hdt. V 30.

\textsuperscript{18} Thuc. III 47. 2.

\textsuperscript{19} Arist. Pol. 1307b 22-24.
439 BCE, “they were forced to come to terms” προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ after a nine-month siege. Some thought Athens also established a democracy at this time in Samos, based on two facts; (i) Diodorus Siculus told, “he (Pericles) restored the democracy and returned to his country” (ii) it was normal practice for Athens to establish a democracy. A commentary by S. Hornblower said, “neither (i) nor (ii) is decisive: Diodorus may have described what he ignorantly assumed to be the truth. And ‘normal practice’ was not doctrinaire”. In Samos later in 412 BCE “the rising of the people δῆμος against the powerful men δυνατοί took place”, which shows the attempt was made to establish a democracy. Then if an establishment of democracy in 439 BCE is assumed, an oligarchy must have been set up between 439 to 412 BCE, but no record has informed such events. Also, the inscription which may contain the needed information lacks many letters, to which readings favorable both to democracy and to oligarchy can be supposed. Hornblower himself takes “the powerful men” as ones in democracy and suggests that institution might be formally democratic, but that ‘powerful men’ would in practice dominate; he probably supposes Athens established democracy in 439 BCE. It is not certain how such regime can be actualized, but even so it is quite certain that Athens cooperated with oligarchy-oriented states. Other cases that Hornblower pointed out are Miletus in 450’s BCE based on Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol. III 11, Chios on Thuc. VIII 9. 3, and Potidaia on Thuc. I 56. 2. Some or all of them must not be wrong.

On the other hand, it is worth examining the sources which are thought to prove that the Athenians forced democracy. Firstly, a decree on Erythrai will be looked into. This inscription also lacks many letters and its interpretation is very laborious. Its lines from 8 to 16 should be read as the following:

120 men selected by a lot out of Erythraians should form a council. ...in the council those not less than thirty years old should serve. ... No one to serve twice within four years. The inspectors ἐπίσκοποι and garrison commander φρούραρχος are to draw lots and set up the current council. In the future, the council and the garrison commander are to do this prior to not less than 30 days before the term of office expired.

Based on the fact that council-members are selected by lots, it is supposed to be modeled on the Athenian council of the Five Hundred. Also from the fact that its members are to swear loyalty to “the people of the Erythraians πλῆθος τῶν Ἐρυθραίων” in line 22, the establishment of democracy by the Athenians is inferred. But the council itself does not prove the establishment of a democracy and as for the latter word it can be used also for the “people in power” (in oligarchic Erythrai). There is neither word nor evidence in this decree which

20 Thuc. I 117. 3.
21 Diod. XII 28. 4.
22 Thuc. VIII 21.
23 IG I’ 48 l. 22. τῶι δέμωι τῶι | Σαμίοι or τῆι πόλει τήι | Σαμίοι.
24 IG I’ 14. Many readings are proposed by Meritt. The third edition of IG is, however, very cautious about it. The reading of this paper is owed to the new IG.
proves the meeting of all the citizens δῆμος in Erythrai. Another inscription dated around the middle of the fifth century BCE records the decree as the following:

(A) 1-3 : ... neither allotment ... nor honours. ......
13-25 : Judgement to be given by nine men from each of the tribes whose property is worth not less than 30 staters, having sworn the same oath to the council to judge according to the laws and decrees. Not less than 61 men are to fill the court. ....
(B) 14-33 : There shall be prosecution against whoever himself is living contrary to the law, having born of a freedman or a foreigner. Against anyone whose father or older ancestor held public office or received a position by a lot ....
(C) 3-9 : ... But if he is from a bastard, let him be inspected and let there be enslavement.

What can be deduced from these contents is an oligarchic regime in which the political rights are determined according to birth and property. The date of this inscription is not certain. If the date is earlier than the former inscription or IG I’ 14, Athens should have established a more democratic constitution by IG I’ 14. But this possibility is faint, because an inscription in which so many details are written is much rarer in the early fifth century BCE and its content also suggests the later date; it may be not necessary to regulate “neither allotment” without the regulation on the ‘lot’, such as in IG I’ 14, and the number 61 may be more than half of the 120 that appeared in IG I’ 14, which must have already existed. And the fact that Erythrai was still paying the tribute in the early 430’s shows that the Athenians had allowed an oligarchic subordinate state.

The reading of another inscription about Kolophon which is thought to confirm the democratic constitution is also supplementary, and another possible reading δῆμος is proposed, which makes its constitution uncertain by using the same logic as in the case of πλῆθος as mentioned before. So far, the enforcement of democracy by Athens is not found at least before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. It is plausible that the Athenians coped with each situation of the allied countries flexibly and attempted to keep them under control regardless of their politeia. There is no indication that the politeia is thought to be almighty in Athens.

With such attitude towards foreign countries the democracy came to the stage of completion in the polis Athens itself. Three notable features are to be pointed out in the Athenian democracy around the beginning of

27 Engelmann & Melkelbach dated this inscription before 454 BCE, but they acknowledge this date is uncertain (pp. 25-26). Also, see R. Osborne, The Athenian Empire, LACTOR I’, p. 114.
28 IG I’ 37 = Meiggs & Lewis 47 l. 49.
29 Welwei, op. cit., 184.
the Peloponnesian War in the later part of the fifth century BCE.

1. Citizens are defined by pedigree and thought to be one family. It is in 451 BCE that the Pericles’ citizenship law regulated that those who were born of two Athenians should be Athenians.

2. Almost equal rights were granted to the lowest class of the citizens. Solon’s four classes were still valid, but had become substantially meaningless.

3. The development of Athenian democracy corresponds to the growth of the polis of Athens which resulted in the establishment of the rule of the so-called Athenian empire.

The situations in these three features did not remain unchanged. It is likely, for example, that the definition by the Pericles’ law was not strictly applied at least in some time during the Peloponnesian war. Criticism of the main feature of the democracy in no. 2 grew also during the war and the Athenian Constitution of pseudo Xenophon appeared. Its real author, whose name is not known but called ‘Old Oligarch’, is an Athenian, for he uses Attic Greek and mentions the Athenians as ‘us’. His writing date was put between 446 BCE and 415-2 BCE, and 425-4 BCE is thought to be most plausible. The author’s position and understanding is clear from the beginning;

“Now, in discussing the Athenian constitution, I cannot commend their present method of running the state, because in choosing it, they let the worst people $\piονηροί$ be better off than the good $\chiρηστοί$. Therefore, on this account I do not commend it. Since, however, they have decided to have it so, I will demonstrate how well they preserve their constitution and accomplish those other things for which the rest of the Greeks criticize them.” (I 1)

In sum the Athenian democracy is the constitution in which ‘the worst is better off than the good’ and it is ‘well preserved’. The author stands on the side of the good and sees them (=the people) critically. “They everywhere assign more to the worst persons, to the poor, and to the common people than to the good men : in this very point, it will become clear, they preserve their democracy” (I 4). They know very well that the ignorance and inferiority of the worst people is more useful than the virtue and wisdom of the good. The state on the basis of such a way of thinking would not be the best, but the democracy would be best preserved that way.

“For the people do not want a good government under which they themselves are slaves ; they want to be

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30 They are $\ἀναγκαῖοι$ “connected by natural ties,” Antiph. I 4.
free and to rule. Bad government is of little concern to them.” (I 8)

Based on the value of the good men and taking the point of view of the ‘good and bad’, his criticism went on to depict the various bad aspects that the democracy gave birth to. For example, the wantonness of slaves and metics became so worse; the slaves enjoyed almost the same life as citizens; this is because the Athenians needed to take a portion of the slaves’ earnings in order to keep their navy; they also needed metics because of many different trades and their fleet; this is why they enjoyed a similar equality in speech. (I 10-12)

Then how is it possible to improve the democracy? His answer is pessimistic;

“Under such circumstances, therefore, I cannot say that it is possible for affairs at Athens to be arranged other than they are now, except to take away a bit here and add a bit there; a substantial change is impossible without removing something from the democracy. It is possible to find many ways to improve the constitution, but it is not easy to find satisfactory ways of improving it while preserving the democracy untouched, except, as I have just said, by adding or taking away a little.” (III 8-9)

New and peculiar is his view that the democracy is based on the profit of the people, and that it is difficult to improve it in spite of the fact that it permits to practice moral malice every day. This view had a great influence on the intellectuals who were not satisfied with the current policy of the Athenian democracy. The democracy became for the first time a target for subversion from a moral point of view. A change of the politeia got a new meaning when the overthrow of the democracy was perceived as the pursuit not of an interest of the rich, but of the moral goodness. It is not clear how deep and wide this perception infiltrated into the society. But sometime during the Peloponnesian war when bitter frustration spread over the society because the war was not going well, this perception could provide a foundation of change. Especially when the Athenians were busy in suppressing revolts in many places after the Sicilian expedition failed in 413 BCE, it might be natural that a changing of the politeia loomed large as a new hope, even if the proposal of Alcibiades had not been made.

Then, how was Antiphon, who was said to be a leader of the Four Hundred, involved in the stream of making a new constitution? In the next section this will be investigated.

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[33] The idea that the politeia is an educator τροφή of the men appears in Pl. Mx. 238c. Aspasia is said to address that the good politeia is an educator for good men, the opposite for bad men, and applaud the Athenian politeia.


[36] The Athenians believed or were made believe that if they change democracy into oligarchy, the King would take their side and support them (Thuc. VIII 47. 2, 53. 1). Later the oligarchs, so-called the thirty tyrants believed that the Spartans would never become friendly to the democracy (Xen. Helf. II 3. 25).
3. Antiphon and the politeia

It may be permissible to start from the standpoint that sophist Antiphon and orator Antiphon was the same person, though no one cannot offer its decisive proof.\(^{27}\) He became an orator after long experience as sophist and gained a reputation for cleverness because “he was the one man most able to help any who were involved in contests, either in court or before the assembly, in case they sought his advise.”\(^{28}\) He was around seventy in 411 and it can be easily supposed that those who were not satisfied with the current politics gathered around him and made him a leader in the oligarchic movement. In this section, some possible details of his involvement in this movement will be considered, followed by an evaluation of his position on the idea of politeia.

The problem of the identity of Kallikles, who appears in Plato’s Gorgias, should be clarified first. He is a chief interlocutor in Gorgias, who stayed in his house. Socrates talked with Poros and Gorgias in the first half of this book and then with Kallikles in the rest (exactly speaking, 57.5% of the book), stimulated by his own theory of justice. Kallikles, showing goodwill to Socrates, persists in his own theory and tried to construct counterargument, while Socrates intimately pointed out their similarity; “I notice that you and I are at this moment in much the same condition, since the two of us are enamored each of two things—I of Alcibiades, son of Kleinius, and philosophy, and you of two, the Athenian Demos, and the son of Pyrilampes.”\(^{29}\) He knows not only his belonging to the deme of Acharnai and his recent entry into the political career, but also his friendly relationship; “I know, Kallikles, that four of you have formed a partnership in wisdom—you, Tisander of Aphidna, Andron, son of Androtion, and Nausikydes of Cholarges.”\(^{30}\) Almost all named persons except Kallikles were thought to be real, that is, their existences were confirmed by other sources. But the reality of Kallikles was not confirmed by any other sources.

According to Zeller in 1920, there was few who thought he was a sham character, but many believed in his reality under the false name.\(^{41}\) And his identity was considered variously but he was usually identified with Charikles, a member of the Thirty, who was well-known and referred to in many places.\(^{42}\) He first appeared as a commissioner of inquiry concerning the mutilation of the Hermai and other bad omens together with Peisander and they were thought to be strong supporters of the democracy at that time.\(^{43}\) Then he was one of the generals in 413 and became a member of the Four Hundred in 411. Later in 1959 Dodds challenged the problem of the identity of Kallikles again and supposed that he was real but died in his youth so that nobody other than Plato remembered his name.\(^{44}\) MacDowell in his book on Andokides I in 1962 emended Kαλλιδης on the manuscript

\(^{27}\) My conclusion on this problem is that it is not strange if there existed a person who could work both as sophist and as orator in the middle of the fifth century Athens, S.Takabatake, Antiphon and his Age, Kanagawa, 2011 (in Japanese), 329-337.

\(^{28}\) Thuc. VIII 68. 1 (Loeb translation).

\(^{29}\) Pl. Gorg, 481 d (translated by W.R. M.Lamb).

\(^{30}\) Pl. Gorg, 495 d, 515a, 487c.

\(^{31}\) E. Zeller, Der Philosophie der Griechen : in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung 12, Leipzig, 1920, 1330 Anm.3.


\(^{42}\) And. I 36.

into Καλλικλῆς (§127), insisting in his commentary that three persons, Καλλίδης here, Καλλιάδης in Lys.XXX 14, and Καλλικλῆς in Plat. Gorg., are the same one and the former two should be read Καλλικλῆς. After these two studies the problem of the identity of Καλλικλῆς seemed to become less attractive.

Every argument has no decisive evidence and based on likeliness. The degree of the likeliness is not so different that any of suppositions can be preferred. Plato might have assumed the name for Charikles or made an error in his memory, and a copyist also might have mistaken Καλλικῆς for Καλλίδης or Καλλιάδης. But if Antiphon and his involvement in the Four Hundred is looked at on the supposition that Kallikles and Charikles is the same one, an interesting picture can emerge.

Charikles and Peisander worked together as colleagues in 415, and Andokides’ short mention of their evaluation suggests a close relationship at that time. Early in 411 Peisander came back from Samos to Athens and engaged in a difficult maneuver to change the constitution into oligarchy. It is difficult to imagine that he did not make any contact with Charikles during this maneuver. Charikles, then, must have sought a consultation with his friends who, as cited above, “have formed a partnership in wisdom.” He must also have talked to his loving Demos, the son of Pyrilampes, for whom Antiphon had written one of his masterpieces, Against Erasistratos concerning the Peacock. A consultation, in no doubt, took place with Antiphon, who was an acquaintance of Demos and was, as Thucydides notes, “most able to help any who were involved in contests, either in court or before the assembly.” Charikles (Kallikles) himself had shown his idea of contrasting law and nature in Plato Gorgias, in which the influence of Antiphon (sophist) could be recognized. They must have relied upon Antiphon as an old sage, probably along with a tendency to seek wisdom from older people, which appeared, for example, in electing ten elderly probouloi when the news of the failure in Sicily reached. Then how did Antiphon treat them?

Antiphon wrote the Abuse of Alcibiades and critically referred to his unlawful and licentious character. The date of this pamphlet (rather than oration) is uncertain, but, even if it was written several years ago, he must have tended towards opposition to the return of this ambitious person he criticized. He, however, must not have felt satisfaction with the current situation of Athens, as can be drawn from one of the passages of Aristophanes.

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47 fr. 44(a)(b)(c) = P. Oxy. 1364, 3647, 1797.
48 Thuc. VIII. 1. 3.
49 For me it seems possible to date this from during the maneuver of Peisander to immediately after his departure to Tissaphernes, pace the normal view which dates it in 418-7 when efforts were being made to bring about the ostracism of Alcibiades, and also pace Dover, in the time of the Four Hundred.
50 Under the opposition there may have been criticism on him for easily changing his homeland from the ethical viewpoint common to those in the same generation, such as Socrates and perhaps Phrynichus.
Peisander insisted that oligarchy was necessary for Alcibiades to return to Athens with great money from the Persian king. What Antiphon could do at this situation was to make people coming around him recognize the merit of oligarchy itself, apart from the money Alcibiades would bring. “What do you want to do?”, “You want to make Athens good, don’t you? Then you should not have resort to Alcibiades, such an eccentric!”, “What sort of constitution is your ideal? You should pursue your ideal.” These must be his questions and advises to them. He may have read or known the Old Oligarch’s thought, which was helpful for him to persuade them. In response to their instructor the younger men coming around him, such as “a partnership in wisdom”, discussed an ideal constitution feasible for them to set up. Their results may be reflected in the two constitutions the one-hundred anagrapheis proposed later.\(^{52}\)

Around the time of the proposal of the two constitutions a failure of the negotiation between Peisander on the one side and Alcibiades and Tissaphernes on the other began to appear. The possibility of Alcibiades’ returning diminished vastly and then presumably unsatisfied factions focused on the merit of oligarchy itself. It is easily supposed that an adviser Antiphon, who had urged on such direction, was set up as their leader. Originally he was not oligarchic, since he composed speeches for others to deliver in court, the practice which would have been forbidden under the oligarchy; his ability in speech was especially useful under the democracy, but not under the oligarchy.\(^{54}\) His strong dislike for Alcibiades may have caused him to look for the way to separate his returning from making the oligarchy. But now he was made a hope of oligarchy and then he must have asked a help from an old friend and now dismissed general Phrynichus, who, as a general, minutely objected to the proposal that Alcibiades could come back with great money by changing the constitution into oligarchy and insisted, “As to the allied states, who had been promised oligarchical government because Athens too was going to abandon democracy, I am sure that an Athenian revolution would not bring the rebellious cities to make terms with an Athenian oligarchy and that the cities still in the empire would not be more loyal to Athens on that account. Those cities did not want to be subjects, whether under a democracy or an oligarchy; either was fine, provided they were free.”\(^{55}\)

Given the later movement, the Antiphoneans considered how to overcome the crisis and reached a conclusion that a truce should be made with Sparta. The oligarchy first appeared with relation to bringing the money which would support the finances of the war, that is, in order to keep the war going. An idea of truce must have been revolutionary in a sense. Some might have agreed to it but some might not have. Their explanation must have been that the oligarchy would make a truce more attainable because the Spartans had an oligarchical consti-

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\(^{52}\) Vespae 1299-1303. Antiphon and Phrynichus there can be the persons who are discussed here, as MacDowell and Mastro-marco pointed out. They are called the Phrynichus group and it suggests that Antiphon, Phrynichus and others were a companion at least at that time (422 BCE) and probably from their younger time.


\(^{54}\) So defended he himself in the apology of his trial after the collapse of the Four Hundred, in frg. 1a.

\(^{55}\) Thuc. VIII 48. 4-6. A slander of Peisander and dismissal from the general is stated in Thuc. VIII 54. 3. Translation by W. Blanco is used here.
tution, and they decided to hide their purpose to the people.\textsuperscript{56} They contrived a meticulous and perfectly legal procedure to establish oligarchy and entrusted its beginning to Peisander.\textsuperscript{57} He succeeded in persuading the assembly to change the constitution into oligarchy by a threatening way but could not keep his word that he would recall Alcibiades. He needed to put an end to what he proposed. Approaching him with everything ready, they could easily make him execute their plan and also a reconciliation with Phrynichus could be attained without difficulty. Their plan worked and the Four Hundred was set up.

From the scanty sources the role of Antiphon can be surmised as the above. For him the \textit{politeia} was not decisive, but just an expedient. He pointed out the merit of the oligarchy itself because he wanted to prevent Alcibiades from returning to Athens, and he made a detailed plan to establish the oligarchy because not only the people who came to rely on him sought it according to his advice but also he needed rights for truce to be achieved. Antiphon was a leader of the oligarchy who did not believe in oligarchic merit but desired to save Athens from crisis. For him Phrynichus must have been a friend who made him reassured anytime by outstanding talent for insight. He was assassinated when he and Antiphon came back from the negotiation with Sparta in vain. This must have been a great shock to him, while probably the fact that the changing the constitution was not useful for Sparta to change their attitude was not so big surprise to him. He himself could not bring the Four Hundred together any more and it fell into an internal collapse without showing any merit of this \textit{politeia}.

4. Aeneas the Tactician and the \textit{politeia}

In the fourth century there could be seen a curious situation: on the one hand the \textit{politeia} was a big problem to discuss for philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and they consider what form of \textit{politeia} should be better for the man; on the other hand there were many meetings and partings of \textit{poleis} without paying any attention to the \textit{politeia} in the real politics. For philosophers “a \textit{politeia} is a thing which nurtures men τροφὴ, a noble one good men, an evil one bad men,”\textsuperscript{58} but for politicians or orators “no human being is naturally either an oligarch or a democrat: whatever constitution a man finds advantageous to himself, he is eager to see that one established.”\textsuperscript{59} Then the power of the idea of \textit{politeia} seems to have been weak in this era. In this section, however, clarification will be made not from a general survey but from an oblique way, that is, from reading one book on which I have worked in recent six years to translate and give commentary, \textit{Poliorketika} or \textit{How To Survive Under Siege} by Aeneas the tactician.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} Theramenes said, “it was the people itself, as everybody knows, which voted for the government of the Four Hundred, being advised that the Lacedaemonians would trust any form of government sooner than a democracy.” (Xen. \textit{Hell}. II 3. 45). He was in upper class as a son of Hagnon and could hear their explanation, but the description of Thucydides seemed it unbelievable that they explained their purpose and future view officially.

\textsuperscript{57} Thuc. VIII 67.

\textsuperscript{58} Pl. \textit{Mx}. 238c.

\textsuperscript{59} Lys. XXV 8.
Aeneas the tactician may be a general of Stymphalus, a small polis of Arcadia, and may have had many military experiences (sometimes as a mercenary leader) especially in the eastern area. On the basis of them he wrote many guide books on war, only one of which was remained, that is, Poliorketika or How To Survive Under Siege. It is interesting because the author has an ordinary polis in his mind and the situation of such a polis can be seen in this book instead of a big polis like Athens.

Aeneas has not used the term politeia in his book. But he used some terms which might suggest his thinking about the politeia. Here we will attempt to approach his thinking from the examination of his usage of such terms:

1. νεωτερίζω, νεωτερισμός <to revolt, revolution>: Aeneas used these words ten times in his advices to keep watch for a revolution:¹ hostages should be divided under surveillance, for in this manner they would be least able to begin a revolution (X 25); guard duty should be short in time, large in unit and frequent in change, so that they cannot start a revolution (XXII 4-6); arms imported for sale and put on display in the agora or in the shops and markets should be treated with caution not to be used by those who wish a revolution (XXX 1). As for gatekeepers he says, “they should be well-to-do εὔποροι and men who have something at stake ἐνέχυρα in the city, that is to say, wife and children”, and continues, “but not men who, because of poverty ἔνδεια, or the pressure of some agreement, or from other stress of circumstances ἄλλην τινὰ ἀπορίαν, might either be persuaded by anyone or by themselves to foment a revolution” (V 1). For him a revolution often takes place by approaching of outsiders to those who are not satisfied with the current situation. His recognition is also confirmed from other words, too.

2. προδίδωμι, προδοσία, προδότης, πρόδοτος <to betray, betrayal, traitor, betrayed>: Aeneas used these words ten times in total. He used them five times in Chapter XXXI, where secret messages are dealt with; every case is related to how a traitor sent a secret message about his betrayal to the enemy who stayed outside the city. In XXII 7 concerning the watching of the citizens he advised that everything should be changed as frequently as possible; because this is the best way to minimize opportunities for a traitor to betray anything to outsiders’ hands τοῖς ἔξω or to receive anything from the enemy. These usages confirm the recognition deduced in the previous terms.

3. δημοκρατία, ὀλιγαρχικός <democracy, oligarchically minded>: Aeneas used these words only once in Chapter XI. Also, the words δῆμος <the people> and its opposition πλούσιοι <the rich> were used respectively nine times and eight times, and all appear in this chapter with one exception of the latter used in opposition to

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¹ It was published in July 2018 by the University Press of Toyo University. An argument in this section is represented in Japanese in this book, pp. 255-258.

² The number of his using is based on the index of my would-be-book, which was arranged in consultation with D. Barends, Lexicon Aeneium : A Lexicon and Index to Aeneas Tacticus’ Military Manual “On the Defence of Fortified Positions”, Assen 1955.
χρεωφειλέτης <debtor> in XIV 1. Chapter XI is a peculiar chapter where he cited five cases of plots from “the Book” ἐκ τῆς βίβλου. In three cases out of the five, that is, Argos, Herakleia Pontica and Corcyra, a plot was depicted to be hatched in a conflict between the people and the rich, aiming at a change of politeia, democracy or oligarchy. It may also be the case in Chios though it is not mentioned. This type of recognition does not appear in other chapters other than Chapter XI. Winterling pointed out this fact first and went on further to argue that the source of these cases is not Aeneas himself but the other unknown “Book”, which was interpolated later. Whether it was interpolated later or was original is not sure, but it can be said from the survey of the whole texts that he was scarcely interested in a conflict between the people and the rich, while he was interested in avoiding the plots.

4. ἐπιβουλή, ἐπιβουλέω, συνεπιβουλεύω <plot, to lay a plot against, to be a party to a plot> : Aeneas used these terms twenty-one times and they are one of key terms in his treatise. All of them have in the core a meaning of a plot which leads to subvert the current politeia. And what he implicated in every case was to prevent such a plot. He gave specific warnings about a plot; if there is only one open space in the city and the plotters are first to occupy it, it is dangerous for the besieged in the city (II 7); in order to frighten and deter plotters such proclamations as so-and-so should be made (X 3), and so on. He advised what kind of men should be selected for military purposes and said, “they must be loyal and satisfied with the status quo: the existence of such a group plays a role of fortress ἀκρόπολις against the other plotters” (I 6). His interest was in avoiding the plots, as is stated before.

Considering from the examination of his usage of these terms, the most important thing for Aeneas is not a politeia itself but its stability. Insisting on the importance of leading the mass of citizens into unanimity ὅμονοια, he proposed as one of the means to reduce or completely cancel the interest of debts, and, in case of especial danger, even some or all of the principal money (XIV 1). Ste Croix once wrote, Aeneas “affords some interesting evidence of the fear by the propertied class of revolution prompted by the burden of debt”. But if this proposal is based on the fear by the propertied class, why must he also pay attention to the rich τοῖς πλουσίοις, annotating “how this could be done fairly and without pain to the rich ... has been clearly explained in my book Procurement” (XIV 2)? Rather his interest in avoiding the plots or revolutions should be perceived in this proposal, as is deduced from the survey of the whole texts. What made him to propose such measures must be the fear not by the propertied class but by a man who wished to protect the current politeia.

Then where did his wish come from? From his experience of war must be an answer. For a man who is responsible for defending the city, the disorder in the very place must be unfavourable and he would naturally take


every measure to avoid it. At that time, to select those who were the most prudent and most experienced in war τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους τε καὶ ἐμπείρους μᾶλις τα πολέμου, whether they were rich or poor, as the case of the leaders or the men around the leaders, was important. In addition the leaders and officers should be not only prudent and vigorous, but also one who would expose himself to the greatest risk from a change of regime. In the core of his thoughts lay the idea to reduce the possibility of causing disorder from human conditions and to wage war efficiently.

Conclusion

In the previous four sections four aspects of the politeia was examined; how it was confirmed, how it worked in fifth-century Athens, how did Antiphon see it, and how it did not matter with Aeneas. What can be said from this?

It is undoubted that the politeia had a great meaning for some ancient Greeks: the (oligarchic) Athenians planned to establish the same politeia in the subject states; Pseudo-Xenophon saw moral malice in democracy; Plato and Aristotle considered the best politics from the point of view of the politeia. There existed what one may call “politeia first” view, that is, the belief that the politeia regulates everything; in other words, changing the politeia means changing everything. But in a small polis, which Aeneas had in his mind, the people could not change their mind according to the politeia which the other, stronger poleis forced them, as Phrynichus once criticized. Small poleis, therefore, could hardly engage in a conduct on the principle of “politeia first”, although situations were so various in each of nearly one thousand poleis that any generalization could not be attained. What Aeneas could advise was to recommend unanimity ὁμόνοια and to select prudent persons. This was an advice which led not to establish a certain politeia, but to defend the current one.

The Athenian recognition reached the point that they discerned moral goodness and badness in the politeia. At least some oligarchs believed that oligarchy was morally better than democracy. But they did not insist on that belief to the outer world. They did not say, like “πλούσιοι aller Länder, vereinigt Euch” (The rich of all the cities, unite), nor did they make any effort to spread their belief. For example, they tried to change the politeia of Thasos, when they decided to establish an oligarchy in their homeland, but it was just a formal change, not a change intended to awake sympathy between them. Their “politeia first” principle was directed only inward, while outward it became “Athens first”.

But inside Athens this principle could not succeed in proving its truth. The Four Hundred, the oligarchy which was thought to be morally better than democracy, revealed its inability to cope with the actual problems; it could not stop war with Sparta nor prevent its companions from breaking up into several factions. This took

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64 His idea can be drawn from I 4, 7, III 4, V 1, XV 3. The citation is from I 4.
65 I 7.
place in too short time to recognize its defect, and the Thirty Tyrants came up seven years later. But this govern-
ment, too, took the policy to meet the needs of the moment and not to improve and strengthen its politia.

In the fourth century Athens lost its imperial power, and needed to use diplomatic strategy. In diplomacy
nothing other than the profit of the polis had any meaning and difference between politia had little room to
play its role. Athenian politicians or orators had to stand on the position similar to Aeneas the tactician. De-
mosthenes and Aeschines must have considered their policy to cooperate with or depart from Thebe, Phocis or
Macedonia according not to the politia but to the profit of Athens. In this situation the idea of politia did not
loom large in the real politics, and thus remained as an implement to analyze politics among philosophers.
Abstract

An idea of politeia appears to have played an important role in ancient Greek history. The fact that the Athenians aiming to establish the Four Hundred tried to change the politeia of the subject poleis into oligarchy shows their strong belief in the politeia. They believed they could change people’s mind by controlling the politeia. This “politeia first” thinking, however, did not continue long. This paper pursues when and how an idea of politeia originated and how it worked in the conduct and words of Antiphon and Aeneas the tactician. By this a true nature of the “politeia first” thinking in ancient Greece is clarified.

Key words: Ancient Greece, constitution, Solon, Antiphon, the Four Hundred, Aeneas the tactician, politeia

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